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Summary 
The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a 
moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional 
questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be 
addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in 
this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at 
least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of 
a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general 
conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the 
corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The 
sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic 
beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in 
the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is 
brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important 
conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, 
is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their 
empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for 
their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. 
Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general 
requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. 
Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing 
as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how 
justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must 
provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. 
It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs 
which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these 
requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which 
ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. 
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CHAPTER 1 - The epistemological problem 
The question that this thesis addresses is the venerable problem of 
immediate justification: whether the beliefs about the world that we acquire 
in the course of sensory experience are justified or reasonable beliefs, and if 
so, how we are to recognize, understand and explicate that justification 1 
1.1 The implications of naturalization for a theory of empirical 
justification 
The way in which an answer to the question of immediate empirical 
justification is arrived at here, is: firstly, to examine the concept of 
'naturalized epistemology' as it has been defined in some recent debates and 
to sketch its general consequences for the answering of epistemological 
questions; secondly, to follow up the specific consequences of naturalization 
for a theory of perceptual belief; and lastly, to show that these two 
antecedents lead to a theory of prima facie justification for immediate 
beliefs. The argument-structure of the thesis is thus 'If a naturalized 
approach to epistemology (with all that entails) is accepted, and if one adopts 
the theory of perceptual belief that follows from it, then the justification 
proper to perceptual belief will be seen to be prima facie justification, 
marked by the belief's sensory character'. 
In arguing for the first premiss, we need to distinguish the minimal or 
essential conditions for naturalization, from the consequences of 
naturalization for the theory of knowledge 2. There has been a good deal of 
discussion and debate in the literature as to what exactly a naturalized 
epistemology might be 3; agreement exists however that the impulse towards 
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naturalization is grounded at least partly in the desire to achieve for 
epistemological theories the same degree of pragmatic success, testability, 
general acceptance and predictive power which the theories of physical 
science enjoy. 
This sweeping characterization of science needs a word or two of 
qualification. Not all sciences exhibit the desirable characteristics 
attributed above to 'science'; some sciences are more testable, successful, 
acceptable and predictively powerful than others. No epistemologist would 
want to construct theories on the model of a chancy science like meteorology, 
for example. There is, moreover, even among the 'hard' natural sciences, a 
notorious lack of success, certainty and consensus both at the very big end of 
the scale, {the nature and size of the cosmos, and related questions), and also 
at the very small end of the scale, (on the number, nature, history and 
function of sub-atomic particles). 
The naturalistic epistemologist who sets up a scientific model of explanatory 
success, therefore, is thinking of 'science' in the sense in which classic 
Newtonian physics is paradigmatically a science. It deals with unproblematic 
and easily recognized objects whose properties and behaviour are explained 
and predicted with a satisfactory degree of exactitude by a network of 
theories. The theories are mutually supportive and confirmed by their 
explanatory and predictive successes. The naturalist, who hopes to achieve 
something of the same for epistemological theory, therefore embraces some 
degree of scientific empiricism in methodology. This position may be 
contrasted with that of the epistemologist with a Cartesian bent, who 
eschews empiricism in favour of pure reasoning as a method. 
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It is argued in Chapter 2 that this commitment amounts only to adopting a 
heuristic approach: the epistemologist sets out in the first place to discover, 
in the light of the available evidence, what knowledge, belief and 
justification are, and does not set out to construct definitions of what they 
should be . On the strength of the naturalistic epistemologist's heuristic 
method, the following principles (argued for and discussed at more length in 
Chapters 2 and 3) may be attributed to him, and acceptance of these would be 
enough to make a naturalized epistemologist of their holder: 
(i) the attitude that epistemological definitions are to be arrived at 
primarily by observation and description rather than by prescription and 
stipulation; 
(ii) a realistic, anti-sceptical tenet to the effect that we may suppose most 
of the mental states which are generally thought to be states of knowing, 
are in fact such; this means starting from the phenomena of knowledge 
rather than the definition of knowledge, as the Cartesian does; 
(iii) the view that the material causal connections between the world and 
the epistemic agent (perceptual processes) have an important role to play in 
constituting knowledge and justification, and that the epistemologist 
must give them commensurate weight in her theories. 
If these are the conditions for a naturalized epistemology, what are its 
consequences or effects? One general feature of any epistemology which is 
based on the above three assumptions, is that it tends to have an 'empiricist' 
or Lockean, rather than a 'rationalistic' character, in the sense in which Plato 
and Descartes are labelled 'rationalists'. Another general feature of any 
Chapter 1 - The epistemological problem 4 
epistemology which emphasizes material causal connections, is that its 
theory of justification tends to distinguish sensorily-acquired beliefs from 
reasoned beliefs, and is thus foundationalist rather than coherentist in form 
(which is not to say that non-naturalistic theories may not also be 
foundationalist in form). There are many, more particular consequences of 
naturalization for the specific questions of epistemology. In the following 
chapters, we shall examine only those consequences which are important for 
a theory of justification. They include: 
- a thesis of doxastic involuntarism (supported by {iii) above) concerning 
sensory empirical beliefs, which means that epistemic agents have beliefs 
about their immediate environment thrust upon them, rather than choose 
which they shall hold. (That this fact nevertheless does not diminish the 
agent's. epistemic responsibility will be argued for in a later chapter.) The 
implication of this for a definition of justification is that in appropriate 
circumstances, the belief carries its justification 'on the face of it' and 
appears self-evidently acceptable to the agent. 
an admission of the corrigibility of all beliefs; if one looks at actual 
beliefs as the naturalized epistemologist does, then the holders of such 
beliefs are ordinary fallible people and not ideally rational agents, and any 
single belief may prove to be false, even beliefs of the kind which make up 
knowledge states. This is in contrast with a Cartesian view on which to be 
justified is to be certain of the truth of what is known, and with a Platonic 
view on which corrigible belief (doxa) is not to be confused with the mental 
state which figures in knowing (episterna). The naturalist holds that if agents 
are ever to be justified in their beliefs, and so also to achieve knowledge, 
then justification and truth must not be too closely identified. The theory of 
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prima facie justification allows for the ever-present possibility of error, via 
its defeasibility clause. 
- an enriched view of beliefs and propositions, on which beliefs are more 
than just a positive attitude to a bare Fregean proposition. Beliefs are seen as 
complex psychological states in which causal dependence relations with the 
material world, as well as relations to other beliefs of the agent, are 
intrinsic (cf Chapter 5); their contents, that is, propositions, are seen as 
essentially perspectival, determined by context and, especially in the case of 
sensory beliefs, as including indexical elements. The implications of this for 
the concept of justification are that empirical justification is linear in 
structure. Many of a person's beliefs about the world depend for their 
justification on other beliefs , which may also in their turn depend on other 
beliefs of that person, but ultimately, justification stops in beliefs which are 
justified without depending on further beliefs of the agent, the so-called 
'basic beliefs', which coincide with the class of sensory beliefs. 
Against this background, there are two related questions which suggest 
themselves as obvious problems for the naturalistic epistemologist: (i) is a 
naturalist bound to hold a materialist theory of mind, as would seem likely, 
and if so, how can one avoid the ill effects of the reductionism involved? and 
(ii) can anyone successfully reconcile the empirical objectives of science and 
the conceptual goals of epistemology, or are they conflicting ends, success in 
one of which must militate against success in the other? These are important 
underlying issues which will come in for discussion, in one aspect or another, 
in other parts of the thesis, so it will be useful to give a preliminary 
indication of where I stand on them. 
Chapter 1 - The epistemological problem 6 
1.2 Two underlying themes 
The following two issues have not been dealt with explicitly anywhere else in 
the thesis, and it seems advisable therefore to make clear at this initial 
stage, why they have been treated as they have. 
1.2. 1 Materialism as the naturalized epistemologist's theory of mind 
I shall argue in this section that the naturalistic epistemologist's theory of 
mind is bound to be a materialist one, but that the acknowledged difficulties 
of reductionism which such a theory entails, are not a serious handicap in the 
present context, for various reasons which will be explained. The sort of 
materialism adopted in this thesis offers specific advantages for solving the 
problem under consideration, that of the justification of immediate empirical 
beliefs. 
It is a truism to say that epistemology studies the status of, and the criteria 
for, knowledge claims, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge. One characteristic project of the epistemologist is the definition 
of justification, another, the explication of the relations between belief and 
knowledge. On a naturalistic view, this kind of project is best carried out by 
close study of the mental state of knowing or believing that something is the 
case. It seems likely then, that the naturalistic epistemologist will have 
some underlying theory of mind, and though it may not be explicit, it will have 
an influence on how the epistemological issues are tackled. 
Given that naturalistic epistemology is methodologically an empirical, 
heuristic exercise, it follows that within it, mental states will be conceived 
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as accessible in some way to empirical observation by a third party who is 
not the subject of the state, like Qany of the observable phenomena that 
science concerns itself with. It seem likely therefore, that the naturalistic 
epistemologist is going to have some kind of materialist theory of mind. 
It appears that while a materialistic theory of mind is a necessary condition 
of naturalistic epistemology, it is not a sufficient condition for it. If a 
naturalistic epistemology implies heuristic principles (in a sense to be 
discussed in Chapter 2), then it implies some kind of a materialistic theory of 
mind. It does not follow that everyone who holds some kind of materialistic 
theory of mind, however, is committed to a naturalistic epistemology. In the 
first place, the materialist philosopher of mind might choose to deny 
altogether that knowledge is best analysed through the mental state of 
knowing, preferring to see it as a body of consistent and true propositions. 
In the second place, it is possible to concede that knowledge is essentially 
tied to mental states, and furthermore, to hold that mental states are 
physically instantiated, and yet at the same time deny the naturalist's claim 
that epistemic states and properties are best approached via their physical 
instantiations. That is, it is possible to hold out for the autonomy of mental 
states from, and their irreducibility to, physical states, thus by implication, 
accusing the naturalist of reductionism. 
The anti-reductive position insists on the sui generis nature of mental 
states, and their distinctness from the physical brain states which 
instantiate them. The anti-reductivist has two kinds of argument to back this 
position: the arguments against reductionism and the arguments for the 
autonomy of psychological phenomena. 
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Reductionism of the psychological to the physical has two aspects. 
Ontological reductionism holds that a mental state like a belief, is really just 
a certain brain state and that what we loosely or mistakenly think of as the 
belief's properties are really relations, powers (causal efficacy, especially) 
and properties of the brain state. Semantic reductionism holds that any 
sentence which makes reference to a mental state or property is really just a 
sentence about physical facts under a special aspect, and that consequently, 
it may be translated without loss or change of meaning, (and salve veritate if 
it is a statement), into a sentence which mentions only physical states or 
properties. 
However, the reductionist position is difficult to maintain. There are 
notorious problems inherent in saying that beliefs, wishes and all the other 
familiar mental states, are nothing but configurations of neurons in the brain 
(central state materialism), or characteristic behaviour (logical 
behaviourism). One of these problems is that, by Leibniz's law of identity, we 
are obliged then to say that beliefs have the properties of brain states and 
actions, and this leads to absurdities like 'My belief that 2 + 2 = 4, is 
composed of neuronal tissue' and 'Her belief took place in the passage at six 
o'clock'. 
Attributing mental predicates to material states seems no less ridiculous. It 
is difficult to understand how neurons or actions might represent things 
other than themselves, as mental states do; physical things or states do· not, 
qua physical things or states, have the property of intentionality that mental 
states invariably do. Then there is the difficulty of attributing consciousness 
to matter. Problems like these provide a wealth of anti-reductionist 
argument. 
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The anti-reductionism arguments often take the form of a reductio ad 
absurdum. The pro-autonomy arguments are more positive. One of them is the 
argument from variable instantiation. If mental states and physical states 
could be invariably correlated on a one-to-one basis, there might be a case 
for saying that mental properties could be understood in terms of physical 
properties. But the fact is that 'any given mental state is likely to have 
"multiple physical realizations" over distinct physical structures' (Kim, 
1984:173), so that the physical co-extension of a given psychological 
property will at best be a set of states expressed in a long disjunction. This 
militates against any simple identification of a psychological state with a 
physical state, at least at a general or type-type level, and this in its turn 
means there can be no explanation of the psychological in terms of the 
material. Ontological reduction at a type-level, and explanatory reduction are 
thus both incorrect. 
Another means used by non-reductive materialists for preserving the 
autonomy of the mental, is defining the relationship between mental states 
and their physical instantiations as a very special sort of relationship. Searle 
(1981} for instance, holds that mental states are special properties of 'brain 
stuff'. Though they are ontologically realized in neurological configurations, 
Searle thinks this is an insignificant contingency having no implications for 
the essential character and features of mental states. He opts (1984) for a 
macro-property I micro-property model in terms of which mental states 
'emerge from' the neuronal micro-structures of the brain, and are not 
identical with them. 
Davidson's position (1980:107-109), 'anomalous monism', sees a mental state 
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as 'supervening' on a complex array of causally-linked physical states, but not 
being completely determined by it; relations to other mental states also 
determine it, as do normative factors like the wishes and values of the 
subject. Mental states are thus not subject to the general causal laws which 
govern physical regularities, nor are there any psychophysical laws which 
link the two nomologically across categories. 
In the face of these arguments, we may well ask if the naturalistic 
epistemologist, who after all only wants to use some kind of empirical 
methodology, is really committed to reductionism? It seems so, because 
naturalism cannot avoid its materialistic commitments, and materialism 
cannot avoid its reductive implications. There is not space in this 
introductory survey to give the arguments by which this last point is 
established, but the interested reader is referred to Kim (1989) who, in a 
Presidential Address to the Central Division of the APA entitled 'The myth of 
non-reductive materialism', showed that none of the non-reductive 
materialist theories of mind really succeeds in preserving mental states as 
sui generis entities with properties and causal powers in their own right. 
There is at present, Kim holds, no clear way of being a non-reductive 
materialist, that is, of holding that mental states and properties are realized 
in physical states but are not reducible to them. 
But there are ways of taking the sting out of reductionism. In the present 
context, limited as it is to the issue of immediate empirical justification, we 
do not have to address the issue of wholesale reduction of the mental to the 
physical, and secondly, we can insist on not underestimating the complexity 
and range of properties which a physical state may have. 
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On the first score, we may concede that unresolved difficulties exist in 
establishing a general principle of explanatory reduction of the mental to the 
physical, and yet argue for the special case of epistemological definition 
which is the burden of this thesis. The mental states in which the 
epistemologist is interested are limited to beliefs, and here we are concerned 
with only empirical beliefs, and sensory empirical beliefs moreover, so that 
the links between mental and physical are a lot stronger and more obvious 
than in the case of say, wishes or intentions. 
We can at least venture to say that the typical immediate empirical belief 
('Here is an apple') supervenes on a physical state which centres on a 
neurological or brain state, which is the result of interaction with some part 
of material reality, typically including an apple, and which has the potential 
to cause a characteristic range of actions in certain contexts. Given this 
theory of mind, it is reasonable to think that the question of the justification 
of sensory beliefs, the question, that is, of what makes such a belief 
epistemically excellent, can be addressed in terms of empirically 
determinable input and output conditions. 
Secondly, the naturalistic epistemologist can mitigate the ill-effects of 
reductionism by the sort of materialism chosen. There are many 
interpretations of a broadly materialistic position, ranging from 'central 
state materialism', which identifies mental states with brain states alone, to 
'logical behaviourism', which interprets mental states in terms of the kinds 
of behaviour typically associated with them. The empirical observation 
criterion does not commit the naturalistic epistemologist to any one specific 
materialist theory of mind. The anti-reductionist move is to identify mental 
states not with only brain states or with only behaviour, but with both, that 
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is, with the material complex involving the whole person in a given situation. 
This results in a variety of functionalism according to which a mental state 
may be identified by identifying a tripartite physical state, consisting of a 
set of causal inputs, (from both external stimuli and existing brain states), 
the brain state they result in, in a particular individual, and the behavioural 
outputs or effects which that brain state is likely to cause in certain 
conditions. This implies that mental states and, for our specific purposes, 
empirical beliefs, are realized in a complex physical array defined by a set of 
causal relations. As a theory of mind, it is a materialistic functionalism 
which does not allow the identification of a belief with its correlative brain 
state, narrowly and solipsistically conceived as something 'inside the head', 
but rather suggests that the belief be identified by identifying the 
determining conditions of a certain brain state 4. It is similar to the 
Davidsonian position referred to above (1980:107~119). 
This is an approach which has merits for epistemology. The epistemological 
properties of any particular empirical belief, its justificatory status for 
instance, are to be found in these input and output conditions (as will be 
argued in detail in Chapter 5}. As a theory of mind, it offers scope for the kind 
of psychological naturalization outlined by Kornblith (1987} and Kitcher 
(1983), in terms of which a belief is to be conceived as a state with 
properties and a character extending beyond a contextless proposition held 
true by the subject. Up till now (as noted earlier) there has been a tendency 
within epistemology to conceive of a belief as nothing more than an attitude, 
positive or negative •. to a proposition, or perhaps an attitude of holding true a 
positive or negative proposition. A belief's history, the situation and identity 
of the subject of the state, had nothing to do with what belief it was; the 
Chapter 1 - The epistemological problem 13 
character of the belief-state was exhausted by its propositional content. 
That content, moreover, was conceived in a strictly truth-conditional way, so 
that Joe's belief 'I am about to be run over by a truck' and an observer's belief 
'Joe is about to be run over by a truck', were said to be the same belief. (An 
argument for their distinct identity is presented in Chapter 5.) On this view, 
the justification of a belief state consists in the relations of its content to 
other propositions held true by the subject. It is, in Kornblith's phrase 
(1987:117), the 'arguments-on-paper' thesis of justification. However, this is 
a position which, in spite of long trying, has never yielded a satisfactory 
definition of justification. A main theme of this thesis is its 
'anti-propositionalism', which holds that there is more to belief and 
justification than propositions narrowly construed, and their relations, and 
that what more there is, is epistemologically significant. 
1.2.2 The place of naturalism in epistemology 
The overriding goal of this thesis is to answer one of the traditional 
questions of epistemology - what is the nature of immediate justification? -
in an empirical way, and to accommodate the advantages and explicate the 
consequences of naturalism while addressing the acknowledged concerns of 
epistemology within its established terms of reference. This may require a 
synthesis of interests which pull in rather different directions and of 
methodological commitments which may seem at first to be exclusive of each 
other. The problems of reducing mental states and properties to physical 
states and properties were discussed briefly in the previous section; the 
following tensions, or opposition of interests, are manifestations of the 
underlying issue of reductionism. 
Chapter 1 - The epistemological problem 14 
Though there is some overlapping, three main issues may be distinguished on 
which the naturalist seems to be introducing radical changes into 
epistemology: the issues of whether mental states are to be intensionally or 
extensionally defined, whether the epistemologist is concerned exclusively 
with factual or conceptual questions, and of whether his theories are 
primarily descriptive of reality or prescriptive of an idealized model of 
knowing. We should note that it is difficult to draw these distinctions with 
any degree of clarity or generality, and that what we are after is a rough 
charaterization of the naturalistic epistemologist's position vis a vis an 
epistemologist who rejects it. 
Epistemologists have tended to assume that mental states, especially beliefs, 
must be identified by their intensional content, that the epistemologist gives 
prescriptive answers to conceptual questions, using the powers of reason on a 
priori knowledge of the concepts involved. A naturalistic epistemologist 
assumes that beliefs can be identified by their observable extensional 
relations (input and especially output), that the epistemologist cannot ignore 
the generally agreed or newly discovered facts in the field and consider only 
the entrenched or implicit concepts, and that in the theorizing process, 
describing is at least as important as prescribing. 
In the following chapters, a great deal will be said, implicitly or explicitly, 
on these and related issues, but at this introductory stage, it may be helpful 
briefly to set out how the reconciliation will be attempted, in these three 
areas where it is most needed. 
A preliminary note: since a reconciliation of divergent interests, the 
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synthesis of methodological assumptions, and an accommodation of different 
points of view within one theoretical framework, is being attempted, it 
hardly needs saying that no extreme positions can be adopted. This means that 
a thoroughly Cartesian epistemology, with its unattainable ideals of certainty 
and truth, cannot be contemplated, and, what is perhaps more tempting, a 
radically naturalized epistemology, like the project which Quine sketches in 
'Epistemology naturalized' (1969:69-90), and 'The nature of natural 
knowledge' (1975:67-81), must also be rejected. 
Let us turn then to the question of whether beliefs are best identified 
intensionally or extensionally. An 'intensional identity criterion' is a means 
of identifying a belief by its content, by the proposition which the subject of 
the belief state immediately recognizes as what she believes. Two important 
things about a belief on this view are that it is a conscious state, and that it 
has intentional or representational content. The further assumption has been 
that the belief state is intuitively and incorrigibly accessible to its subject 
in a way not available to observers, who may infer to it only by analogy with 
their own experiences of belief states. Since it is not equally accessible to 
all, the belief state is not an extensional or material state. 
Statements of a belief on this view, also have non-extensional properties. For 
instance, 'Sue believes that the Vatican is in Natal', is not truth-functional -
the whole statement may be true even though the Vatican is not truly in Natal 
- nor can we substitute co-extensive terms salve veritate into it - the first 
statement may be true while 'Sue believes the Eternal City is in Natal' may be 
false. Statements about straightforward material facts, empirically 
observable, do not have these features; if it is true that the Vatican is in 
Natal, and 'Vatican' and 'the Eternal City' are co-referring terms, then it is 
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true that the Eternal City is in Natal. 
The intensional identity criterion is basic to epistemological questions as we 
know them, {we could hardly talk about individual beliefs if we were not able 
to refer to them by 'name', i.e., content) and it is not necessary to give it up 
altogether in order to make beliefs empirically accessible. There is a 
satisfactory balancing of intensional and extensional elements in the 
definition of belief in the functionalistic theory of mind outlined in the last 
section, the theory we shall be using in the rest of this thesis. It is 
especially the inputs to a belief state from the subject's other mental states, 
which are determinative of its intensional identity criterion. So, if Sue had 
had the active belief that the Vatican is also known as the Eternal City, then 
her belief about its -location could have correctly been expressed as either 
'The Vatican is in Natal' or as 'The Eternal City is in Natal'. 
It is possible to refer to, to classify and to individuate beliefs on the 
strength of their contents, while inferring to their existence and contents on 
the evidence of their input and output relations. A belief's behavioural output, 
which is empirically observable, is especially useful. For instance, if we see 
Joe scrutinizing a banana, peeling it and eating it, we are generally entitled 
to ascribe to him the belief that 'This thing is edible'. The framework for 
belief ascription in this case, is the same as that used by Davidson in his 
deployment of the idea of 'interpretation' of behaviour as a means of gaining 
access to mental states, more discussion of which is given in the next 
chapter. In this way, the proposition which forms the content of the belief is 
both defined and enriched by being placed in a web of contextual relations. 
The second issue on which the ·naturalist might be accused of going too far, is 
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whether epistemology is primarily a factual or a conceptual enterprise, to be 
pursued by heuristic methods or by armchair reasoning, and resulting in 
theories and definitions which are known a posteriori or recognized a priori 
to be true. The solution here it seems is to realize that this is not an either I 
or option; acceptance of one of the apparent alternatives does not necessitate 
rejection of the other. Both are necessary, and related, features of 
epistemological methodology, the only question being one of emphasis. This 
issue is closely related to the description I prescription question (ut infra), 
so we need say no more about it than that while the position being adopted 
here aims to accommodate both sides of the coin, when it comes to the 
question of priority, the emphasis falls on heuristic methods. The naturalistic 
epistemologist concentrates on the generally agreed facts of knowledge, and 
makes claims which may be checked against experience and which, when true, 
are known a posteriori. 
Lastly, there is the descriptive I prescriptive question. In any 
epistemological theory, what are or should be the relative weights of 
straightforward observation and objective recording of the data, of the kind 
that the scientist strives for, on the one hand, and the idealized definitions of 
knowledge, certainty, justification, etc., that the epistemologist has 
traditionally worked with, on the other? 
There are of course prescriptive elements in science, just as there are 
empirical and heuristic elements in traditional epistemology, so that once 
again it is a question of priority or emphasis rather than a clear-cut 
exclusion of one or the other. Moreover, it is impossible to say which is 
logically or chronologically prior in any theoretical activity - do we observe 
instances of X and on the basis of the empirical evidence, derive our concept 
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of X's? Or do we have a concept of X's on the basis of which we identify X's for 
observation?5 These questions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
There is a caveat to be entered against the question of whether prescription 
or description is the proper method for the naturalistic epistemologist. This 
is a self-reflexive question which can be asked of any answer we give to the 
-question itself, and of the answer we give to that question, and so on ad 
infinitum. In discussing the methods of science or epistemology we either 
have to ask: 'What are the current practices - describing or prescribing?', and 
answer by describing current epistemological practice as it actually is. Or we 
have to ask: 'What should these practices be?', and answer by prescribing 
what they would be in an ideal world. Choosing between these two 
possibilities would seem to be begging the question. 
It does not help to seek criteria for proper meta-theoretical discussion, 
because this amounts to the same thing - we may enquire about what 
meta-theoretical practice actually is or what it should be , and so on, again, 
ad infinitum. 
This inability to pose or answer the question in a way which does not 
pre-empt the issue suggests that no single unequivocal answer can be 
forthcoming and that prescription and description, at all the levels of 
theorizing, are inextricably linked. What remains for the would-be 
naturalistic epistemologist is to understand the roles and relation of these 
two functions in scientific methodology and to extrapolate this understanding 
to the domain of epistemology. And as will be made clear in the next chapter, 
the naturalist will tend to give more emphasis to description than to 
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prescription. The best rationale for adopting a descriptively-weighted 
methodology lies in the adequacy of the definitions it produces, just as the 
ultimate proof of the naturalistic pudding must be the success or otherwise 
of naturalistic epistemological theories. 
It is a goal of this thesis to make plain how a theory of justification emerges 
from a study of the facts and nature of empirical belief, seen against the 
background of an empirical view of the place of the epistemic agent in the 
natural world. All we need for the naturalized definition of justification is 
thus a careful empirical study of how we do in fact believe 6. 
1.3 A traditional epistemological question in a naturalized setting 
The issue that concerns us here is that of empirical justification, and 
specifically, the justification of sensory beliefs. It is a question that has 
occupied philosophers since· Plato, and it does not have to change its form 
when asked within a contemporary naturalistic framework; we may still ask 
and hope to answer the traditional questions 'What, if anything, makes it 
reasonable for a person to believe the contents of sensory experiences?'; 
'Does the subject of a justified belief have cognitive access to whatever it is 
that justifies the belief?'. 
According to the answer that ultimately results from the conciliatory 
naturalistic approach outlined in 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, epistemic agents are 
reasonable in believing the evidence of their senses. It will be argued in 
following chapters that the generally reliable nature of the sensory 
mechanisms warrants the beliefs they produce as objectively likely to be 
true, and that the believer's reasonableness in holding such beliefs rests on 
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three factors: (i) sensory contents are automatically acceptable and prima 
facie justified for their subject (ii) they are warranted by the general 
reliability of the sensory mechanisms, and (iii) prima facie justification is 
always defeasible; when undefeated, it licenses a truth=claim for the belief 
in question. 
The main features of the justification which emerges are: 
- prima facie, that is, it is immediately evident to the epistemic agent, 
from the sensory character of an immediate belief and not on the evidence of 
other beliefs, that it is reasonable to hold; 
- defeasible, that is, the justification which is evident at first blush may 
prove to be misleading, and insufficient to warrant holding the belief; this is 
a consequence of the naturalistic admission of fallibility on the part of real 
rational agents; 
- internalistic, that is, that feature of the belief that marks it as likely to 
be true, its sensory character, is accessible to the holder of the belief, so 
that the holder knows when a belief is justified and when it is not; 
- deontological, that is, the holder of the belief has a duty to ensure that 
the belief is not held in the absence of internal marks of justification or in 
the presence of countervailing beliefs; 
- doxastic, that is, we do not need to look for the justification of a 
particular sensory belief outside the circle of the agent's own belief-set, in 
things like intersubjective agreement; 
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- basic, that is, the sensory beliefs which have this kind of justification are 
self-evident, and do not depend on any further beliefs of the agent for their 
empirical justification. 
Each of these features will be individually explicated and argued for in the 
course of the thesis, and it will, I hope, be shown that in spite of what may 
initially seem to be difficulties and inconsistencies (e.g., are epistemic 
agents in any sense conscious of the reliability of their perceptual 
processes? how can epistemic justification be effective if it is defeasible? 
can a belief be justified if it is held involuntarily? how can justification be 
doxastic and basic at the same time?), all the above six features of sensory 
justification are not only just logically compatible, but regularly occur, 
within one belief state. 
1.4 Brief synopsis of the thesis 
In order to show all of this, the course. that the following chapters follow is 
one of a gradually sharpening focus on the subject of empirical justification. 
In Chapter 2, after a survey of the literature to get some idea of the ways in 
which naturalized epistemology is actually practised, a radically naturalized 
position is rejected because it makes the subject unrecognizable as 
epistemology. The three minimal conditions for a naturalistic epistemology 
listed above, which allow for the traditional questions to be addressed in the 
usual terms, are spelled out. The claim is made, and argued for, that 
naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with a commitment to 
scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification 
condition goes. 
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In Chapter 3, five general consequences of a naturalistic position are drawn 
out of the discussion. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a 
modest foundationalism, that is, their implications of the corrigibility of all 
empirical beliefs and of basic status for some, are spelled out. 
The view of empirical belief in general, and of sensory belief in particular, 
that emerges from this naturalistic background, is the topic of Chapter 4. The 
terms 'sensory', 'immediate', 'experiential' and 'basic' are all used of 
empirical beliefs about the subject's immediate environment; typical 
examples are the belief that there is a red ball on the grass in front of the 
perceiver {a visual belief), and that there is a mosquito in the vicinity of the 
perceiver's head (auditory belief). Particular attention is given to the 
question of whether we can attribute sensory character to beliefs qua 
beliefs, and it is concluded that this is possible. 
The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence 
relations') is then examined, in Chapter 5. The important conclusion, for a 
theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory 
beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical 
justification {a term defined in the course of discussion). This points to the 
fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident 
and prima facie justified. 
Before an exposition of the nature and implications of prima facie 
justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic 
justification are set out, in Chapter 6. Such a theory must account for the 
reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does (and this is taken to be 
Chapter 1 - The epistemological problem 23 
the core of any notion of justification); it must accommodate deontological 
aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified 
belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief 
and its likely truth. 
In Chapter 7, it is shown how the theory of prima facie justification of 
sensory beliefs which emerges from the naturalistic conception of empirical 
belief, satisfies these requirements. An argument is offered for the 
conclusion that the agent is reasonable in accepting sensory contents; his 
epistemic duties consist in being alive to the corrigibility of his experiential 
beliefs in general and remaining sensitive to the evidence; and the warrant of 
the belief, that is, its objective likelihood of truth, rests on both the reliable 
perceptual mechanisms by which it is acquired, and the confirmation it gets 
from being defeasible and undefeated. 
Chapter 8 compares and evaluates two different views of the nature of prima 
facie justification, one which relies on purely internal and non-naturalistic 
criteria and one which anchors prima facie justification in the reliable 
sensory means of production of immediate belief. There are problems for the 
non-naturalistic view which the second view avoids. 
The last aspect of immediate empirical justification to be discussed is 
defeasibility, in Chapter 9. The problem of whether a belief can be effectively 
justified if its truth status is in doubt, as it must be if the belief is 
corrigible, is addressed, as is the question of whether, on this view of prima 
facie justification, any sensory belief at all could be unjustified. It is 
concluded that neither of these is an insurmountable problem for the theory in 
question. 
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Finally, in Chapter 10, a summary review of the main themes, and the 
conclusions they lead to for a theory of prima facie justification of 
immediate empirical belief, is undertaken. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1. The discussion in this thesis never leaves the field of empirical belief (a 
term defined in Ch. 4), and if the terms 'belief', 'justification' and 'knowledge' 
are used occasionally without qualification, it should be remembered that 
only empirical belief, justification and knowledge are at issue here. 
2. The traditional three-condition definition of knowledge in terms of 
justification, truth and belief is the assumed background to this thesis. It has 
been suggested by some (see Pappas and Swain, 1978:11-40) that the 
challenge to this definition offered by Gettier's counter-examples (1963) 
means that it must be discarded. The more conservative view is preferred 
here, viz., that what Gettier has shown is that a better understanding of the 
relations among the three conditions, and a better definition of the 
justification condition in particular, is required. Gettier counterexamples do 
not necessitate, nor even imply the desirability of, the rejection of the 
tripartite framework of traditional epistemology. 
3. Quine's work in general, and his essays 'Epistemology naturalized' (1969) 
and 'The nature of natural knowledge' (1975) make the case for a radically 
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scientific epistemology. Other discussions of the issues involved are to be 
found in Duran 1988, Haack 1975, Haldane 1989, Kim 1988, Kitcher 1983, 
Kornblith 1982 and 1987, Sanford 1988, Shimony and Nails 1987, Siegel 
1984, Sosa 1983, Stroud 1984, and Thompson 1981. See also Synthase Vol. 
64, Nos. 1 and 2 on 'Naturalistic epistemology'. Almeder's recent work (1990, 
1993, 1994) is a sustained assessment of the arguments that have occurred 
in the literature for and against naturalization; as such, it constitutes a 
progressive definition by elimination of what the conditions for a properly 
naturalized epistemology are. 
4. Block (1980: 174 - 181) gives a definitive analysis of different types of 
functionalism and shows how they are all similar in taking physical inputs, 
relations to other mental states, and behavioural outputs as the definitive 
properties of any particular mental state. In Block's terms, the theory of mind 
from which we shall work in this thesis is that of a 'materialist functional 
specifier', with this difference: that the relations of a mental state M to 
other mental states of its subject, are taken as input conditions of M. 
5. For an analysis of the root of this seeming impasse, see Rescher's 
discussion ( 1980: 1 0-15) of the sceptical problem of the 'diallelus' or 
'problem of the criterion': in any theorizing process, stipulation is necessary 
in order to identify objects for observation, and observation is necessary in 
order to have some idea of what to define. 
6. This is what Kornblith (1987:9) refers to as 'antiskepticism and ballpark 
psychologism' in naturalized epistemology: 'the processes by which we arrive 
at beliefs are at least roughly like the processes by which we ought to arrive 
at our beliefs; the one set of processes is in the same ballpark as the other.' 
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What I shall try to do in this chapter, is firstly, to set out the kind of 
methodology which will secure for epistemology the advantages of science 
without giving up too much that is distinctively epistemological; secondly, to 
argue against any form of radical naturalization, like that which Quine 
(1960) recommends, and Church land (1979) practises; thirdly, to trace the 
anti-sceptical implications of the mild form of naturalization being argued 
for in this thesis. 
2.1 The minimal conditions for naturalization 
2. 1. 1 A scientific basis for epistemology 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the first duty of the epistemologist must 
be to the subject itself and its sui generis subject matter. Nevertheless, 
some kind of empirical methodology in epistemology remains an attractive 
option, as it has always been since Locke's 'historical, plain method' 
(1964:64) and Hume's 'attempt to introduce the experimental method of 
reasoning into moral subjects' (1978:xi). The changing perceptions we have of 
science in general, and the developments that take place both in the scientific 
enterprise and in our understanding of it, open up new possibilities for 
understanding what knowledge is, and how it is that people have it. 
There has, for instance, been a fair amount of attention recently paid to the 
relation of normative and descriptive elements in scientific theorizing, and 
this is an illuminating background against which to consider epistemological 
methodology 2. It affords us a new perspective on the sceptic's position 
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concerning our knowledge of the external world. The sceptical conclusion 
depends essentially on a stipulation, or prescription, of conditions tor 
knowledge that cannot possibly be satisfied, and this is demonstrably at odds 
with the practices of science. Scepticism and naturalism are thus to some 
degree incompatible, it would appear, and if this is indeed the case, then the 
arguments that there are for a naturalized epistemology, might at the same 
time be deployed as anti-sceptical arguments. This issue is taken up in 
section 2.3. 
The aims of this section are, firstly, to show that there is a soft form of 
naturalized epistemology which is very plausible, and very hard to argue 
against; indeed, it would seem to have the support of anyone who has even a 
slight appreciation of science or empirical realism; and secondly, to show 
how, within this model of naturalized epistemology, there is a heuristic 
requirement that places realistic constraints on the construction and testing 
of theories and definitions. 
We need to consider what is useful in scientific methodology for the pursuit 
of epistemology, in order to set the minimum requirements for naturalization 
in a way that will not do violence to the traditional projects of the 
epistemologist. Almeder {1990: 263) distinguishes three forms of naturalized 
epistemology: the Quinean 'replacement thesis', the 'transformation thesis' of 
someone like Goldman {1986), and a third form, which 'simply insists that the 
method of the natural sciences is the only method tor acquiring a proper 
understanding of the nature of the physical universe'. It is a modified version 
of this third form that I am advocating here. Its effectiveness as a grounding 
principle for a naturalized study of knowledge depends in the first place on 
tying knowledge into 'the physical universe', and in the second place, on 
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explicating the relations between epistemology and science. 
(i) Here is one way (in rough outline) in which the first requirement might be 
satisfied, that is, one way in which the mental state of knowing might be 
shown to fit into the domain of science. 
Of all the different mental states, knowing is the one which seems most 
amenable to scientific investigation. It is the only one with a guaranteed 
extension. S (the epistemic agent) may think that p is the case, may wish it, 
fear it, even believe it with conviction, and yet p may not be the case. But if S 
knows that p, then p must be the case. Whatever 'p' expresses must be a fact. 
Further, the requirement that for S to know p, S must be justified in holding p 
true, is often taken to imply that there must be some kind of nomological 
connection between the fact of p and the belief that p. It is not quite a simple 
causal relation; Goldman's suggestion that it might be (1967) raises the 
difficulties of how a fact (and not a thing) might have causal efficacy, how 
we might then have beliefs about future facts (backward causation?), and 
what might be at the causal end of general beliefs like 'All men are mortal' 
(see Dancy, 1985:33-34). But the relation between knowing-that-p and p is at 
least of the same general kind as a causal relation; both are relations of 
dependence or supervenience of the second term (effect, mental state) upon 
the first ( cause, physical configuration which includes the fact known). Their 
similarity is shown by the fact that both relations may be defined in terms of 
a pair of subjunctive or counterfactual conditional statements. Ordinary 
cause : (i) If C were the case, then E would follow, and (ii) If C were not the 
case, then E would not follow. The psychophysical relation in knowing : (i)lf p 
were the case, then S would believe that p, and (ii) If p were not the case, 
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then S would not believe that p. Nozick (1981) makes use of this latter pair of 
conditionals in his analysis of knowing as 'tracking truth'. Their similarity to 
the causal case suggests that the epistemologist may be concerned with the 
same general kind of relation as the scientist is. 
When the kind of knowledge under discussion is empirical knowledge, then the 
claim that knowledge is tied in this way to the physical world, becomes even 
stronger. It would seem that the necessary extension of the contents of 
knowledge provides grounds for a scientific investigation of the phenomenon; 
or at least it suggests that states of knowing are terms of the same kind of 
relationship that governs the physical causal network which is the domain of 
science. 
In explicating the relations between science and epistemology, it becomes 
evident that there are other reasons (at least the following three) why 
science, and especially natural science, should be of such interest to the 
epistemologist. 
(ii) The object of epistemology is knowledge, and science broadly construed is 
knowledge. At any one moment, it represents the best theories and 
judgements that the collective efforts of humanity have up till then been able 
to produce, the 'best knowledge of the day'. Within this body of knowledge, the 
theories of natural science enjoy a certain priority for the epistemologist 
concerned with empirical knowledge. Such theories do not of course make up 
all of knowledge. There are fields outside natural science, like the social 
sciences, which lay claim to true theories and established facts of their own, 
comprising bodies of knowledge other than the physical, so that it would be a 
very narrow positivism which identified all knowledge with physical science. 
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But the structures, methods, theoretical devices and subject material of 
natural science, since they produce empirical knowledge, are of primary 
concern to the epistemologist working in that field. It may reasonably be 
asserted that natural science is all the empirical knowledge there is. This 
involves seeing ordinary bits of empirical knowledge at a humble level, things 
like 'The bread rolls are stale', as scientific in character and continuous with 
knowledge of more elevated and esoteric facts, like 'The DNA molecule is 
helical', and in an important sense, they are plainly of a kind: both claims 
ascribe a material property to a class of physical things. 
Furthermore, the ways in which these claims are arrived at and grounded, 
though they differ in degree of complexity, are the same in kind. The 
methodological principles which the epistemologist adumbrates in studying 
the practices of natural science, are thus relevant mutatis mutandis, to every 
case of an empirical knowledge claim (see (iv) below for for more detailed 
discussion of this point). 
(iii) From the fact that natural science is all the empirical knowledge that 
there is, comes the further claim that it has a special importance in relation 
to all other kinds of knowledge. To claim knowledge of something - anything 
at all, whether it be God, a quark, oppression, the tooth-mouse or paranoia -
is to claim to have observed or experienced, either the thing itself or its 
physical effects. We either experience things directly through our senses or 
we are apprised of their existence through experience of distinctive causal 
regularities in the material world which can only be explained by positing the 
object of the knowledge claim. 
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Either way, it is the physical world which is both the origin of and the ground 
for knowledge claims of all kinds. It is the epistemologist's task to 
investigate the origin and ground of knowledge and in consequence, even 
though the generalizations of epistemology are not substantively the same as 
those of science, the subject matter and methods of empirical science have a 
special significance in the epistemological context. 
(iv) This principle of the material grounds of all knowledge, gives us one last 
possible reason for a naturalistic epistemology. Epistemology is itself 
engaged in a quest for knowledge. The matter is complicated by the fact that 
the inquiry is into the subject of knowledge, the mental state of knowing both 
in the individual and in the aggregate, and into features of it like acceptance, 
justification, evidence and truth. Nevertheless, from the fact that the 
epistemologist hopes to arrive at knowledge about his subject, hopes to 
understand, define, explain and predict it, it follows that he is bound to 
follow at least some of the procedures essential to any rational inquiry. 
Granted the analytic statement that science (including both the natural and 
the social sciences), represents the best knowledge of the day, it follows 
that scientific methods (whether of the natural or social sciences) are likely 
to embody our best methods of acquiring knowledge, and successfully coming 
to understand, define, explain and predict phenomena. 
When the phenomena in question are those of the material world, and the 
knowledge is empirical knowledge, then it is the methods of the natural 
sciences which provide a model for the epistemologist. Having knowledge of, 
or understanding, a mental state like knowing, no less nor more than having 
knowledge of a physical state like AIDS or electricity, is a matter of trying 
out hypotheses against the instances we have of it (a procedure to be 
discussed at more length in 2.1.2 below). 
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To sum up, we have at least four reasons for wanting close relations between 
epistemology and science, especially between the study of empirical 
knowledge and natural science: (i) knowing is the one mental state whose 
conte.nt is also, necessarily, objective fact, in the domain of science; (ii) 
science is knowledge and thus the object of the epistemologist's study; {iii) 
physical science explains the causal regularities in the material world which 
are the basis of all claims to knowledge; (iv) in so far as the epistemologist 
seeks to know her subject, she follows the method of science. 
On this view, epistemology stands in a dual relationship to science. In so far 
as the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge (scientias), the 
epistemologist as methodologist stands on the meta-level, in judgement on 
science and its practices, theories, etc. In so far as the methods and aims of 
epistemology are scientific in character, and in so far as what it produces 
adds to the body of knowledge, it is on a par with the other special sciences. 
It differs from them in that it has a self-critical and self-regulating 
function, and engages in self-reflexive study. 
The four points listed in summary above have been put in a general way, as 
definitive in an unqualified way of the relations between epistemology and 
natural science, and a case could indeed be made, with more extensive 
argument, for that position. But the more limited claim which issues from the 
foregoing discussion, viz., that in the context of empirical knowledge, the 
epistemologist will be especially interested in natural science, is all that is 
necessary for the purposes of this thesis. 
The four statements above are interwoven in a way that makes their 
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separation difficult. The last two points are especially closely connected. 
Explaining causal regularities in the material world is the method of science, 
and, as we shall argue, the method of any kind of theorizing which would 
claim relevance to, or applicability in, the actual world. Let us look more 
closely at this process of explanation. 
2. 1.2 Prescriptivism and descriptivism 
We need to notice, first of all, that we are talking about prescription as an 
activity on the part of the theorist rather than about prescriptivity as a 
property of the concepts being defined. Characteristically epistemological 
concepts are essentially normative and evaluative concepts: 'true' is 
applicable to beliefs which appear to meet certain standards of accuracy; 
'justified' is used of beliefs where the holder has met certain standards of 
reasonableness for supposing the content true; 'certain' marks a commendable 
property in a belief, and so forth. It is not the concepts themselves that are 
at issue here, but rather the method of defining them, or of giving the 
conditions for their proper application. 
The question that concerns us is whether, in listing the standards to be met 
for justification, an epistemological theory should proceed from observations 
of actual cases of justified beliefs, the more the better, or whether it should 
proceed from some antecedent desiderata for justification, known a priori, in 
the light of which there may be no actual cases of justification at all. 
In the context of a naturalized epistemology, the methodological contrast is 
sometimes made in terms of the descriptivism of the natural sciences versus 
epistemological prescriptivism and normativity (Kornblith, 1987:1 - 3; Kim, 
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1988:381 - 383, 397 - 400), and while this certainly reflects a real 
difference between the two, it is not an absolute distinction. There is no neat 
or easy way of separating them along these lines. Science is not entirely 
devoid of idealized models, like the classical gas laws for instance, which 
real gases follow only roughly, with contingent deviations, though nearly 
enough to be said to exemplify them; while some traditional theories of 
knowledge, for example, those of the empiricists Locke and Hume, have a 
strongly descriptive bent. 
We may then ask whether the epistemologist is to confine himself to 
statements of observed fact and merely describe, as accurately as is possible 
for the general case, what are acknowledged by the epistemic community at 
large to be actual instances of justified belief and knowledge; or whether he 
is rather to stipulate an ideal of justification, which may have the sceptical 
result that no instances of it are possible. The issue is whether it is possible 
or sensible to fix the criteria for justification, and so too for knowledge, in a 
way that does not go beyond what actually obtains, or could obtain, in the 
case of ordinary people. 
Following the practices of science, the naturalistic epistemologist will 
prefer to take the generally agreed facts of empirical belief and justification 
as subject matter. It may be said to be an axiom of the whole enterprise of 
naturalistic epistemology (and as such not provable within the system) that 
people do have knowledge of the world, that is, they have justified true 
empirical beliefs. At least many, and arguably a majority, of those 
psychological states which are generally thought to be states of knowing, or 
justified belief, are in fact such. The sceptic starts with an idea of 
knowledge and justification of a kind attainable only by an infallible and 
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omniscient epistemic agent, and then finds that real people are not capable of 
such states; the naturalistic epistemologist on the other hand, starts by 
assuming that ordinary agents do know, and are justified in believing, at least 
some of the things they think they know· and are justified in believing. The 
definition of a justified belief for the naturalistic epistemologist is not 
based on a transcendental ideal, but on the normal, average type of belief (or 
believer). 
Moreover, if the naturalistic epistemologist takes the norm to be an average 
belief derived from the aggregate of all the empirical beliefs of all normal 
rational agents, then it can be show that the normal belief is a justified 
belief and most likely true. It is of course quite normal for an individual 
agent to believe falsely or unjustifiedly in any one single case, perhaps even 
to have many false and unjustified beliefs, but when a doxastic set is judged, 
on the best epistemological criteria available, to contain significantly more 
false beliefs than true ones, or unjustified beliefs than justified ones, then it 
is classified as abnormal. By definition then, the normal, average belief is a 
probably true, and a justified belief, and the naturalistic epistemologist 
engages in just the modest task of describing that standard. 
This is not to say that science is devoid of any prescription. It is true that 
science has, historically, been thought of as purely descriptive. Even more 
than human science, natural science with its goal of arriving at an accurate 
and exhaustive picture of the world, is _characterized by the objective and 
consciously non-evaluative stance that its practitioners adopt. They seek to 
observe a reality free of subjective idiosyncrasies, and to this end, specify 
their subject matter as the causal properties of matter, these being 
empirically determined for all observers in a broadly uniform way which is 
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further standardized by scientific conventions. However, the goal of a 
completely asubjective science is not achievable; there are, necessarily, 
prescriptive aspects to science as well. 
The process of theorizing in any field consists in constructing a systematic 
framework for a mass of disorderly data, the data then being interpreted as 
conforming with the hypothetical ideals which theory requires. A fair degree 
of divergence between the actual data and the theory which explains them, 
and which they in turn instantiate, can be tolerated, a good example of this 
being the idealized gas laws. Scientific theory is thus not an unalloyed 
description of an independent material reality, recorded by the perfectly 
neutral observer. On Popper's hypothetico-deductive model (1980), scientific 
method is not that different from the philosophical and it is a matter for 
ongoing consideration by both scientist and philosopher, how description and 
prescription might be related. 
One respect in which epistemology can benefit from the scientific model, 
especially one like Popper's, is that it dispels the allure of the impossibly 
strict truth and certainty conditions which have characterized the history of 
epistemology. Science is a hypothetical enterprise, a matter of setting up 
tentative theories which may always be disproved by fresh evidence, and 
which never attain more than a high degree of confirmation. Absolute truth of 
any theory or definition is beyond demonstration, though we may be entitled, 
for practical purposes, to assume it when certain conditions of confirmation 
and consistency have been fulfilled. The ever-present possibility of defeat of 
a theory, definition or single knowledge claim, however, with which the 
scientist works, is a salutary consideration for the epistemologist, and one 
moreover, which must be included in substantive epistemological theory. 
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If the epistemologist takes up a minimally naturalized perspective, then she 
will see mental states of knowing as arising within, and at the instance of, 
the causal order, as having therefore the character of brute fact and her 
methodology will be heuristic, or investigative; she will set out to discover 
the nature of knowledge. She will differ from the sceptic in allowing that 
epistemic agents do actually have beliefs which achieve a satisfactory 
measure of justification, and that such beliefs may also on occasion be true, 
and so constitute knowledge. Definition and the setting up of criteria will 
also be important for her; she will want to give description and prescription 
an equal role. 
Thagard (1989: 491) sees this as a new development: 'Perhaps it would be 
useful to coin a new term to describe an approach that is intended to be both 
descriptive and prescriptive. I shall say that a model is biscriptive if it 
describes how people make inferences in accord with the best practices 
compatible with their cognitive capacities. Unlike a purely prescriptive 
approach, a biscriptive approach does not offer a theory of God's cognitive 
performance, but is intimately related to actual human performance. Unlike a 
purely descriptive approach, biscriptive models can be used to criticize and 
improve human performance.' The epistemologist may choose to say 'Here is 
something which is agreed on all hands to be a justified belief. What 
conditions can we observe in this case that are shared by all and only other 
cases recognized as justified beliefs?' Or he may choose to ask: 'When I 
identify something as a justified belief, what criteria am I applying? What 
conditions must be present in objective reality before we are satisfied of the 
presence of a justified belief?'. 
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The two questions are inextricably linked. To ask which is prior or more 
important, or even to conceive the two approaches as separable in practice, is 
to fall into the sceptical impasse of dialellus or the problem of the criterion. 
This is a sceptical argument which applies quite generally to any field of 
study: without a satisfactory definition of the objects of study, they cannot 
be identified and the field cannot be delimited; on the other hand, without 
some recognizable subject matter, no definitions can be arrived at 3 . 
A naturalistic epistemology will not avoid the setting up of stipulative 
definitions, as unscientific. All that naturalism does require is that the 
epistemologist allow that those definitions have real instances. The 
naturalistic definition of knowledge and justification must firstly be such as 
not only to allow the subsumption of actual cases of belief under it (which 
means that no sceptical ideals of absolute certainties or unrealizably perfect 
beliefs will be acceptable), but also such as to characterize the broad cross 
section of what is recognizable as and agreed to be knowledge and justified 
belief. 
The naturalistic epistemologist will maintain that the question 'What is 
knowledge?' and all the distinctively epistemological questions like 'What is 
justified belief?', are to be answered with reference to the actual (rather 
than possible) mental states of real (rather than ideal) epistemic agents. The 
assumption is that how we ought to believe and to arrive at our beliefs 
cannot be very different from how we do in fact believe and arrive at our 
beliefs. Our epistemic capabilities, like all our other capabilities, are fixed 
by nature; the 'ideal' is to be conceived of as a realistic norm. The model of 
empirical belief, far from being an unattainable ideal, is simply the average 
belief, belief free of too great a degree of discrepancy or deviation, which by 
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definition includes the majority of what are commonly thought of as beliefs. 
The desideratum here is to say as accurately as possible what justified 
beliefs are in fact like. 
This first requirement of naturalistic epistemological definition may be 
thought of as its descriptive task. A second requirement on such definition is 
that it must also help to demarcate the class of justified beliefs and be of 
use in problematic or borderline cases. It must provide some sort of decision 
procedure against which ascriptions of knowledge and justification can be 
verified, the desideratum here being that the definition say what justified 
beliefs should look like. This may be called its prescriptive task. The 
important thing about these two requirements is the order of their priority. In 
a naturalistic epistemology, it is the descriptive interest which is of first 
importance. This is in line with principles (iii) and (iv) in section 2.1.1, which 
require that any theory or definition which seeks to be of some relevance in 
the actual world must be grounded in instances from the actual world. 
Of course to assume that we do in fact have knowledge, justified true beliefs 
about the world, is to beg the question against the sceptic. But if the 
aforegoing arguments have any force, then this basic assumption is justified 
in the light of the methodological requirements of epistemological 
naturalism, and is acceptable to the degree that a naturalistic theory 
satisfactorily defines the concept of knowledge and explains epistemological 
phenomena. 
2.2 Why radical naturalization is unacceptable 
2.2. 1 Rejection of the 'replacement thesis' 
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The charge has often been made that in the process of naturalization, at least 
in the thorough naturalization recommended by people like Quine (1960) and 
practised by people like Churchland (1979), the matter and method of the 
discipline is so changed as to be unrecognizable as that of epistemology, and 
then there is good reason to think that the subject itself has changed. 
Extreme naturalization would allow the epistemologist only to practise one 
or more of the established natural sciences, like neurophysiology or 
biochemistry, and not to engage in epistemology as anyone would recognize it. 
However, any model of a discipline which changes it into something else, is 
not a model of that discipline. If it is a naturalized epistemology we are 
after, then the character of epistemological concepts and issues (their 
intentionality and normativity especially) must somehow be reconciled with 
the scientific method. 
Kornblith (1987:3) refers to radical Quinean naturalism as 'the replacement 
thesis', since it advocates 'the view that epistemological questions may be 
replaced by psychological questions', doing away with anything we would 
recognize as epistemology in the process. After the abandonment of the 
traditional terminology and concepts of epistemology 'what remains is a 
descriptive empirical theory of human cognition which, if Quine has his way, 
will be entirely devoid of the notion of justification or any other valuational 
concept' (Kim, 1988:397); indeed, the phrase 'human cognition' might well be 
put in quotes. And Chisholm, a propos of a materialistic definition of 
justification like reliabilism, remarks (1988: 285): 'Some of those authors 
who profess to view knowledge and epistemic justification "externally" are 
not concerned .. . with the analysis of any ordinary concept of knowledge or of 
epistemic justification. Therefore their enterprise, whatever it may be, is 
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not that of traditional theory of knowledge.' 
If the whole 'enterprise' has been replaced, the subject is no longer 
epistemology. We may conclude from these quotations that the concern that 
epistemology may be unrecognizably altered by naturalization, is a 
wide=spread one. It is moreover expressive of the wish to maintain the 
essential character of the discipline as it is presently, and has traditionally 
been, known and practised. 
It was Quine who gave the term 'naturalized epistemology' the wide currency 
which it now enjoys, and his conception is often taken as paradigmatic of the 
new enterprise. In his extremely materialistic naturalism, the subject matter 
of psychological states is replaced by that of physical states. A short quote 
is revealing. Commenting on Davidson's paper 'Belief and the basis of 
meaning', Quine writes that he is 'puzzled over Davidson's doctrine of the 
irreducibility of the mental'. Although he (Quine) agrees with Brentano on the 
'irreducibility of intentional discourse to proper scientific discourse', where 
Brentano thought this showed the need for a special 'science of intention', 
Quine thought 'so much the worse for intentions ' (1974:329, my italics). 
Again, on the central issue of how to identify a sensory belief, Quine has this 
to say (1969:84): 'One effect of seeing epistemology in a psychological 
setting is that it resolves a stubborn old enigma of epistemological priority. 
Our retinas are irradiated in two dimensions, yet we see things as 
three-dimensional without conscious inference. Which is to count as 
observation - the unconscious two-dimensional reception or the conscious 
three-dimensional apprehension? In the old epistemological context the 
conscious form had priority, for we were out to justify our knowledge of the 
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external world by rational reconstruction. What to count as observation now 
can be settled in terms of the stimulation of sensory receptors, let 
consciousness fall where it may ' (my italics). So whether neuronal activity 
is accompanied by the subject's consciousness of some content is, in Quine's 
opinion, irrelevant to the epistemologist. Questions of justification according 
to this view are neurophysiological questions, and reasonableness on the 
internal perspective simply disappears. 
In Quine's view, all the justification that there is for our theories and beliefs 
about the world is to be found in patterns of sensory stimulation which are 
not available as such to the subject of the belief state; the fact that the 
first-person perspective is thus excluded is of cardinal importance for any 
epistemological theory, especially of justification. Davidson (1988:2) writes 
that Quine has 'tied meaning and content to the firings of sensory nerves', 
which 'comes about as close as science allows to the end product, presumably 
a brain state or change, and yet remains reassuringly physical and publicly 
observable, at least in principle'. 
It is Quine's view of a belief as drawing all its significance from its 
associated physical state, qua extended and publicly observable physical 
state rather than qua subjectively experienced and conscious physical state, 
that results in the disappearance of any recognizable epistemological 
concepts and their replacement by those of the established sciences. While 
the supervenience of psychological states upon their physical bases is not 
denied, the special nature of those physical states must not be lost sight of. 
They are physical states which include a cortex with properties of 
consciousness, intentionality (content), and often phenomenological 'feel'. 
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Several arguments will be offered in ensuing chapters to the effect that 
including the first-person perspective on neurophysiological states is 
essential for maintaining the epistemological enterprise's character. Quine 
could remain naturalistic and be a better epistemologist, Davidson believes 
(op. cit.), by allowing the dependence of beliefs upon their physical bases 
within the natural causal order, and yet not investing these bases with 'prime 
epistemological significance' (ibid.:2). Such a shift of emphasis would save 
Quine from an absolute reduction of the epistemological in favour of the 
physical, and save epistemology from replacement by neurophysiology. 
Let us look at how the Quinean programme is implemented in two actual 
cases: the work of an eliminative materialist like Paul Churchland and an 
evolutionary epistemologist like Campbell. 
2.2.2 Criticism of two applications of the replacement thesis 
Firstly, the eliminative materialist Churchland is one who advocates, like 
Quine, and moreover practises, a thoroughly scientific approach in his work, 
favouring especially the vocabulary and theories of cognitive science, e.g., 
1979: Chapter 5. After discussing how descriptive (naturalistic} epistemology 
is distinguishable from normative epistemology, and pointing out that there 
is a need for the latter enterprise as well, ('our concern here, after all, is 
with the ideal rather than the real' [ibid.:122]), he criticizes the mainstream 
of epistemology for assuming that 'the current state of 'an epistemic engine' 
(that is, the rational agent) is relevantly and adequately represented by a set 
of sentences or propositions' and 'that the epistemic system is subject to 
inputs, also representable by sentences' (ibid.:125). 
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This criticism is accptable to a point, and reminiscent of the 
Kornblith/Kitcher complaint that traditional epistemology is too concerned 
with propositions. But where they advise that it should instead be concerned 
with investigating psychological states, Churchland is critical of the 
propositional focus because it is not mechnaistic enough, and in consequence 
is inadequate to the evaluative task of saying wherein epistemic virtue 
consists. He recommends in its place, not a greater sensitivity to 
psychological complexity, but an approach 'inextricably bound up with a 
deeper conception of ourselves as provided by some science of epistemic 
engines generally' (ibid.:142). 
In the rough outline that Churchland provides of such a conception, however, 
there is a marked absence of any distinctively psychological concept. The 
programme that he sketches is aimed at defining concepts of epistemic 
excellence that would apply equally well to a sophisticated computer as a 
person. Notably, belief is defined in purely extensional terms, with no 
mention of the characteristic mental attributes which accompany belief 
states. This makes any ascription of justification (the traditional, Socratic 
notion of justification as internal reasonableness, which is basic to 
epistemology) to a belief, extremely problematic. 
Secondly, let us consider the evolutionary epistemologist. A different kind of 
naturalization to Churchland's is evident in the work of someone like Donald 
Campbell, the evolutionary psychologist who is nevertheless classed as a 
naturalistic epistemologist by many (with contributions to Natura I i sti c 
epistemology [Shimony and Nails, eds., 1987] and Naturalizing epistemology 
[Kornblith, ed., 1987]) but who would not qualify as an epistemologist on the 
'recognizability criterion' suggested above. At his hands, questions of 
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justification become questions of what neurological mechanisms are involved 
in the passage from immediate sensation to awareness of an object, or of 
what can be inferred from the observable physical properties of 'neurological 
embodiments of belief' (part of the title of the article in Shimony and Nails), 
or of what biological processes promote survival of the species. Whatever 
justification turns out to be in these contexts, it is not the reasonableness of 
the person holding the belief, a concept which is basic to epistemology 
proper. Furthermore, on an evolutionary outlook, truth as an epistemological 
property of empirical beliefs, is to be valued solely for its role in promoting 
the continued survival of the individual in his environment. 
Consistently with his scientism, Campbell explicitly disavows the usual 
frame of reference of epistemology, for instance, that the study is limited to 
human subjects: 'here, knowing in science is introduced in continuity with 
those modes of knowing on the part of· organisms described by biologists and 
psychologists' (1987 (a):81), with the implication that 'epistemology' is to be 
extended to all forms of life. He is aware of what the consequences for 
epistemology will be: 'The traditional terms "epistemology" and "philosophy of 
science" are not quite right for many of the exciting current developments 
that go by these names . .. science today (is) the main arena in which 
descriptive-epistemological issues get argued' (1987 (b): 165-166). 
To further illustrate the gulf between epistemology and any radically 
naturalistic sort of project, let us consider a central concept in 
epistemology, truth, and its transmutation at the hands of the evolutionary 
'epistemologist', who like Quine, advocates a thorough replacement of 
epistemology by science, biology in this case. Truth becomes, in Kantian 
terms, a hypothetical rather than a categorical imperative. 
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Truth, it 1s widely agreed by all, is the greatest virtue in a belief and the 
ultimate epistemic value. Absolute truth would characterize the perfectly 
rational doxastic set of an ideal (omniscient and infallible) epistemic agent; 
the belief sets of real agents are epistemically good in so far as they 
approach this ideal, in so far as the belief sets are more rather than less true. 
Other possible properties of a belief, besides truth, especially the 
justificatory ones like groundedness, trustworthiness, evidence and 
obviousness, are judged epistemically excellent in so far as they guarantee a 
belief's truth, or increase its likelihood of being true. These other epistemic 
virtues in a belief are thus instrumental in securing truth, and are virtuous in 
so far as they serve their function. The epistemologist and the evolutionist 
would be in agreement on the hierarchy of epistemic values thus far. 
The epistemologist, however, has always viewed truth as an ultimate value, 
whose goodness or virtue cannot be explained by reference to anything else. It 
is not an instrument serving any higher purpose. It is thus not justificatory in 
character itself, that is, it does not warrant the epistemic status of the 
belief it accrues to, in the light of any further values. For the epistemologist, 
there is simply no answer to the question of why a belief should be true 
rather than false, or why the epistemic agent should aim at truth in believing, 
and not falsity. 
In terms of the Kantian imperatives, the command of reason that one ought to 
believe truly, is unconditional; like any categorical imperative, it is 
'objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end' (Kant, 
trs. Paton, 1964: 82}. It is simply in the nature of belief that when we 
believe, we strive to believe truly. The governing vision of man here is of a 
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creature who is essentially and peculiarly rational, in a way which 
distinguishes him from the rest of the natural order, and of belief as 
essentially representational and truth-aspirant. 
By contrast, for the naturalistic evolutionist, the truth of a belief is good 
only because it is 'adaptive'. As such, truth is not a categorical but a 
hypothetical imperative; if we believe truly, then we adapt to the 
environment and survive better. Truth for the evolutionist is not the highest 
value, as it is for the epistemologist. Truth has its place somewhat lower 
than that in the hierarchy of values in general, in which, as it must be for any 
animal, survival of the individual and the species is the top priority. Truth in 
a belief is good because, and only because, it enables the individual (and so 
also the species) to deal more successfully with its environment, to promote 
its continued existence. It is in this way that truth becomes a hypothetical 
and not a categorical imperative: one ought to believe truly, not in an 
unqualified way, but because one lasts longer that way. 
The project of the epistemologist is to define man the knower, whereas that 
of the evolutionist is the description of man as just one of the species in the 
natural order. Within this framework, the hierarchy of values for all species 
is fixed by nature, survival being at the top and truth in a belief being a 
hypothetical imperative for any kind of organism no less than for man. It is 
not man's specially rational character that makes the striving for truth an 
absolute duty for him; like any other creature, he seeks truth in order to 
survive. 
Nor is the intentional character of belief important or interesting to the 
evolutionist. If it were to transpire, in some just-conceivable epistemic 
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community, that false empirical beliefs had a property - call it Magooth 4 -
which enabled their holders to cope more successfully with the environment 
than a true belief did, then a Magoo belief would be preferable to a true belief. 
The sense in which truth is an 'imperative' for a person on this naturalistic 
conception is lacking in the moral or deontological force which the 
categorical imperative has. The concept of justification as reasonableness 
which lies at the heart of epistemology includes a measure of deontological 
weight. It is a measure of just how thoroughly a radical naturalism can 
disrupt the scheme of things epistemological, that it should dispense with 
any distinctive notions of the duties of the knower. 
2.3 The anti-sceptical implications of naturalization 
The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion above is that the terminology, 
concepts and issues of mainstream epistemology should be taken up in any 
naturalistic epistemology. The question may then well be asked: 'But how does 
naturalistic epistemology differ from the usual project then, if at all?' The 
answer, in a word, is 'anti-scepticism'. Traditional epistemology, whether it 
was of the Cartesian rationalistic variety, or of the Lockean empirical kind, 
was an attempt to answer the problems posed by impossibly demanding truth 
and certainty conditions. Current epistemologists like Chisholm and Moser, 
who set themselves the task of finding incorrigible foundations for an 
absolutely true body of knowledge, attained by infallible epistemic agents, 
have accepted the axioms established in the history of epistemology. 
Descartes tried to secure for the epistemic agent the absolutely certain truth 
of a valid deductive system based on a self-authenticating and analytically 
Chapter 2 - A sensibly naturalized epistemology 49 
true proposition. Locke based his account of knowledge on the incorrigibly 
known simple elements of sense experiences, from which all knowledge could 
logically be constructed. Both represent an attempt to answer the sceptic, to 
show how knowledge was indeed possible even though the knower had to be 
infallibly right. It was this antecedent idea of what constituted knowing that 
Descartes brought to bear in his methodological scepticism, just as it was 
the criterion of incorrigibility that prompted Locke in his definition of the 
'ideas of sense'. 
Once one has accepted the sceptical requirements for knowledge, of course, 
based as they are on an a priori ideal of the perfect knower and not on 
observation of real, fallible people, it becomes very difficult if not 
impossible to satisfy those requirements. Hence the sceptical conclusion 
concerning empirical knowledge, that people can never know anything about 
the world. In so far as the great figures in the epistemological tradition 
started with a set of excessively strict criteria for knowledge, which they 
then allowed to determine their observation of actual cases of knowing, and 
did not start from such observation, they were laying themselves open to the 
sceptical conclusion. 
With reference to the notions of prescriptivism and descriptivism, we might 
say that the sceptic assumes a definition of knowledge, supposed to be 
applicable in the actual world, which is not based on observed regularities of 
any kind. At least one influential sceptical argument depends upon a 
definition of knowledge which stipulates conditions impossible of fulfilment 
by human epistemic agents. It is actually a kind of argument, of which the 
Evil Genius argument of Descartes and the more recent 'brain-in-a-vat' 
argument, are specimens, and in outline it runs as follows 5 . 
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1. We have experiences as of material things in a real world. 
2. On the basis of experience, we claim_ knowledge of independent material 
reality. 
3. But all our experience is consistent with its being caused by something 
quite other than what it seems to be about (by a mad scientist's electrodes, 
say, or an evil demon). 
4. There is no justification for preferring the real world to other 
alternatives, as the cause and explanation of sensory experience. 
/:. We have no knowledge of the material world. 
The sceptical conclusion depends essentially upon the epistemic agent's not 
being able to eliminate conclusively the possibility of the mad scientist/evil 
demon as the real cause of his experience (and so too of his beliefs). What 
would count as conclusive elimination of such a possibility? 
The mad scientist and his laboratory, and the evil demon, are by definition 
real and effective agents, part, with S, the epistemic agent, of a material 
causal network. They are therefore in principle accessible to perception by S. 
Perhaps if S were minutely to examine every square millimeter of his world 
and find no evidence of the mad scientist, he could claim to have eliminated 
the possibility of one. But this will not do; S's whole experience, including his 
supposed examination of the world, is in the control of the mad scientist, who 
does not choose to feed S glimpses as of the mad scientist. S can thus never 
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justifiably claim there is no mad scientist but a real world which causes his 
experience. To satisfy the justification ·requirement which the sceptic is 
assuming, S would have to be omniscient, or an epistemic agent with 
superhuman powers of perception and cognition. By definition, however, he is 
a person. 
The sceptic's conditions for empirical knowledge are thus logically 
impossible for S to fulfil and there can ex hypothesi never be any instances of 
such knowledge in the actual world. Nevertheless, the sceptic claims that her 
definition is relevant in the actual world; she applies it as a criterion to 
purported cases of knowing and finds them wanting, rejecting them as 
instances of empirical knowledge. 
There are difficulties for this position. Firstly, a criterion for anything, say 
x, if it is to be worthy of the name, must serve to distinguish cases of x from 
cases of non-x. But this the sceptic's criterion cannot do, because by its 
lights there are no cases of x. If she hopes to establish and use her definition 
as a criterion, then she must allow that on it, there could logically be cases 
of x. Secondly, we could have an interest in asking where the sceptic gets her 
definition from. It denies the possibility of empirical knowledge in the real 
world, so that it is clearly not from the real world that the sceptic gets her 
ideas of knowledge. This consideration raises suspicions about the accuracy 
or effectiveness of those ideas as a criterion of actual, mundane knowledge, 
which the sceptic submits them as. 
If she wishes to avoid these difficulties, the sceptic's best bet is to present 
her definition of knowledge as an idealized model which actual instances may 
approach more or less closely. Then we could allow that a particular instance 
Chapter 2 - A sensibly naturalized epistemology 5~ 
is actually a case of knowledge even though it does not perfectly or 
comprehensively fulfil the sceptical ideal. 
Though the sceptic will probably want to insist that her definition of 
knowledge is incapable of real instantiations, it can still play a useful part in 
a naturalistic epistemology by laying down the prescriptive ideal of 
knowledge. There are plenty of models in science which the actual material 
world fits only with difficulty, and with the help of ad hoc adjustments to 
explain contingent deviations. The idealized gas laws, as we have mentioned, 
express perfect ratios which real gases satisfy only more or less accurately. 
Nevertheless, real gases are said to exemplify those laws, and the laws apply 
to (that is they predict and explain the behaviour of) real gases. 
The sceptic's requirement for justification is useful in so far as it expresses 
the desirability of considering every conceivable circumstance which could 
defeat a knowledge claim and of eliminating as far as possible such 
defeaters, in order to establish a knowledge claim securely. The naturalistic 
epistemologist differs from the sceptic, however, in that he holds that 
knowledge can, and does very often, occur, with less than such absolute 
justification, just as the behaviour of actual gases instantiates Boyle's and 
Dalton's laws, even though it may measurably deviate from the ideal. 
Notes to Chapter 2 
1. Parts of this chapter have appeared, in slightly different form, in 
'Naturalized epistemology and scepticism', published in the South African 
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Journal of Philosophy, 12, 4, Nov 1993. The material is used here with 
acknowledgements to that Journal and the permission of the Editor 
2. See for instance the work of Laudan (1984, 1987) and Thagard (1989). 
3. See Rescher (1980: 10-15) for a general discussion of the problem; 
Chisholm (1977: 119 - 134) for an analysis of how it enters into any 
epistemological methodology. Shope (1983: 34 - 44) offers an interesting 
analysis of how current epistemology proceeds by means of definition and 
counterexample, a sort of dialectic between the prescriptive ideal and the 
observed reality. 
4. After the deaf, purblind comic character Mr. Magoo, who has consistently 
amazing luck in avoiding open manholes, runaway trucks, etc, that he isn't 
aware of. Though they are false beliefs, because they are invariably 
accompanied by great good fortune, they enable Mr Magoo to negotiate his 
environment with consistent pragmatic success. The epistemological interest 
of the concept lies in its splitting of truth and practical success, as pointed 
out by Sosa (1978: 192 - 193) and discussed by Shope ('Magoo's Murk',1983: 
112). 
5. See also Dancy's version of the brains-in-a-vat argument, 1985:10-11. 
CHAPTER 3- Some implications of naturalization 
In the recent epistemological literature, though naturalization has been 
widely discussed in general terms, and its methodological propriety either 
recommended or questioned, there has not been much evidence of work done on 
substantive theses that might come out of a naturalized position in response 
to traditional or mainstream epistemological issues, and especially in 
response to the question of epistemic justification. 
Kornblith is one exception to this general remark. He has argued (1987: 115 -
128) that both foundationalism, the traditional theory of rationalists and 
empiricists, and coherentism, the newer theory of more socially and 
pragmatically oriented epistemologists, have been superseded by naturalism . 
Foundationalism and oherentism were two theories which, in spite of their 
differences, shared an 'anti-psychological approach to epistemological 
questions' (ibid.: 116) which, in the new light of naturalism, makes them 
equally untenable. He goes on to outline a theory of justification 'beyond 
foundationalism and the coherence theory' (ibid.: 115}. 
Haack (1988} is another epistemologist who sets out some of the explicit 
conclusions which follow from a naturalistic methodology, for a theory of 
justification. She investigates a conciliatory route to getting beyond 
foundationalism and coherentism, in a theory she calls 'foundherentism'. This 
synthesis of the two established theories of justification concedes the 
justificatory significance of both sense experience and the web of doxastic 
relations, for any one particular empirical belief, which is a position similar 
to the one being argued for in this thesis. We too shall arrive at the view (in 
Chapter 5) that some form of foundationalism regarding empirical 
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justification, and some form of coherentism regarding other kinds of 
justification, is inevitable. However, it seems to me that 'foundherentism' 
does not give due attention to the considerable variety of the relations in 
which an empirical belief might stand to other beliefs, a subject to be 
discussed later under the style of 'dependence relations of empirical belief'. 
Before attempting a naturalized theory of immediate empirical justification, 
it is necessary to spell out certain general guiding principles that follow 
from a heuristic methodology (that is, setting out to discover what 
knowledge is rather than to construct a definition of knowledge), and from 
realism about the instances of knowledge and justified belief (that is, 
assuming that many, and probably most, of what are generally thought to be 
cases of knowing, are in fact such). These may be called the two sine qua 
non's of naturalization. 
3.1 Five naturalistic principles 
From what has been said so far about the two essential commitments of a 
naturalized epistemology (the methodological and the ontological), it may be 
claimed that the following maxims follow from them: 
1. Empirical beliefs arise within the physical causal order and are essentially 
dependent upon, though not always directly definable in terms of, their 
material causes. 
2. The content and character of an empirical belief of an agent S is 
establishable on the basis of material facts accessible to an observer (the 
belief's input and output conditions). 
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3. Justification is a normative property of the psychological state of belief, 
which in turn is a property of a complex of natural facts, including a 
conscious cortex. 
4. Justification is primarily applicable to the epistemic agent S, in virtue of 
the complex psychological state he instantiates, rather than only to the 
proposition which is the content of the state. 
5. Most of what are commonly taken (said, thought, claimed) to be justified 
beliefs, and states of knowing in actual epistemic agents, are in fact so. 
These principles are basic to the kind of naturalistic epistemology being 
advocated here, and acceptance of them results in a certain epistemological 
position concerning the nature of empirical belief and justification, one 
which combines doxastic involuntarism and realism about psychological 
states (consequences of principles 1, 2 and 5), in a modest or fallibilist 
(principle 4) foundational ism (principle 1 ), that nevertheless acknowledges 
the internal and deontological aspects of justification (principles 3 and 4). 
The implications of 1, 2 and 5 will be looked at; firstly, the difficulties of 
reconciling the intentionality and justifiability of beliefs with the fact that 
they are physically caused, and secondly, the realist consequences of the 
three axioms. Then the foundationalist implications of naturalism will be set 
out, and finally its fallibilist consequences. 
3.2 Fitting beliefs into the causal order 
The first principle states that empirical beliefs 'arise within the causal 
Chapter 3 - The implications of naturalization 57 
order'; the second, that the physical facts related to a belief are a means of 
access to it. If this is true of all empirical beliefs, it is even more true of 
immediate empirical beliefs about one's immediate physical environment, 
which we acquire largely as a result of what happens to be in the immediate 
physical environment. S opens the curtains, and as a result of a complex 
interaction between light, the surface of an object and the interoceptors and 
higher brain centres, S comes to believe that there is a cypress tree in the 
garden. He acquires the belief through no conscious effort of his own; rather, 
it simply occurs to him. In the acquisition of a typical immediate empirical 
belief then, there is a chain of physical events, causes and effects of each 
other, between objects in reality and the neurophysiological system of the 
subject, and the belief is a result of this process. Accepting this picture 
means accepting that beliefs are inextricably bound up with physical causal 
processes, and it suggests a thesis of involuntarism 3 with regard to 
empirical beliefs. 
Given this causal picture of objective physical fact in an epistemological 
context, two difficulties arise. Firstly, the question of intentionality: how 
are beliefs as representational, conscious, non-physical states to be grafted 
onto the physical causal chain? How can a little burst of electro-chemical 
activity in the neurons be an experience of a cypress tree in front of one? 
Secondly, the question of justification: how can we speak of S being justified 
{a concept including normative notions of responsibility, reasonableness and 
choice) in an immediate belief, if it is something that the agent suffers 
willy-nilly as the result of an automatic process? 
3.2. 1 Intentionality 
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On the first point, we have already said something about how a belief is 
related to its physical base. It (the belief) is not to be thought of as the final 
event in the cause I effect series of events. The relation of the belief to the 
chain of physical events is not that of an effect to its cause, but rather of a 
result to its determining conditions, the relation referred to by the term 
'supervenient'. The belief depends upon, or is determined by, a complex array 
of physical facts related by cause I effect links, including, most importantly, 
states of the subject's nervous system. These states are conscious physical 
states, and the sui generis mental property of intentionality, essential in a 
belief, is a function of consciousness ('consciousness' being the subject of 
more detailed definition in Chapter 4). So if we remember that the sensory 
experience, which is a set of causally related physical states or events 
centering on a nervous system, is essentially a conscious state, the problem 
of how S has access to the physical facts disappears. She has access because 
she consciously instantiates the brain states which are at the centre of the 
experience. 
This conclusion is supported by a further argument in the next chapter, to the 
effect that perceptual experience is essentially doxastic in character, and 
that the caused sensory state is not to be divorced from the belief; and in 
Chapter 7, there is a claim that S, in a conscious sensory experience, has a 
special kind of cognitive access to the fact that it is a caused sensory state. 
In short, I am relying here on the special property of consciousness, as a 
feature of brain-states, to carry us from the physical causal order to the 
realm of the mental. Brain-stuff, as Searle points out, is capable of having 
both physical and psychological properties, though the fact is perhaps not 
very widely recognized yet. 'Many AI (artificial intelligence) workers are 
quite shocked by my idea that actual human mental phenomena might be 
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dependent on actual physical-chemical properties of actual human brains' 
(1982:371). 
3.2.2 Justification 
How shall we address the second difficulty then, and what will carry us from 
the determined causal order to the realm of responsible and justified 
believing? The problem might be put so: a belief is said to supervene on a 
chain of physical causes and effects which occur without any choice on the 
part of S. His empirical beliefs 'occur to him', we said earlier; he has them 
thrust upon him by the environment. A belief 'arises' automatically, given 
certain physical facts involving a brain, within the causal order. The upshot 
of all this is that S is constrained to believe as he does; he has no choice in 
the matter. 
But it is also true that the notion of justification is essentially a normative 
one, applying to the subject of the belief state. She is judged as reasonable or 
not, as justified or not, according to certain criteria for epistemically 
responsible believing (as indicated in principles 3 and 4), where the action 
which is being assessed is the accepting or maintaining of an immediate 
empirical belief. There is an implication of voluntariness in this terminology 
of 'accepting' and 'maintaining'. Moreover, we speak of an agent as being 'rash' 
or 'hopeful', 'careful' or 'conservative' in what she believes, implying that 
believing is the sort of action we can evaluate. But if someone is judged as 
praiseworthy or blameworthy in a certain action, the assumption is that she 
had a free choice in the matter. If S could not have done otherwise, if she was 
forced to act as she did, then the possibility of normative assessment of her 
action falls away. So it seems that to say S's belief was caused is to say that 
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she was not responsible for it and cannot therefore be either justified or 
unjustified in holding it. 
I can do no more here than indicate the two main routes to a resolution of this 
difficulty. The first is to put the issue into the general terms of the free will 
I determinism controversy. 'Free choice', at least in the context of decision 
theory, is usually taken to mean that S, when he chose to do A at t, could 
equally well have chosen to do 8 or C. But if we consider that at t, S had a 
fixed set of preferences and background beliefs which worked to determine 
his choice of possible outcome, then it becomes obvious that S, as he was at 
t, could not have chosen otherwise than he did. The choice was a function of 
S's perceived circumstances and his relevant psychological states at t. The 
idea that S could choose otherwise at t, i.e., according to preferences and 
beliefs. which he did not then have (and which would those be, exactly?), is 
difficult to make sense of. 
The sort of free will embodied in the notion of a choice which is not 
contingent upon the agent's interests and beliefs, is thus seen to be an 
illusion. People do not have it in general when acting in the world, they do not 
have it in the case of empirical believing in particular, and it is just wishful 
thinking to expect that they could. Indeed, it is not greatly to be wished that 
our believing should be governed by unspecified and unknown sets of beliefs 
and interests. The sense of free agency which the epistemic agent might have 
when he thinks about choosing, rejecting and maintaining empirical beliefs, is 
attributable to the phenomenon of first-person instantiation of conscious 
states. The determining set of preferences and beliefs are present to the 
agent's consciousness as reasons pro and con a new belief, and the way in 
which they determine it, is present to consciousness as deliberation or 
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reflection. 
The fact of first-person instantiation of conscious states also affords a way 
of understanding the deontological aspects of justification theory within a 
naturalistic epistemology. An agent is obliged to 'follow rules' in acquiring 
and holding beliefs. Now a naturalistic epistemologist sees justificatory 
rules as emerging from the stipulation of causal processes of getting and 
maintaining normal empirical beliefs. If, as will be argued in Chapter 7, those 
processes are present to the agent's consciousness through her first-person 
instantiation of them, then she will experience them as the 'following of 
rules'. There is thus no reason why the naturalistic epistemologist should not 
continue to use the convenient idiom of deontological justification theory, so 
long as it remains clear that the duties, rules and responsibilities referred 
to, are ultimately determined with reference to the natural causal processes 
according to which agents standardly acquire and hold empirical beliefs. 
The discussion so far has tried to indicate a way of understanding how the 
experience of free choice and responsibility which is present to believing, can 
be reconciled with the causal processes by which empirical belief is 
determined. The second part of the argument attempts a resolution of how it 
is that we can apply a normative judgement to a caused action, relying upon a 
Humean kind of answer to the problem. 
Hume shows (Selby-Bigge, 1978: 409 - 411), that moral accountability 
inheres in choices made according to, and not independently of, the agent's 
beliefs and interests. The opposite of a caused action is a random action, to 
which no judgements can be applied. The causal or determinative processes at 
work in the case of action in general, and of empirical believing in particular, 
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are to be thought of as not only constraining but as ordering, as providing the 
possibility of rational explanation and assessment. 
The involuntariness with which S accepts or maintains an empirical belief 
means that his rational action takes place in accordance with certain 
determinative laws; that, given certain sensory experiences, or certain 
background empirical beliefs, S is bound to believe what they point to, as 
factual. We are able to apply evaluative judgements to this sort of believing 
just because it does take place in a law-governed way. If the accepting or 
maintaining of an empirical content by. S were 'Brownian', anomological, 
completely random or at the whim of S, then there would be no question of 
assessing the belief for its doxastic propriety - 'anything goes' in a realm 
without determining principles. If, as Hume shows the negation of causal 
determination is chance or indifference or random, accidental connections, 
then it is in nomological, 'involuntary' connections of cause and effect that 
the possibility of evaluative judgement inheres. 
This has been a very brief discussion of very big issues, but I hope it has done 
enough to indicate that the commitment in a naturalistic epistemology to the 
importance of physical causal processes, need not necessarily conflict with a 
commitment to either the intentionality or the normative assessibility of 
empirical beliefs. How those two commitments may actually be reconciled, 
and whether both sides can satisfactorily be accommodated in 
epistemological practice, will transpire in the theory of prima facie 
justification of immediate beliefs that follows in the rest of this thesis. 
3.3 Realism about beliefs 
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Now for the realist implications of the two physicalist principles, numbers1 
and 2. A realist about beliefs would want to say that, as supervenient 
psychological states produced by the natural physical order, empirical beliefs 
have a real ontological basis, and thus could be other than they are taken to be 
by the general theorist, by an observer ascribing a belief to an agent, or even 
by the subject of the belief. The tenet of realism is consistent with the 
heuristic methods adopted by the naturalistic epistemologist. Beliefs exist in 
their own right, supervening on physical facts, and the epistemologist (like 
everyone else) finds out about them through careful attention to the material 
evidence that we have for their existence. The epistemologist sets himself 
this task, of discovering the features of beliefs, since it is a belief of a 
certain kind that forms the core of a state of knowing. 
Commitment to a heuristic methology implies that a philosophical theory of 
belief, no less than its scientific counterpart, is an hypothesis which is 
always open to revision in the light of new data on particular cases, from 
ordinary life or from the psychological laboratory. The epistemologist must 
constantly remind herself that she could be wrong in her definition of belief. 
In the particular case too, any attribution ·of a belief to an intentional agent, 
might turn out to have been wrong. There are of course ways of correcting a 
wrong attribution, ways of being right about beliefs - the identity criteria of 
any one particular belief state are publicly accessible, and the content of the 
state is explicable with reference to the state's place in the natural causal 
order. 
How exactly are we to take the realist thesis? Where idealism may be roughly 
characterized as the view that in taking cognizance of something, the 
cognizing subject invests the objects of his thought with all the reality that 
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they possess, realism is the view that the world and the things in it have a 
real existence and individual characters independently of these being 
cognized or recognized in any way. A common formulation of realism which 
sums this idea up, is that 'things might be other than they seem to me'. In 
order to be a realist about belief one would have to maintain that 'Beliefs 
(any and all beliefs) might be other than they seem to me'. On the score of 
beliefs in particular, the realist's claim of possible mistake applies to the 
ascription of any of the individual beliefs in some determinate set. If we can 
be mistaken in identifying any one belief of S's, then the possibility exists 
that we are globally mistaken with regard to S's doxastic set. However, that 
possibility is most real when a small selection of S's beliefs is in question; 
it becomes remoter as more and more beliefs are consistently attributed to S. 
4 
There are (at least) two different ways in which the realist thesis about 
beliefs is commonly denied, ways in which the implicit assumption is made 
that a belief is just whatever we say it is. We might say these are two 
anti-naturalistic currents in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. 
Firstly, there is the plausible view of belief as essentially a 'theoretical 
construct', as something an observer of behaviour constructs and ascribes so 
that the behaviour may be explained or understood. Secondly, there is the 
philosophically widespread notion that people have privileged access to, and 
cannot be mistaken with regard to, their own mental states, including 
(perhaps especially ) belief states. 
3.3. 1 Discovering other people's beliefs 
Why should the first be a difficulty for the realist about beliefs? Because it 
seems to imply that a belief just is whatever the attributor reasonably 
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imputes to the agent. What we are calling the 'theoretical construct' view of 
belief may be drawn from several philosophical theories of mind, ranging 
from Davidson's interpretation theory, through Bayesian decision theory, to 
Rylean and Wittgensteinian logical behaviourism. It must be stressed that 
these various views of mental states do not necessarily imply a reductive 
definition of belief as 'nothing but a theoretical construct', but in the ways to 
be set out below, they all lend credence to it. 
On the 'theoretical construct' view of belief, a belief state has no independent 
existence apart from its being the explanation of an action, and it can be 'read 
off' the action by an observer, given some information about the agent's ends. 
If beliefs have no status apart from their role as the rational explanation of, 
or reason for, a piece of behaviour, then observers have only to hit upon a 
reasonable account of an action to be incorrigibly right in attributing a belief 
to an agent. The belief is no more than the rational explanation of the action. 
Another version of this kind of anti-realist reduction, is the definition of 
belief about the future as the subjective probability of some state of affairs 
for a rational agent S, which is formalized in Bayesian decision theory 5 . On 
such a view, belief is completely determined by the likelihood of S's acting in 
a certain way, given that she holds certain values. For instance, if S is 
disposed to eat bananas in preference to anything else, then, given that she 
prefers food which is good for her, an observer may infer that S believes that 
bananas are good for her. Behaviour is a function of expected utility and 
subjective probability, and from here it is a short step to identifying belief 
exhaustively with the reason for an action, where 'reason for' means 'cause of' 
and 'explanation of' indifferently. The three interlocking elements of 
rationality - behaviour, belief and value - are mutually definitive of each 
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other, and access to any two gives an accurate fix on, and complete definition 
of, the third. This much is useful; to use a given action and desire as evidence 
for the existence of a particular belief is quite consistent with a naturalistic 
methodology. The mistake only comes in, the realist claims, when we start 
thinking that there is no more to a belief than its definition in terms of 
behaviour and values. 
A similar conception of belief, with the same reductive tendency, has been 
promoted by those who see a belief state as a state exhaustively describable 
in terms of actual or probable behavioural outputs; behaviouristically inclined 
philosophers like Ryle and Wittgenstein might be examples of this viewpoint. 
It is hard to reconcile such a view of belief with realism concerning beliefs, 
and to see how an observer 0 could be wrong about what he takes a such a 
belief - belief which is nothing but the reason constructed by an observer for 
an action - to be. It is important for the naturalist about beliefs to 
distinguish his realist position from the kind of behaviourism that denies any 
independent existence to beliefs, especially since a naturalistic epistemology 
is sometimes mistakenly thought to consist in precisely such an 
identification. 
The anti-realist about beliefs wants to claim: '0 cannot be wrong in 
attributing a particular belief to S so long as his attribution is based on good 
information about the action and S's ends, and conforms to certain criteria 
for describing rational action, and so long .as S is minimally rational'. There is 
much that is right in this claim. In so far as the explanatory construct view 
of beliefs rests on functionalist principles regarding output conditions, it has 
several wholesome implications; in fact, the view that a belief is 
attributable on the strength of a consistent pattern of behaviour is an 
assumption underlying many of the arguments in this thesis. The only part of 
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the anti-realist's claim that we are taking issue with, is that 0 cannot be 
wrong in his attribution. 
Take the banana-eating case for instance. 0 claims that S's belief that 
bananas are good for her, is an ineluctable function of her desire to eat what 
is good for her and her habit of eating bananas. Yet it is always possible that 
S desires to eat what is good for her, eats bananas, and yet does not believe 
that they are good for her. She has, let us say, a general background belief to 
the effect that bananas, while very good-tasting, are actually bad for people, 
or have no nutritive effect; her eating of bananas is just weakness of the 
will. In this case, an observer who sees S eating the banana and knows of S's 
general desire to eat what is good for her, would nevertheless be quite wrong 
in drawing what seems the only conclusion - that S believes bananas are good 
for her. S's belief regarding bananas is that they are not good for her to eat. 
The observer may even attribute a belief where none exists. As an example of 
how one could be mistaken in this way, consider the case of someone who 
sees a man waving his hands about his face, and thinks: 'That man believes 
there is something, perhaps a fly, in the air about his face, and wishes to 
drive it away'. But it may be the case that this is not a piece of behaviour at 
all, that the hand-waving is a compulsive· tic on the man's part and that no 
belief-ascription can explain it since it is not a rational action. 
These ways in which belief attributions may go wrong are enough to show 
how beliefs are distinct from, and essentially independent of, the evidence 
we may think we have of them. The realist's sensitivity to the gap keeps him 
alive to the evidence and always willing to revise an attribution or 
identification of a belief. We should remember however, that even granting all 
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the uncertainties in the attribution of beliefs on the basis of observable 
evidence, studying the material evidence remains the naturalistic 
epistemologist's preferred method of gaining access to beliefs. 
3.3.2 Discovering our own beliefs 
The second difficulty for a realist thesis concerning beliefs, is the widely 
accepted view that a belief is just whatever its subject says it is, that the 
first-person avowal of a belief or of an experience (which, as I shall argue in 
the next chapter, amount to the same thing in the epistemological context) is 
self-authenticating. In the first-person case, the assertion of a content ('This 
is an apple') and the meta-level assertion of belief in a content ('I believe 
this is an apple') come to the same thing. The realist claims that contrary to 
the usual assumption of infallibility concerning one's own mental states, 
there is always the possibility that S is mistaken about even his own sensory 
experiences and immediate empirical beliefs. S's beliefs may 'always be other 
than they seem' to S. 
The thesis of first-person authority with regard to ascriptions and 
descriptions of beliefs rests upon the idea that people have a privileged sort 
of epistemic access to their own internal psychological states, which they do 
not have to things in their external environment. The assumption is that S's 
cognizance of his own pain, his visual image of a patch of blue, and his belief 
that it is cold, is immediate and non-inferential and leaves no room for error, 
so that he cannot be mistaken in it. This is the claim of S's infallibility with 
regard to his own immediate beliefs. Moreover, since no one else has access 
to S's psychological states, if he is sincere in his attribution of the state, he 
cannot be proved wrong about it. This is the claim of the incorrigibility of 
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the first-person statement of an immediate belief. 
The claim of infallibility and incorrigibility has obvious anti-realist 
implications. If S has these powers with regard to his immediate beliefs, 
then they cannot be other than they seem to him. His consciousness of the 
belief would be sufficient for its existence. The realist's claim to the 
contrary, upon which a naturalistic, heuristic methodology depends, is that 
even in the first-person avowal of immediate beliefs, S may always be 
mistaken about what he takes himself to be believing. It can be shown that S 
may be mistaken about his own doxastic states in several different ways: he 
may make a mistake in identifying and describing a belief of his own; he may 
have beliefs that he does not know about, and that he may fail initially to 
recognize even when they are offered for his corroboration; and he may 
erroneously take certain psychological states of his own, which mimic 
empirical beliefs, for the real thing. 
Perhaps the best argument for these three ways of being mistaken about one's 
own beliefs, is to consider some examples. In the first case, (making a 
mistake in identifying and describing an immediate belief of one's own), S 
might believe that the flowers in the vase are vermilion and yet misdescribe 
his belief as being that the flowers in the vase are magenta . This need not be 
just a negligible verbal slip, the result of 'bringing out the wrong word' 
(Austin, 1962: 113, also 1976: 90 - 95), in which case one would say that S 
was not so much mistaken as to the features of his belief and its content, as 
to the meaning of the two colour words involved, and in which case correcting 
his error would entail improving his semantics and not reconsidering his 
experiential belief. But there is always the possibility that S, knowing the 
meaning of the two words perfectly, and perceiving accurately, didn't 'notice 
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or attend to or properly size up the colour' as it occurred to him 
phenomenally, so that he could 'be brought to see, or perhaps remember' (ibid.) 
that the flowers had in fact appeared to him as vermilion. 
As another example of a misidentification of a belief, consider the 
entomologist who, being thoroughly familiar with a certain species of moth F, 
having before her a specimen of it and recognizing it to be an F, yet at time t, 
refers to it mistakenly as a G and files it in the G drawer. Shortly afterwards, 
it strikes her that she has erred, and she corrects her error. Now what did S 
believe at t? She claimed, both verbally and by her actions, to believe that the 
moth was a G. But the features of the sensory experience, together with her 
background beliefs about kinds of moths, were in fact constitutive of the 
belief that the moth was an F, a fact that S herself recognizes when she 
rights the mistake. As with the colours, S corrects her mistake in retrospect 
and with reference to nothing beyond her own mental states. It is not fresh 
data that caused S to revise her classification, but a new awareness of the 
features of her sensory experience. We have grounds therefore for saying that 
at t, S believed the moth was an F, and further, for saying that S may 
misdescribe and misidentify her own beliefs. 
The second possible way of being wrong with regard to his own beliefs lies in 
S's having beliefs that he does not initially recognize when they are offered 
for his inspection. The qualification 'initially' is necessary if the generally 
true principle of an agent's having access to his own doxastic states is to be 
maintained; it does not weaken the claim that, at any given moment, he may 
be mistaken about them. There is nothing surprising in S's having beliefs that 
he does not know about; it is probable that a majority of any agent's empirical 
beliefs are non-occurrent in the sense that they are never consciously before 
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his mind or asserted in sentence form by him. But infallibility about his own 
beliefs would seem to require that S assent to a sentence that he understood 
and that expressed the content of a belief state of his, when it was offered 
him, or to assert the sentence that expressed his belief when appropriately 
questioned. 
This need not be the case. S rummages through a drawer for his pen, then goes 
to the next room, where 0, having heard the rummaging, asks: 'Are my keys in 
the desk drawer?' S blankly but sincerely replies: 'I don't know'. He does know, 
however, and is brought to realize it when 0 reminds him he's just looked in 
the drawer. He then consults his visual memory of its contents and 
remembers that the keys were in it. When questioned by 0 then, he did have 
the belief that the keys were in the drawer, but did not immediately 
recognize it. This sort of experience, though perhaps not common, is ordinary 
enough and certainly recognizable. Again in this example, there is nothing in 
the way of new input or evidence between the time at which S denies that he 
has a belief about the pen's presence in the drawer and the time at which he 
acknowledges it. 
The third way of being mistaken about one's own belief states involves being 
'taken in' by states that are really wishes, fears, guesses, etc., and coming to 
accord these the status of full-blown empirical beliefs - laying claim, in all 
sincerity, to a belief that one does not actually possess. 'Laying claim to a 
belief' need not be just a matter of explicitly ascribing it to oneself; one 
might lay claim to a belief by avowing its content or behaving in appropriate 
non-linguistic ways too. It is easy enough to show that S can ascribe a belief 
to herself when she does not in fact possess it - habitual liars do so all the 
time - but the tough question for the realist to answer is: can she do so 
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sincerely and without self-deception? Can she honestly think that she 
believes that something is the case when she does not really so believe? If 
the naturalistic approach to beliefs outlined so far is right, and the thesis of 
doxastic realism that it implies is correct, then the answer to these 
questions will be 'Yes'. 
Wishful thinking and groundless hunches do in fact fill the role of 
pseudo-beliefs which dupe their subject. They are, it is true, usually 
conceived of as paradigms of unjustified belief, and they may play the same 
role as beliefs in directing behaviour, but they are not what we shall call 
'empirical beliefs proper'. At least three considerations can be introduced to 
throw suspicion on their full doxastic status: they are not states which arise 
in the same natural causal way as ordinary empirical beliefs; when such a 
pseudo belief's unnatural genesis is exposed, S cannot (without 
self-deception) continue to hold it; and, though they may be loosely referred 
to as beliefs, they are actually wishes, guesses or flights of imagination 
which have been allowed to behave as beliefs. 
For example, the thought pops into S's head that there is ice cream in the deep 
freezer, and soon it has enough force to impel S freezerwards. S, standing 
before an empty freezer, plate and spoon in hand, says, 'Oh well, I didn't really 
believe there was ice-cream here; I was just sort of hoping it.' We need to 
notice two things. Firstly, when confronted by the empty freezer, S is obliged 
to give up the wishful thought. It is doubtful whether an agent can have a 
wishful thought, a hunch or a guess about an immediate empirical content, 
since immediate beliefs necessarily occur in sensory experience which is 
absent in the case of hunches, etc. Secondly, if she had critically reflected on 
the origins of her mental state, or the grounds on which she held the 
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statement true, S could have saved herself the trip to the freezer. That is, the 
hunch is groundless, and it is within S's cognitive competence to realize this. 
But S is not always so reasonable, and might not always be able or willing to 
give up her groundless hunches, or to aqmit that they are just that and not 
serious beliefs. She conceives the thought that p is the case, and comes to 
treat this thought as a piece of properly acquired information. Her behaviour 
is consistent with her believing such a fact, she holds true with great 
conviction (interestingly, often with more vehemence than one who simply 
believes the fact) sentences expressing the content of the hunch. 
Nevertheless, she is still capable of recognizing that the mental state is not 
a straightforward belief about some empirical fact; it is a wish or a hope, 
that she is allowing to play a belief-like role in the 'economy of her 
intentional system' (to borrow a Davidsonian phrase). 
To draw a distinction between empirical belief states proper, on the one hand, 
and hunches, guesses and wishful thoughts on the other hand, is, in the first 
place, to build a kind of normative 'success' condition into the concept of 
empirical belief proper. Hunches and guesses may be called beliefs, they may 
sincerely be thought of as beliefs by their subjects, but the ascription is 
withdrawn or at least qualified as soon as these states are subjected to 
critical reflection. They cannot be called empirical beliefs unconditionally, 
which is why the special terms 'hunch', 'wishful thought', etc., apply to them. 
They are at best a sub-class of beliefs. In deference to accepted usage, 
however, we may continue to call hunches, etc., 'beliefs', referring to the kind 
of empirical belief which is epistemologically relevant, as 'serious' or 
'epistemic' empirical belief, or empirical belief 'proper'. 
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Secondly, the distinction implies that all empirical beliefs proper are 
justified on the subjective perspective. Since they are not automatically 
renounced once their subject examines the grounds he has for holding them, 
the content of empirical beliefs proper must be something S thinks he has 
good reason to hold, and to continue to hold even after subjecting it to 
critical evaluation. The content of hunches, etc., essentially lack grounds; 
they are paradigms of reasonless states. Of course, subjective reasons are 
not necessarily good reasons simpliciter, nor is S's justification for thinking 
that p is the case, ipso facto objectively successful justification. More of the 
difference in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The third implication of this distinction between hunches and empirical 
belief proper, is that not just anything which plays a determining role in the 
behaviour of an intentional system vis a vis its environment, that is, not just 
any mental state in which S holds true some empirical content, is an 
empirical belief proper. The 'scant propositional' view of belief was 
criticized earlier, as neglecting important aspects of the psychological state 
of empirical belief, especially its aetiology. To think that a hunch or guess is 
a fully-fledged belief depends on seeing belief as only the holding-true of a 
proposition, and perhaps its consequent disposition to act, a position that 
needs to be qualified in the light of the first naturalistic principle above, 
viz., that belief arises within the physical causal order. Behavioural output 
alone, which might be indistinguishable in the cases of the guess and the 
proper belief, that there is ice-cream in the deep freezer, is not enough to 
establish an empirical belief proper; the input must be right too. 
The principle of realism regarding empirical belief thus dictates that even 
the subject of a belief be alive to the evidence he has for it. There are 
Chapter 3 - The implications of naturalization 75 
belief-like states that S might mistake for beliefs proper until he examines 
the grounds he has for holding them, whereupon he ceases to hold them as 
beliefs. Those beliefs which stand up to critical reflection are beliefs proper; 
given the reasons for which he believes, S cannot do otherwise than hold 
them true. 
The distinction is reinforced by the thesis of doxastic involuntarism. The 
definition of involuntary belief has it that a belief is 'involuntary for S at t 
iff S cannot do otherwise than hold p true at t' (note 3 below). Wishful 
thoughts and guesses are not involuntary in this sense. If S pays attention to 
the origins of a groundless hunch, say, as it is in his reflective capacity to do, 
he will be obliged to give it up as a seriqus belief. He will have to recognize 
he has no reason to suppose its content true. S in his capacity as 'the rational 
agent' thus certainly is not obliged to hold the content of a hunch or guess 
true. If he does so, it is not in virtue of the involuntary constraints which a 
genuine empirical belief-producing process place on him, but in virtue of a 
voluntary choice made usually at the instance of his desires or interests. 
In sum then, the thesis of realism concerning empirical beliefs, both other 
people's beliefs and our own, requires that we admit they could always be 
other than we take them to be. It is an admission which is in accordance with 
the fact that mistakes occur in both first- and third-person 
belief-attribution, as seen in the examples above, and which is consistent 
with the naturalistic epistemologist's heuristic methodology. 
3.4 Naturalism and foundationalism 
An important consequence of methodological naturalism, (specifically, of 
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taking the first three naturalistic principles in 3.1 seriously), is that a 
foundationalist view of the structure of empirical justification is entailed. 
By 'taking seriously' these three principles, which refer to the physical 
determining or causal conditions for beliefs, I mean that the epistemologist 
acknowledges the importance of these conditions for, and the need to use the 
scientific model of explanation in, epistemological theorizing (cf. Chapter 2, 
section 2 .1.1 - 'four reasons for wanting close relations between 
epistemology and natural science'). Any enquiry into the phenomenon of 
empirical belief must be conducted by observing the determining or causal 
regularities with which such belief is associated; any understanding of belief 
will be gained by seeing how belief, especially empirical belief, results from 
its originating causes; and explaining belief and its features means showing 
how beliefs arise in terms of general causal covering laws. 
The question is: how does this position result in foundationalism? As a 
general rule, theories of empirical justification (doxastic theories anyway; 
cf. Pollock 1986:19 - 21) are classifiable as either foundationalist or 
coherentist. The foundationalist sees the structure of any one particular 
belief's justification as linear, being constituted by other beliefs of S, which 
in turn are justified by further beliefs of S's, until a set of beliefs is reached 
which are justified without depending on any other beliefs. These are the 
sensory beliefs, or beliefs of experience. On this view, there are two 
different kinds of empirical justification and belief: basic, immediate, direct, 
or foundational, and inferential, indirect, or mediated. 
The coherentist on the other hand, holds that empirical justification is a 
complex web rather than a straight line; it consists in a particular belief's 
relations to all other beliefs in S's doxastic set. Beliefs, in so far as their 
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justification is concerned, are for the coherentist, all of one kind: inferential; 
there is no such thing as a basic or immediately justified belief. 
It is not in dispute between the foundationalist and the coherentist that there 
are causal, belief-producing processes (specifically the sensory processes), 
which are operative to different degrees and in different ways in introducing 
a belief into S's doxastic set. A particular empirical belief may be acquired 
directly in a sense experience (S may see that the kettle is boiling) or it may 
be arrived at purely on the basis of other beliefs and with no direct input 
from the senses (S may remember putting the kettle on a while ago, and, with 
general beliefs about the behaviour of kettles, this licenses the conclusion 
that the kettle is now boiling). 
The foundationalist and the coherentist agree that S finds out about the world 
either by observing it or by thinking about what she has already observed of 
it. But the coherentist denies that causal physical processes are of any 
significance for the character or justificatory status of a belief. More; the 
coherentist would wish to claim that observation and inference are two 
(negligbly) different routes to exactly the same belief; the foundationalist, 
that the ways in which they are acquired make them two different kinds of 
belief 6 . The coherentist is thus unable, within the framework of his 
epistemology, to distinguish the class of sensory beliefs from that of 
inferred beliefs. 
Bonjour (1985: 112 - 113) notes the difficulty of developing 'a viable 
conception of observation which is at the same time recognizably 
coherentist in character' when 'it is essential to the concept of observation 
that observational beliefs are noninferential in character' and 'equally 
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essential to the conception of a coherence theory ... that all justification is 
inferential, never direct or immediate'. His solution is to distinguish 'two 
quite different senses in which a belief may be classified as 'inferential' or 
'non-inferential' .. . how the belief was arrived at ' and 'how the belief in 
question is epistemically justified or warranted' (Bonjour's italics). 
Observation beliefs then, on a coherentist view, are arrived at without 
reference to other beliefs of the subject but, are justified with reference to 
them, while indirect beliefs are both arrived at and justified with reference 
to other beliefs, and the same set of beliefs in each particular case. For 
instance, if S uses the beliefs that the kettle was switched on five minutes 
ago, and that kettles generally boil in five minutes, to arrive at the new 
belief that the kettle is now boiling, then he also uses those two beliefs to 
justify his conclusion. The coherentist, however (in the person of Bonjour}, 
claims that genesis and justification, even though they happen to coincide in 
the case of indirect beliefs, are essentially distinct, and that the processes 
by which beliefs are produced and their causal determining conditions, are 
irrelevant to their justification. This is to say that how we understand and 
define an empirical belief, how we distinguish between a well-formed, 
epistemically proper belief and a belief which is neither of these things, is 
not to be done with reference to the causal process by which the belief was 
produced. In consequence, the coherentist must claim that one cannot explain 
belief and its justificatory status on the naturalistic model of causal 
explanation. 
In recognizing the role of causal processes, the naturalistic epistemologist 
acknowledges the asymmetry of justification among empirical beliefs which 
is definitive of foundationalism. The fact that beliefs produced essentially by 
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perception supervene upon one kind of physical array, including a sense 
experience, whereas those produced by memory or inference or a mixed mode 
will depend on another kind (ct. the dependence relations of basic and indirect 
empirical beliefs as discussed in Chapter 5), gives to perceptual and 
inferential beliefs a different epistemological character, on a naturalistic 
perspective, and this difference is reflected in the thesis of foundationalism. 
It is thus fairly safe to say that anyone who pays attention to, and grants the 
epistemological significance of, the material facts of belief acquisition and 
instantiation, as by definition the naturalistic epistemologist does, cannot 
avoid being a foundationalist. Conversely, anyone who adopts a coherentist 
view of justification is bound to ignore the causal processes that give rise to 
empirical beliefs. 
Is there some way in which a non-foundationalist could satisfy her 
naturalistic leanings and construct a theory which translated her insights 
about belief and justification into empirically observable terms? She would 
have to find some way of including beliefs in the natural order without paying 
any attention to their origins. Perhaps a behavioural theory of belief which 
ignored input, and identified a belief with its behavioural output, would do it. 
Pragmatism might be one such solution - the sort of view on which a belief, 
especially its truth value and justification, is identified with its observed 
behavioural effects. Justification, for instance, is nothing but consistent 
success of practical action. The sort of pragmatism or 'radical empiricism' 
made popular by James 7 , is usually associated with an admiration for 
science, and so might be thought to be necessarily naturalistic in character. 
It is not naturalistic in the methodological sense explained above, however, 
since it ignores the question of a belief's essential determining or causal 
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conditions - its input - in favour if its output. Were the pragmatist to adopt 
the scientific model of enquiry and explanation with regard to the character 
of empirical belief, then he would be a foundationalist. 
Contextualism might be another such solution (e.g., Annis, 1986); naturalistic 
because belief is observable action in a social context and coherentist rather 
than foundationalist because justification of an individual empirical belief is 
its coherence with the doxastic set of some epistemic community. Again, the 
contextualist, like the pragmatist, is silent about the causal origins of an 
empirical belief and their implications for its justification, and necessarily 
so, if he wishes to remain coherentist in outlook rather than foundationalist. 
In general, this is the cost of being a coherentist - that one must overloo·k the 
epistemic, and especially justificatory, significance of a belief's origins. The 
cost is not so high in the case of general empirical beliefs or a priori 
knowledge. In the case of particular empirical beliefs however, their causal 
physical conditions being essential to their general character and particular 
individuation, it is a considerable handicap. 
3.5 The corrigibility of empirical belief 
Another implication of naturalization for the epistemologist is the 
corrigibility of all belief. If the first three principles in 3.1 were the 'causal 
theses', then 4 and 5 may be thought of as the 'psychological theses' of a 
naturalized position. They commit their holder to relativizing all 
epistemological claims to a plausibly human epistemic agent and a time, 
rather than an ideal agent in a utopian epistemic context. In principle 5, (to 
the effect that most of what are commonly taken to be justified beliefs in 
actual epistemic agents are in fact so), the limit of prescriptivism for the 
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naturalistic theorist is set at the definition of normal empirical belief, 
realistically constructed with the average case as a model, rather than 
idealistically, with the perfect case in mind. 
This kind of methodological background leads away from the incorrigibility 
which was the mark of 'Cartesian epistemologies' (in Rorty's phrase, 1979), 
since the distinctive thing about real epistemic agents, in contrast to ideally 
rational ones, is that they may be mistaken about things. In reality, it is 
always possible that an empirical belief, even a justified empirical belief, 
will turn out to have been false. Real agents are not always wrong, of course, 
nor if they are normal are their empirical beliefs false in even a significantly 
large proportion of cases. As was claimed in the introductory chapter, the 
average empirical belief, on a bivalent system (as any theory of knowledge, 
with its strict truth condition, must be), will be true and not false. But the 
point is that any one belief in S's empirical belief set might be false, so that 
a naturalistic epistemology has to account for the ubiquitous possibility of 
error. 
The same position regarding the corrigibility of empirical belief is reached if 
principle 4 is followed to its logical conclusion. This is the principle that it 
is the whole complex doxastic psychological state of an agent that is the 
primary seat of epistemic justification 8 . In order to make clear what this 
entails, firstly, some explication of a 'complex psychological state' is offered 
below; then the view that justification inheres essentially in propositions is 
discussed, by way of contrast with the preferred view; and finally, four 
possible kinds of reasons are presented with the aim of comparing 
propositional and psychological-state conceptions of empirical justification. 
The overall aim is to add to the persuasiveness of principle 4. 
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I am assuming that there are at least three elements to the complex 
psychological state of empirical belief, widely construed: (i) a rational agent 
S, (ii) a representational content p and (iii) a context or background C, which 
S takes some statement of p to be true of. It is helpful to see p as stipulative 
and C as objective truth conditions. These three elements are summed up in 
the naturalistic relativization of epistemological claims to an agent and 
time: 'Bp is justified for S at t iff ... '. If Bp is an immediate empirical 
belief, then the time index t refers to the same thing that C does, since the 
only way of fixing an instant of time is to specify one frozen cross-section of 
the chronological procession of states, and this is the same thing as to 
specify a context, albeit not a specifically located one. Saying 'twelve o'clock 
yesterday', is just a way of pointing to a particular context, or of saying 'the 
instant at which there were five apples in the bowl, and the cat stretched on 
the mat, and the sun was at its zenith, and the phone rang, and ... '. In this way 
the elements of time and context may be seen to amount to the same thing in 
defining the psychological state of belief. We could say, for instance, of a 
basic belief: 'At t, S holds p true of t'. 
This does not define basic belief though, because the same might be true of a 
present-tense indirect empirical belief, as when S infers that the kettle is 
now boiling though he cannot see or hear it. However, in past-tense 9 
empirical beliefs, p's objective truth conditions are not the same as the 
context in which S holds Bp, so that we have to say: 'At t, S holds p true of t -
n', where '- n' is an indication of how far back in time S takes p to have 
occurred. What we may infer from this is that the objective reference of an 
empirical belief is as much a part of the whole doxastic state as is its 
content and subject. 
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If principle 4 is right, and it is this whole complex that is justified and not 
just the proposition in it, then we should be able to say what role each 
element plays in that justification. The agent S, qua agent, is justified 
(morally or deontologically) in the rational act of accepting or maintaining p 
just in case p is credible for S in C and S has fulfilled epistemic 
responsibilities of scrutinizing p and C, and being alive to background beliefs; 
p is credible (reasonable, justified) for S in C if it bears warranting marks, 
i.e., if it is recognizable as having some objective likelihood of being true of 
C. The justification of the whole belief state is a function of these 
justificatory relations holding between its parts 1 0 
In contrast to this view, the propositionalist assumes a belief is justified if 
the proposition in it is apodictically true, i.e., if it has evident incorrigibility 
or valid deductive relations to other propositions. The agent and the belief as 
a whole are derivatively justified just in case the proposition is. But it does 
not make any sense at all to speak of a particular empirical proposition being 
justified in abstraction from a doxastic state. It certainly cannot be 
contextlessly true, nor can an agent hold it true without reference to its 
objective truth conditions. Even general empirical claims like 'All crows are 
black' need a background (the whole actual world) against which their truth 11 
and reasonableness may be established. Propositions which are a priori in 
character, e.g., the theorems of logic and mathematics, since their truth is 
guaranteed by their position in a whole system of propositions, might be 
thought to enjoy some special autonomous kind of justification, regardless of 
whether they are believed by any particular agent or not. But the truth of an a 
posteriori, empirical proposition is tested against the particular material 
circumstances to which it refers, so that it cannot have any justification out 
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of the context of its being held true or believed. 
Historically, this fact was not accommodated in epistemological theories, 
which saw their project vis a vis the empirical, as the demonstration of how 
certainty might be attained. The focus has thus traditionally been on 
propositional properties and relations as the source of justification, a 
narrowing of range brought about by the feeling that incorrigibility of belief 
was somehow necessary if knowledge was to be satisfactorily explained, and 
that an incorrigible belief, whose justification was indefeasible, was just 
the mental state of acceptance of an incorrigible proposition. Propositions 
could be incorrigible in one of two ways. They could be the necessary 
deductive truths referred to above, guaranteed by convention and apprehended 
by reason or intuition, or they could be propositions which referred to the 
agent's own immediate state of consciousness, and whose acceptance was 
thus self-authenticating 12 . In whichever of the two ways the proposition 
achieved incorrigibility, it was confidently thought that its character was 
such, that when a rational agent took cognition of it, she found it indubitable, 
and in holding it true, she was infallibly right. 
'Autonomous justification' might well be a feature of such propositions and it 
calls for some explanation. It may be understood as a property vesting in any 
and all of those propositions which have a guaranteed, or at least highly 
secure, truth value, a truth value not contingent upon circumstance. If p is 
such a proposition, then Bp might be said to be 'autonomously justified' for 
any S, regardless of the context or causal history or character of her belief, 
and regardless of any of her other beliefs. This abstract justification 
consists in the fact that p's evident truth is a good reason for believing it; p 
thus comes with a ready-fitted justification. As such, it confers real 
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justification upon the belief state of any actual epistemic agent who, 
recognizing this property, comes to hold the proposition in question. 
But S might not recognize its necessary truth in accepting such a proposition. 
so that it need not be subjectively justified or reasonable for every agent 
holding it. For example, S may come to believe some true theorem of an 
axiomatic system not because he has deduced it for himself, or because he 
believes it to be just such a theorem, but because he thinks that particular 
set of symbols just looks right. In such a case, though there is a good 
justification for S's believing that p, he does not avail himself of it. His 
mental state is nevertheless, on the traditional view, incorrigible, since the 
proposition which he believes is indubitably true. 
In order to see what kind of justification it is (if any) that may be located in 
propositions rather than beliefs, let us take as a thumbnail definition of 
empirical justification, and one which will not beg the question - 'good 
reasons to believe that p'. Then there are four doxastic qualifications which 
may be put upon those reasons (R) in relation to Bp. 
R(i) - R may exist as facts, or 'asserted propositions' in the Russellian 
phrase, in perfect abstraction from any actual doxastic set. They would be 
recognizable as good reasons for Bp were anyone to come upon them. 
Justification here subsists potentially, in natural causal relations, not 
necessarily instantiated in any belief, between R and p. For instance S may 
believe without good grounds that there is life on Mars, though such reasons 
may exist in the form of little green creatures on the planet. 
R(ii) - R may be beliefs which are actually held by some or all members of an 
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epistemic community, who may or may not believe that p, but R are not in the 
doxastic set of S, the holder of Bp. 
R(iii) - The propositions which make up R may be believed by S, but not 
function as reasons for her believing that p, i.e., they may not be recognized 
as R. 
R(iv) - R may be held by S and function as reasons for which he comes to 
believe that p 13 . 
It seems fairly plain that the reasons in R(i) cannot serve to justify Bp in the 
sense required by principle 4; in fact their claim to being reasons at all is 
attenuated. It is noteworthy that the reliabilist's 'reasons', though they are no 
kind of evidence for the existence of p, are of this sort. For instance, if Bp is 
an immediate visual belief, then the reliabilist thinks it is justified for S by 
the fact that S's eyesight is 97% reliable, whether S or anyone else is aware 
of this fact or not. R(ii) represents the contextualist model of justification. 
It does not matter whether S herself has grounds for Bp; the belief is 
justified for her if it is generally regarded as a justified belief by her 
epistemic peers, if there are beliefs abroad in her society which warrant it 
as a reasonable belief. 
Both R(i) and (ii) locate the justifying propositions externally to S and his 
belief state, so that what is justified by these reasons is primarily the 
proposition held true, and the epistemic agent and his psychological state are 
derivatively justified by the propositional justification. R(i) and (ii) thus 
fail to satisfy principle 4, which holds justification to be 'primarily 
applicable to the epistemic agent and his psychological state, rather than to 
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the proposition believed'. In R(iii), though the reasons are not external to S, 
they are still outside his doxastic state Bp. For all the good they do Bp, S 
might just as well not believe them, and so by extension of the argument for 
R(i) and (ii}, R(iii) also fails principle 4. 
It is thus only R(iv) which satisfies 4, and so may be said to be the 
naturalistic adumbration of reasons, in the psychologistic sense of 
'naturalistic'. The point is worth attention, if only because it is often 
assumed that the reliabilist is the sole purveyor of a truly naturalistic brand 
of justification. 
The state of believing that p, on the naturalistic view, is to be thought of as 
more than the scant holding, witholding or denying that something is the case. 
That was the 'sentential view' taken by traditional epistemologists like 
Chisholm (see, e.g., 1977:6), and criticized by various naturalistic 
epistemologists, i.a., Kornblith, Churchland and Kitcher (ut supra). It embodies 
the conviction that all that is of importance or interest epistemologically in 
a belief, is that it can be characterized as a positive, a negative or a neutral 
attitude to a proposition. 
It is a reading which probably has its origins in the requirement that belief be 
taken as strictly bivalent for the purposes of defining the nature of 
knowledge, and as such it is of more use in stipulating the truth condition on 
knowledge than the justification condition. The naturalistic epistemologist is 
not denying the truth or importance of the fact that belief is a propositional 
attitude of this sort; he is denying that this is all that is of epistemological 
significance in the psychological state of belief. What more there is besides 
includes at least the character and causal history of the belief. 
Chapter 3 - The implications of naturalization 88 
The conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the naturalistic epistemologist 
sees justification as inhering in the whole belief state and not just its 
propositional relations, is that she must forego the hope of incorrigibility of 
belief, rooted in indubitability of proposition and resulting in infallibility of 
epistemic agent and indefeasibility of justification, which characterized 
more traditional epistemologies. 
It has been widely thought that accepting this conclusion about the 
corrigibility of all belief must mean the abandonment of foundationalism 14 
Basic beliefs had always been thought to be basic in virtue of their special 
epistemic status of incorrigibility. If they are admitted to be corrigible or 
defeasible, i.e., revisable in the light of new experience or of further 
evidence, then it seems their foundational status cannot be maintained 
because they will be dependent for their justification on other beliefs of the 
agent. Corrigibility thus seems to entail some sort of coherentism, in which 
all beliefs depend upon others for their empirical justification and no beliefs 
have a justificatory status any different from all the other beliefs in the set. 
This is an unwelcome conclusion for the naturalistic epistemologist, 
committed as he is to foundationalism by his acknowledgement of the 
justificatory significance of the causal processes by which empirical beliefs 
are acquired. However, the implication that corrigibility bears, of 
coherentism, is only an apparent one. The special epistemic status of basic 
beliefs is seen to be consistent with their corrigibility when the distinctive 
nature of the prima facie though defeasible justification that they enjoy, is 
understood. 
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If the argument of the thesis has been successful so far, then it will have 
been established that naturalistic epistemology, as circumscribed in 
principles1 - 5, when applied to the traditional projects of epistemology, 
results in a number of substantive theses, including realism and 
involuntarism regarding empirical belief, which in turn produce a definition 
of a 'serious' or 'proper' epistemic kind of believing; foundational ism 
regarding empirical justification; and the corrigibility of all empirical belief. 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1. It is through a thesis of evidential ism that inferential beliefs can also be 
shown to be involuntary. If S holds Bp and Bq in an operative mode, where p is 
an immediate particular fact and q is a general law by which facts of kind p 
are sufficient for facts of kind r, then it is evident to S, and cannot but be 
evident to S, that r is the case. For instance, S sees that the kettle is now 
steaming - p; he believes that steaming indicates boiling water - q; ergo, he 
believes the water in the kettle is boiling - r. 
2. If S is constrained to believe that p is the case at t, there are two things to 
which he might be constrained: the belief and the content. lnvoluntarism has 
different degrees for immediate and indirect empirical beliefs, since it 
seems that in the first case, S has no choice of either whether to believe or 
what to believe, whereas in the second case, though the content of an 
inferential belief is fixed by S's existent doxastic set, whether he will draw 
a particular inference or not depends on his individual interests and values, 
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and here he does have some power to choose. 
3. A nutshell definition of the involuntarism of empirical belief: Bp is 
involuntary for S at t iff S cannot do otherwise at t than hold p true. There 
are some relevant discussions of the question of doxastic involuntarism in 
Meidan (1989: 9 - 15); Mele (1986: 212 - 222); Naylor (1985: 427 - 436); and 
Williams (1973: 136 - 151 ). 
4. This point is borne out in the discussion of the basis for interpreting the 
rational behaviour of another agent in Davidson (1984: 125 - 140 and 141 -
154; 1986: 195 - 211). See also Child (1987: 551 - 556) for a close 
examination of Davidson's synthesis of coherence (a belief and its content are 
determined by internal relations to other beliefs) and correspondence (they 
are determined by external relations to material reality) as determinative of 
empirical beliefs. We start by attributing beliefs to S on the basis of 
observable conditions, and as we get confirmation of more and more of these 
attributions, we get some idea of the internal topography of S's whole belief 
set, and are able to attribute on the basis of internal relations too. 
5. With qualifications of course; Bayesian theory applies to decision (choice 
of action) under uncertainty so that the beliefs are always about 
'circumstances the agent can neither predict nor control' (Jeffrey, 1983: 1); 
as such they differ from normal empirical beliefs in being future-tense, the 
entertaining of a hypothetical content with more or less conviction, and not 
two-valued but ranging along a scale of probability from 0 to 1. 
6. The claim these are two different beliefs is not quite the wild idea it 
might seem in the light of traditional propositional-attitude epistemology, as 
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hope to show in a later chapter. 
7. James sees truth in terms of successful action: 'To 'agree' in the widest 
sense with a reality can only mean to be ... put into such working touch with it 
as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we 
disagreed ' (1955: 140, his italics), but his conception of justification is 
essentially coherentist: 'All human thinking gets discursified; we exchange 
ideas; we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one another by means 
of social intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, stored up, and 
made available for every one. Hence, we must talk consistently just as we 
must think consistently .... True ideas lead us to consistency, stability and 
flowing human intercourse' (ibid.: 140 - 141). 
To know something, however, is for James purely a matter of acting 
successfully. In 'The meaning of truth', (1955: 195 - 256), he considers what 
it means to say that we know there are tigers in India: 'At the very least, 
people would say that what we mean by knowing the tigers is mentally 
pointing towards them as we sit here. But now what do we mean by pointing , 
in such a case as this? The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known 
simply and solely as a procession of mental associations and motor 
consequences that follow on the thought. ... It is known as our rejection of a 
jaguar, if that beast were shown to us as a tiger; as our assent to a genuine 
tiger if so shown. It is known as our ability to utter all sorts of propositions 
which don't contradict other propositions that are true of the real tigers. It is 
even known, if we take the tigers very seriously, as actions of ours which 
may terminate in directly intuited tigers, as they would be if we took a 
voyage to India for the purpose of tiger-hunting and brought back a lot of 
skins of the striped rascals which we had laid low' (ibid.: 226). 
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8. The complexity of a belief includes not only the elements discussed here, 
but also the dependence relations of Chapter 5 
9. Future-tense beliefs are not discussed since they are not immediate 
beliefs and it is with these that we are chiefly concerned. Belief in some 
future state of affairs must have a hypothetical character and be at best 
indirectly related to sense experience, factors which put them outside the 
scope of the thesis of immediate justification being advanced here. 
10. This paragraph anticipates the analysis of justification in Chapter 6, in 
which a more thorough discussion and grounding of the four aspects of 
empirical justification - credibility, deontology, marks and warrant - is 
given. 
11. A fact which means that the content of a particular or general empirical 
belief is not a Fregean proposition, whose truth value is forever fixed in the 
'third realm' of 'propositional space' outside the material world. 
12. These are the 'appearance' beliefs, or beliefs about sense-data, of 
traditional epistemology. Their contents are not empirical propositions, as 
that term is being taken here; the question will be more fully discussed in 
connection with basic empirical beliefs. 
13. Audi, 1983: 121 - 123, has a similar fourfold classification of reasons. 
14. Rorty, 1979, certainly assumes that the corrigibility of empirical belief 
means foundationalism is impossible, and even someone like Pollock, 1986, 
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who declares himself sympathetic to foundationalism, still thinks that 
foundationalism is refuted tout court by the arguments against infallibility 
and incorrigibility. 
Chapter 4- The nature of empirical belief 
4.1 The role of a theory of belief in a theory of justification 
It has been suggested that at least a part of a naturalized approach to belief 
consists in not taking the belief state to be merely an attitude to a 
proposition or sentence, more especially so if the belief in question is an 
empirical belief. What more there is to a belief state than propositional 
content, was briefly mentioned as its character and causal history 1 • A 
clearer idea of these three aspects of the belief (character, causal history 
and content) and how they are related within one state, is necessary in order 
to lay the approaches to a theory of immediate empirical justification. It is 
argued here that immediate beliefs have a distinctive sensory character, the 
result of their causal history and an intrinsic part of the whole belief state. 
As for content, the view that justificatorily basic beliefs are about features 
of one's own sense experiences is rejected in favour of the view that they are 
about material things in the immediate environment 
This chapter is concerned to give an analysis of immediate empirical belief 
and its epistemologically relevant properties; it may be asked, however, if an 
analysis of belief can serve any useful purpose in a thesis on justification. 
The underlying assumption here is that such analysis is a necessary 
preliminary to the study of justification. Two naturalistic principles - that a 
majority of what we take to be justified beliefs are in fact so, and that how 
we do believe in the standard case is how we should believe - together lead to 
the conclusion that justification is a function of the normal belief, and a 
definition of justification is to be derived from an explication of the features 
of such a belief. That is, if justification supervenes on the psychological 
Chapter 4 - The nature of empirical belief 95 
state of ordinary empirical belief, then from a clear understanding of the 
nature of such an empirical belief, a clear view of its justification will 
emerge. Just as beliefs (and psychological states in general) supervene on 
their physical bases, so justification supervenes on beliefs 2 
It is generally agreed that an empirical belief is a belief about some way in 
which the natural world is . A sentence which specifies the content of the 
belief state will be a statement of some supposed material feature of the 
world. In the case of a true empirical belief, the expression of its content 
will be a statement of physical fact. Though this is too broad a definition to 
be of any use in itself, it has the merits of being uncontroversial and 
suggesting two questions: how such belief might be acquired, and what 
exactly its content and its object might be. 
On the first score, if an empirical belief is a belief about some way in which 
the world is, i.e., about a matter of physical fact, then it must be related in 
some way to perception, this being the only way in which cognizance can be 
taken of physical facts. The first question raised by the rough definition 
above thus concerns the relation of the sensory mechanisms to immediate 
empirical belief. The second concerns what the belief is about and the 
ontological status of what it is about: what exactly is 'a way in which the 
world', or a part of it, is? In answering this, we shall look at the rough 
definition's implications for an understanding of basic empirical beliefs, and, 
briefly, at the ramifications of taking empirical belief to be by definition 
belief which has an existent object - some part of the world, about which its 
intensional content may (in the case of false belief) or may not (when the 
belief is true) be mistaken. 
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4.2 Sensory character, sensations and sensible properties 
On the naturalistic assumption that a belief may have a character and a 
history besides its content, it seems reasonable to say that all empirical 
belief is sensory 3 in character, and it is necessarily the result of the 
operation of the sensory mechanisms. This is most readily conceded in the 
case of the immediate beliefs of experience, beliefs like this is coffee I am 
now drinking , or here is a hibiscus in front of the window , or an aeroplane is 
passing overhead , beliefs which are embedded in sense-specific images like 
the aroma and taste of coffee, the colours and shapes of a hibiscus, and the 
sound of an aeroplane's engines. Immediate empirical beliefs are, in the first 
place, beliefs about the kind of fact whose 'esse est percipi' and which can 
only be observed via the senses. The content of a basic belief is presented to 
the subject in the medium of sensory experience, generally understood to be a 
state of consciousness embodying such things as colours, shapes, sizes, 
textures, and sounds 4. 
About what constitutes the sensible properties of material things in some 
observable state of affairs, there was for long a tradition of assuming that 
all percipients, regardless of their conceptual repertoire and background 
beliefs, had equal access to some set of perceivable properties, simply in 
virtue of their common physiology. These properties were cognized in 'pure' or 
non-cognitive sensations, which formed the 'raw data' of experience. On the 
basis of the data, an agent inferred the presence of material objects and 
acquired beliefs about the immediate environment. Imagine, for instance, a 
dish on a table. On the 'raw data' view, its roundness, flatness, and smooth, 
shiny surface would be some of the dish's sensible properties; its properties 
of being delicate bone china, a Porchester cheese plate and a collector's 
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piece, would not be among its sensible properties. 
The 'raw data' view has been widely discredited. I shall not rehearse all the 
means by which this has been done; Rorty (1980) gives a detailed exposition 
of the recent complex of arguments against 'the myth of the given', among 
which, 'Sellars's behavioristic critique of the whole framework of givenness' 
(ibid., 170), is particularly effective (ibid., 167 - 188). The implication of the 
refutation of 'raw data' for an understanding of sensible properties is that 
there is no sustainable distinction between properties like shape and 
smoothness, and properties like being bone china and a Porchester cheese 
plate. True, the first-named properties will be accessible to many more 
percipients than the second, which are perceivable only by those with a 
skilled eye, and special background beliefs. But seeing shapes and textures 
also depends upon certain acquired skills and background beliefs, so that the 
two sets of properties do not differ in kind on the score of how they are 
sensed. 
The distinction between sensible and cognized properties has often been made 
in terms of the immediacy of the first in perceiving and the inferential nature 
of the second. We see at once that something is round, it is said, while we 
infer that it is bone china on the evidence of immediately perceived 
properties. However, the perception that something is a Porchester cheese 
plate seems to be just as immediate as the perception that it is round. By an 
expert eye, the plate is seen as a Porchester cheese plate. On the other side, 
though we are very familiar with round things, and with making the 
perceptual judgement that something is round, such a judgement depends on 
learned skills and acquired beliefs. So in this regard too, there is no hard and 
fast line to be drawn between sensible and cognized properties. 
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We might say that a sensible property is anything that is accessible to the 
senses of a percipient who has the requisite background beliefs to appreciate 
it, any property of an object capable of stimulating the sensory mechanisms 
of a perceiver and conveying information to him about that object. What 
exactly the information is, depends on the perceiver's mind. This broad view 
of sensible properties gives a correspondingly wide view of sensations, 
defined as the experiencing of sensible material properties. 
Sensations are identifiable with certain complex states of the perceiver's 
central nervous system. This is a system which is by its nature and definition 
sensitive to stimuli from the material environment, so that differences 
among its states are co-variant with differences in the sensible aspects of 
its immediate environment. The question might be asked, of how brain states 
become sensations, and there is a short answer to it: neuronal tissue has the 
property of consciousness; an electro-chemical event in the cortex is a 
mental event. A certain neuronal effect thus simply is consciousness, for the 
subject of the state, of {say) a red, rose-shaped patch. 
Sensations are paradigmatically associated with the phenomenal quality of 
experience. In the stream of visual, tactile, auditory, etc., experience which 
is the forefront content of consciousness in a normal, attentive subject, 
sensations are present to consciousness in the medium of phenomenal 
properties of experience - sense-specific images of greater or lesser 
vividness and strength. 
The relation of this phenomenal content of perceptual consciousness to the 
immediate empirical beliefs of the subject calls for discussion. It is first of 
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all saturated with representational content in the medium of sensations, so 
that it represents a great many individual facts and would sustain the same 
number of propositional expressions of itself, to all of which S has cognitive 
access limited only by his conceptual range. If S's stream of experiential 
consciousness could be frozen at t and its accessible content summed up, it 
would be found to contain a very large number of individual beliefs. 
Furthermore, each single belief state, functionally conceived as the sensorily 
determined disposition to some specifiable range of actions, could cause S to 
hold any number of suitable sentences true, i.e., each content may be 
expressed in many different ways. We may agree with Davidson that there is 
'no useful way to count beliefs' (1986: 308). 
Because the stream of phenomenal consciousness is essentially 
behaviour-guiding and doxastic in character, however, it is best conceived as 
a stream of undifferentiated immediate empirical belief. The identification 
of perception and belief may be challenged, though; Dretske (1981) for 
instance, has drawn a distinction between perception and belief in terms of 
an analogue and a digital watch. The digital watch makes a series of distinct, 
true or false statements about the time, and is therefore like belief in 
character. The analogue watch represents the flow of time in the continuous 
movement of its hands, without ever overtly holding a particular time-claim 
true of a single instant, in the same way that the senses monitor their 
environment. 
The conclusion which Dretske draws is that belief and experience are 
essentially different. It might be pointed out though, that an analogue, just 
like a digital watch is used for telling the time, i.e., taking true or false 
readings at separate moments. In this way, assertions about the time are 
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implicit in the position of the hands, and so the analogue watch has a doxastic 
character too. In the same way, because the stream of sensory experience is 
capable of delivering formulations of sentences held true by S, it is doxastic. 
Beliefs are necessarily named in sentences held true, but it seems to be an 
error of reductiveness to identify them completely with their names. The 
conclusion is that immediate empirical belief and perceptual experience are 
not different in kind, and the impression that they are, is a result of seeing 
such a belief as a discrete entity, exhaustively defined in the sentence which 
states its content, and explicitly before the mind of its subject rather than 
implicitly guiding behaviour. 
The claim that immediate empirical belief is identifiable with experience, 
means that it is necessarily accompanied by imaging and phenomenal 
properties. This might be thought not in fact to be the case. Consider the 
example of someone looking through a desk drawer for his pen, being asked 
just after that if he saw keys in the drawer, and consulting memory to come 
up with an answer. Similar cases of recalled experience are common enough. 
What they seem to show is that the sensible properties of objects can be 
scanned by S's sensory mechanisms in a perceptual experience with no 
phenomenal imaging, and the experience stored in short-term memory, so that 
S may acquire an immediate belief as to whether or not the keys are in the 
drawer, without a visual image of the drawer. 
The same conclusion is suggested by an even more common experience -
periods of successful behaviour in a material environment of which the agent 
has no qualitative, forefront-of-consciousness awareness. An example is the 
driver who, deep in thought and quite unaware (in the phenomenal sense) of 
his immediate surroundings, nevertheless negotiates the corners, other cars, 
Chapter 4 - The nature of empirical belief 101 
pedestrians and all the physical features that require appropriate action of 
him. The mental state that enables this successful behaviour is by definition 
immediate empirical belief, but it seems not to be accompanied by awareness 
of the sensible properties of the environment. 
It is, however, possible to maintain that sensations, i.e., images with 
phenomenal qualities, are in fact present in both cases. In the first case, the 
fact that S is able to consult memory in order to arrive at her belief about the 
keys in the desk, indicates that there must be something very like a 
qualitative image in short term memory, sensory traces by means of which S 
is able to recall the experience of sensible properties. The distracted driver 
is in the same case. He may not be attending to his sensations of the road, 
etc., but it is these subliminal images from which he infers his beliefs about 
things in his immediate neighbourhood. He too has the ability, in the short 
term, to recall something very like a qualitatively-defined image of the 
obstacles he is negotiating, which supports the ascription to him of 
sensations in the classical sense. So the claim that immediate empirical 
belief and sensory imaging are characteristically associated, need not be 
upset by these examples. 
There is however, one kind of case which does seem to upset this general 
claim: so-called 'blindsight'. This is an experimentally well-established 
phenomenon in which subjects with specific cerebral abnormalities which 
preclude qualitative imaging, especially visual imaging, are nevertheless able 
to respond to stimuli (lights and objects) as if they saw them normally 5 
Cases of this sort exemplify the possibility of being conscious of objects in 
the immediate environment, and of having the ability to respond appropriately 
to them, without at the same time having any consciousness of sensory 
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images of the objects. In blindsight therefore, immediate empirical belief 
does not have a recognizably sensory character. What are we to make of these 
anomalous cases? 
Two points need to be made in response. Firstly, these are anomalies - very 
strange instances of immediate belief which run counter to the standard case. 
They have not yet been fully explained or satisfactorily incorporated into our 
common understanding of how it is that we learn about our surroundings. The 
naturalistic epistemologist may feel justified in suspending judgement on 
blindsight until at least more information is available on the 
neurophysiological mechanisms by which it takes place. 
Secondly, the point of emphasizing the association of immediate belief with 
sensory experience has been to establish a basis for the claim, in Chapters 6 
and 7, that the justification of such belief is marked by its sensory character. 
The immediate beliefs of blindsight are admittedly without sensory 
character, but then they are also without anything that we could call 
justification, or grounds on which the subject holds them. Blindsight patients 
report being surprised by their own behavioural successes and cannot say why 
they believe. as they do, or how they come by the accurate information they 
undoubtedly have 6 . The immediate beliefs of blindsight are thus not the 
'serious' or 'epistemically proper' beliefs described earlier, beliefs which can 
withstand critical reflection, and which are based on reason for the subject 
who holds them. Nevertheless, in so far as they are states which result from 
some kind of sensory activity and enable the agent to act successfully in his 
environment, that is, they are functional states with the definitive input and 
output relations of immediate belief, we have to acknowledge that they are 
some kind of immediate empirical belief. 
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What we may conclude from all of this, is that, while the phenomenon of 
blindsight upsets the absolute generalization that immediate empirical belief 
has a sensory character, it supports the thesis that if an immediate Q.elief is 
reasonable, this fact is signalled for its subject by the qualitative perceptual 
imaging which accompanies it. It seems that the generalization should be 
qualified to read: 'All serious immediate belief has a sensory character'. 
4.3 Attributing sensory character to beliefs qua beliefs 
The claim here is that immediate empirical beliefs characteristically have a 
sensory character, and that justified beliefs of this kind necessarily have a 
sensory character. Attributing sensory character to a belief state rather than 
to an experience merits some explanation, since it rather flies in the face of 
a distinction, to be found in Peacocke (1983: 5 - 6), which enjoys wide 
acceptance in the current literature of the philosophy of mind. This is the 
distinction between the representational content of an experience and the 
belief or judgement which is said to be the result of that experience. For 
instance, it seems to be with this distinction in mind that Leon (1987: 337) 
says: 'Experiences, like beliefs, have a representational content. ... But 
experiences unlike beliefs also have a character, a qualitative, or sensory, or 
subjective character.' If we can show that the representational content of an 
experience is essentially doxastic, then the character of the experience will 
also be inseparable from the immediate belief that it instantiates. 
Peacocke is concerned in the first place to account for the nature of 
experience in terms of its sensational and representational properties 7 
These latter properties 'represent the environment of the experiencer as 
being a certain way' (Peacocke, 1983: 5), and whether he believes that the 
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environment is in fact that way or not, whether he accepts the 
representational content of his experience as true or not, is a contingent fact. 
It depends on the particular circumstances of each case, especially S's 
background beliefs, which will have no bearing upon the representational 
properties as such. Content thus is clearly distinguishable from the attitude 
of the subject towards it. 
Peacocke gives as an example, a visual experience of a tromp l'oeuil painting 
of a violin on a door; the representational content of the experience is of a 
real violin hanging on a door but (if S is wise to the painting) there is no 
accompanying judgement that there is in fact a real violin hanging on the 
door. Peacocke concludes that content and judgement are distinct, that the 
representational content of an experience is not necessarily identical with a 
belief that that content is in fact the case. The mental state of experience 
thus is definable in terms of representational and sensational, but not 
necessarily doxastic properties. 
It is arguable, however, that the representational content of an experience, in 
the medium of sensory images, is just the same as its doxastic content. Any 
sensory experience causes the subject to believe something, either about the 
immediate environment (as in an experience with objective reference) or 
about his own sensory state (as in experiences like visual afterimages or 
hummings in the ears). In the given example, Peacocke claims that it is 
always a real violin that is sensed, and the experience causes the uninitiated 
subject to believe 'Here is a violin', and the wise subject to believe 'Here is a 
clever painting'. However, the view of sensible properties argued for above, 
and the impossibility of there being any 'raw data' of experience, support the 
conclusion that the sensory content of the experience for the wise subject, is 
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here is a painting. Knowing what he does, the percipient sees the thing as a 
painting and not as a real violin; his background beliefs play a role in 
presenting the sensory images to consciousness. The belief is immediately 
embedded in the experience and is not a conclusion distinct from it. 
Peacocke's explicit aim is limited to examining two of the necessary internal 
features (representation and sensation) of a certain psychological state, viz., 
experience. He does not expressly deny that belief might be a third necessry 
element of experience, and as he himself notes (footnote to p. 5), his is not 
the only way of setting things up. It is possible that 'experiences with 
content are the causal consequences of sensations', as O'Shaughnessy 
proposes, although we should recognize, says Peacocke, that the fact that 
'some properties of the experience are causally responsible for others would 
be an empirical psychological hypothesis, and one which involves 
simultaneous causation'. 
A similar, farther-going proposal might be made, viz., that belief about some 
way in which the world is (either the environment or the subject's senses), is 
the causal consequence of the representational content of any experience. 
This too is an 'empirical psychological hypothesis' involving 'simultaneous 
causation', and it licenses a conception of experience as a compound state 
including sensational, representational and doxastic elements, an association 
which is basic to the theory of immediate empirical justification being 
argued here. Though all three are present in any experiential state, it is the 
epistemic status of the experience which is of primary importance for the 
epistemologist. 
The automatic holding-true of the content of experience, under some aspect, 
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can be argued for by elimination. The relation of an epistemic agent to a 
representation or intentional content must needs be one of three things: 
holding the content true, or holding it false (denying it), or witholding 
judgement on it (merely entertaining the thought), (cf. Chisholm, 1977:6). Now 
the subject's attitude to the representational content of experience is not the 
last; it is not hypothetical in character. We do not treat the propositions 
delivered to consciousness by the senses in the same way that we treat the 
deliverances of imagining and wishing. We suppose that the latter might or 
might not be the case, where we automatically take the former to be the case. 
Similarly, we do not typically deny or reject what the senses inform us of. 
Even if we have special reasons for doubting the veracity of an apparent 
experiential content, the sensory content of experience always tells us 
something about the world. It follows, if sensory experience is not negative 
or hypothetical in character, that it is doxastic. 
This is a point that Peacocke implicitly endorses when he says that 
'representational content concerns the world external to the experiencer, and 
as such is assessable as true or false ' (ibid: 9; my italics). It is not in virtue 
of being a representation, but a representation held true in a particular 
context, i.e., an empirical belief, that the content has a truth value. Were the 
representation to be the content of an unasserted thought, even one that 
'concerns the world', like a wish or supposition or S's imagining that there is 
a pineapple before her, it would have no truth value nor would it be 
'assessable as true or false'. If a content's truth value can be evaluated at all, 
it is because an agent holds it true of, or asserts it of, some set of objective 
truth conditions. 
That perceptual experience is amenable in this way to the epistemologist's 
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perspective, in fact that it is explicable in terms of the acquisition of beliefs 
is suggested by Chisholm (1957). The representational content of experience 
is identifiable with belief in that the subject of a state with sensory content 
is thereby apprised of some way in which the world is. Sensory 
representational content is always believed under some aspect, and in this 
way it is seen to be dependent upon, if not the fact of being believed, at least 
the doxastic faculties of the subject. 
The conclusion of the previous section, 4.2, was that serious immediate 
belief, that which withstands critical scrutiny by the subject, has 
necessarily a sensory character. From this section we can conclude that 
representations with a sensory character are necessarily doxastic. From the 
two together, it emerges that immediate empirical belief of the kind relevant 
to the epistemologist and the sensory contents of experience are inextricably 
linked. In the light of this, it is reasonable to speak of the sensory character 
of an immediate empirical belief. 
4.4 The content of immediate empirical belief 
A fair impression of the content of immediate empirical belief will already 
have been given. It is in the first place a sensory representation to the 
subject of the world's being a certain way, essentially propositional in that 
what is experienced is a fact about the world and not the thing(s) or simple 
properties which go to make up that fact. A statement of particular empirical 
fact may be taken to express the content. Representational content subsumes 
sensory content in so far as a statement of empirical fact implies a sensible 
state of affairs, and conversely an agent is immediately apprised of the 
content of an experiential belief, by his sensations, i.e., in his sensorily 
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perceiving that something is the case. 
Taking the content of immediate belief to be a representation of some 
material state of affairs in the world, and further (as will emerge from 
Chapter 6), taking immediate belief to be justificatorily basic for all 
empirical belief, entails rejecting the view that the content of 
justificatorily basic belief is necessarily the features of the subject's own 
psychological, especially experiential, states. There has been a strong and 
long-standing epistemological tradition of construing basic beliefs as beliefs 
about the immediate data of consciousness. 
For the empiricist this meant that immediate sensory experience was 
ultimately the stuff of which all knowledge was constructed. It is a tenent 
which runs from Locke and the classical British empiricists, through 
phenomenalism of the kind Russell held, up to the sense-datum and 'logische 
Aufbau' theorists of recent times. In the rationalist tradition, on the other 
hand, the Cartesian interest in a construal of basic beliefs as being about the 
agent's own psychological state was not that it focussed on sensory 
experience, but that it gave the agent the best assurance he could have that he 
was not wrong in his belief, since its content was incorrigibly present to his 
mind and he had infallible authority with respect to the existence of its 
object. The empiricists were more concerned than rationalistic 
epistemologists with how one could get from the data of consciousness to the 
objects in the world that the data represented. 
Chisholm (1977 is representative) is probably the best example of an 
epistemologist still seeking to ground all an individual agent's empirical 
knowledge, if not incorrigibly at least very securely, in his immediate 
Chapter 4 - The nature of empirical belief 109 
consciousness of his own experiences. On the question of what constitutes 
basic beliefs, Chisholm is squarely in the 'appearance-belief' tradition. 'One 
could say that the set of purely psychological properties that a person 
has at any given time constitutes the evidence-base that that person has at 
that time. And as a foundationalist, I would say that this evidence-base 
constitutes an epistemological foundation of everything that that person 
knows at that time' (Chisholm, 1986: 43; my emphasis, his italics). Properties 
of S's psychological states are self-presenting to him, i.e., they are certain 
and evident to him and there is nothing which makes them evident to him 
(ibid: 42). From this evidence-base of psychological properties, and by 
employing logical and material epistemic principles, S is able to arrive at his 
beliefs about ways in which the world is. S goes 'beyond the evidence-base' 
(ibid: 46) in such beliefs, by supposing that there is an objective 'something' 
which appears to him or causes his experience. 
There seem to be two main difficulties in this position: that these are very 
peculiar belief-states, and that, if they are basic in the required sense, we 
have to find some satisfactory way of getting from them to the things in the 
world. 
An appearance belief is typically something like 'It now appears to me as if I 
were seeing a rectangular red patch'. Such beliefs are peculiar for several 
reasons. The first is the typically Cartesian regress instanced in taking the 
agent's own experience as an object of belief for her in the normal course of 
events. Her own psychological properties are 'self-presenting', 'certain', 
'evident' to S, i.e., they are terms in a doxastic relation with her, which 
implies that they figure as the contents of beliefs of hers. The question that 
this suggests is: if basic beliefs are about mental states (physical object 
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beliefs), might we not have beliefs about (features of) basic beliefs?. An 
agent could then very well be said to believe: 'I am now conscious of seeming 
to see a rectangular red patch ', and 'I am aware that I am conscious of 
seeming to see a ... ', and so forth. Then basic beliefs would no longer be basic. 
An appeal would have to be made to ever-ascending levels of monitoring of 
mental states, and this would defeat the whole purpose of basic beliefs, 
which is to stop the infinite regress of justificiation. 
Secondly, beliefs about the contents of experience are peculiar in that though 
the claim is that they are foundational to empirical knowledge, they are not 
themselves empirical in character. They do not act like ordinary empirical 
beliefs in preparing S to deal with his environment. All they seem to dispose 
him to do is make suitable statements of their content in a justificatory 
context. On this ground alone, we should hesitate to call them empirical 
beliefs, and here is another good reason for denying them empirical character 
- they are not a posteriori in the sense required of empirical belief. 
It is a nice question as to whether appearance beliefs are a priori or a 
posteriori. They concern perceptual experience, and are generated in the 
course of it. Without experience they could not exist, so there is a clear sense 
in which they cannot be a priori, before experience. But then, no exercise of 
his senses enables S to believe that he is being appeared to redly. He cannot 
visually inspect his sensory state to observe its features as he does his 
physical surroundings, so that his appearance belief is not arrived at a 
posteriori, after and through the medium of sense experience. It is therefore 
in a clear sense not a posteriori. 
Moreover, there is some reason to doubt their very existence. If all belief is a 
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functional state definable by its causal inputs and effective outputs, as has 
been suggested, then it is fair to say that S acquires an appearance belief 
(Ba), i.e., a belief about the features of some experiential physical object 
belief of hers (Bp), only when she is apprised of the features of Bp and so 
acquires a disposition to act in ways which would evince the particular state 
of consciousness that could be so described. The question is: Is S so apprised 
and disposed in the normal course of experience? It seems more accurate to 
say that the experiential state Bp enables S to arrive at Ba, given the further 
prompt of a request for justification or given some further cause for S to 
inspect his immediate sensory state. Ba is thus not an operative functional 
state in the sense that Bp is, and it does not arise concomitantly with Bp. It 
might be said to exist in posse ; in Bp, S has the disposition to act p'ly, in Ba, 
S has the ability to act a'ly, but only if given further input. 
Of course, it is possible deliberately to think about what one is experiencing 
and to come to believe, as a result of introspection, that one's psychological 
states have certain properties, but such introspective beliefs are neither 
usual nor part of any evidence-base which a (non-epistemologist) S would 
recognize. Features of our own states of consciousness are not what we take 
ourselves to be reasoning about when we think about factual states of 
affairs, nor do they play any characteristically doxastic role in enabling S to 
negotiate his environment. It is the normal course of events and the average 
rational agent, with his ordinary doxastic processes, that the naturalist is 
interested in, and behaviour-guiding states about some way in which the 
world is that the empirical epistemologist is interested in. On these two 
counts, appearance beliefs are not suited for the role of basic empirical 
beliefs in a naturalistic epistemology. 
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The fact that basic appearance beliefs are intended to fix empirical 
knowledge in an absolutely secure foundation, suggests a useful way of 
construing them. It is possible to see the whole account of inference from the 
data of consciousness to empirical belief as a logical analysis of the actual 
process, as Harman (1973) suggests. As such, it may be a useful formal 
description of the elements of an empirical belief, but it would be a mistake 
to read those elements (e.g., sensory features of an experiential state) as 
ordinary objects of belief for S. What S and the naturalistic epistemologist 
take as basic empirical beliefs, and as the ultimate justification for any 
inferential empirical claim, are sensory beliefs about material facts. 
A further major difficulty for an account of basic beliefs as beliefs about 
psychological properties is that of explaining how the agent infers from what 
is present to his own consciousness to particular independent material facts. 
The sceptical possibility that we are all brains in vats is very real once it is 
allowed that the immediate data of consciousness are all there is to the stuff 
of empirical belief. At the very least, limiting the content of a basic belief to 
features of S's own mental state is to limit one's concept of the empirical 
and to eliminate the objectivity of experiential belief. There is no epistemic 
import or ontological weight in the claim 'I am appeared to redly and as if by 
an apple', as there is in the claim 'There is a red apple', so that basic beliefs 
about appearances will not be much use in a theory of empirical justification, 
at least without major supplementation by bridging principles. 
A preferable view might start with the notion of sensations, and draw a 
distinction between two epistemically different kinds. What may be called 
'somatic sensations' include such things as itches, pains and tickles, a 
humming in the ears and lights before the eyes. These are often assumed to be 
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paradigmatic of sensations because they are the most immediate way in 
which a rational agent can perceive states of matter. S has a blood-clot in the 
leg (physical fact) and he experiences it as a throbbing pain (immediate 
perception of the fact). Similarly, lights, spots, or after-images before the 
eyes are S's immediate experience of some spontaneous, or reactive activity 
of his optical system. He does not take the pain or the lights to be the 
objective cause of his experience however, and he does not arrive at 
empirical beliefs about the pain or the lights on the basis of it. 
When the cause of his psychological state lies in some part of his own 
neurophysiological system (hence the 'somatic' sensations) and not some 
external stimulus, then the beliefs that they give rise to in S are typically 
(hallucinations aside) beliefs about features of his conscious experience - 'I 
am in pain', 'I'm seeing spots'. They are not beliefs about some way in which 
the world is, but about some way in which S's psychological state is. It is in 
fact dubious if such states are representational in character at all, and so 
also if they are doxastic or cognitive in nature, a doubt expressed by 
Wittgenstein in the question of whether I can know that I am in pain. 
'Empirical sensations' on the other hand, are caused by particular material 
facts. They were previously defined as 'the consciousness of sensible 
properties', where 'sensible properties' are those properties of matter which 
are potentially accessible to the senses of any percipient. The beliefs that 
they give rise to in S are naturally beliefs about those aspects of the world 
which S takes to have caused his experience, cf. the discussion of sensory 
beliefs above. There is something to be said for calling these 'empirical' 
sensations, since there is far more room for trial (Greek = 'empeirikos') and 
error in matching sensation and sensible property, in finding out what is· at 
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the causal end of a particular sensory experience, than there is in somatic 
sensations which have no external cause, and about which there is very little 
chance of being mistaken - one could hardly have a sensation of bodily pain 
without there being a bodily cause of it. 
There are two objections to this distinction that need to be dealt with. First, 
on the point of the characterization of 'somatic' sensations: S may come to 
believe as a result of the pain in his leg, that there is something amiss with 
his leg, even that there is a clot in his femural artery. This is as empirical a 
belief as any other; its content is a material fact that can be experienced by 
any other agent, perhaps not in the same mode as S, but equally objectively. 
Surely then S's somatic experience does have objective reference? The second 
objection challenges the somatic/empirical distinction on the grounds that it 
is one the agent himself cannot make. Delusive experience may have the agent 
looking for the mosquito that is causing the high whine in his ears, when his 
sinus condition is the real cause, or writing off a fuzzy TV image to his 
rheumy eyes when in fact the set needs adjusting. Qualitatively, somatic and 
empirical sensations are identical. 
In reply to the first objection, it may be conceded that there is an indirect 
sense in which, in his pain sensation, S is aware of a clot in the leg; he may 
for instance infer to the belief that there is a clot in his leg on the basis of 
the pain. However, pain is not a sensible property of blood-clots, as redness, 
size and shape are. It is rather a property of a psychophysiological state. 
Since the clot may reasonably be said to be internal to the system which is 
doing the sensing, S's experience is self-reflexive or 'immediate', a sensation 
of nothing beyond the state of his own physiology. Were the clot external to 
the system sensing it, (say a surgeon operated on S's leg inder local 
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anaesthetic, and he and S inspected the clot visually), then it could only be 
experienced via its sensible (as defined) properties, and then an experience of 
it becomes an experience of a way in which the world, and not S's conscious 
state, is. We may conclude that any objective reference which a pain 
sensation qua pain, or any other somatic sensation, has, is indirect, and that 
the 'content' of the state is correlative (perhaps identical) with 
consciousness of a neurophysiological state. 
In reply to the second objection, that there are cases of sensations which S 
does not correctly classify as either somatic or empirical is undeniable. 
Delusions and hallucinations are caused by and 'represent' nothing outside of 
S's own central nervous system, but they are abnormal and in a minority 
among S's experiences. Generally, there do seem to be means by which S 
correctly recognizes somatic sensations as not having any real or objective 
reference and empirical sensations as being the effect of external causes, 
whether it be memory of previous such experiences or their internal marks. 
He will not, for instance, expect other agents to share his sensations of pain 
as he expects them to share his sensations of the blood clot in extenso, nor 
does he think that the spots before his eyes occupy any location in the world. 
The fact is that S does distinguish, among his sensations, those which have 
objective reference and those that do not, and he is usually right. 
What we can conclude from this distinction, if it is correct, is that those 
sensations which normally give rise to beliefs about features of one's own 
psychological states, are not; empirical in character and have no material 
reference which could be experienced by another percipient. They are in a 
minority among sensory experiences, however; in a normal agent, the afferent 
nervous system is usually fully occupied with the transmission of stimuli 
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from external sources, i.e., empirical sensations. The fact that they are 
empirical as defined means that in so sensing, the agent acquires beliefs 
about ways in which the world is. The objects of basic empirical beliefs thus 
are material facts or configurations of physical things rather than features 
of psychological states, and their contents are expressed in the idiom of 
physical things, rather than in adverbial idiom or the language of appearances. 
It is important to keep a firm hold of the distinction. Those like Chisholm who 
wish to blur it, and view sensations of blueness, texture, etc., as immediately 
experienced psychological properties, i.e., as somatic sensations, wish also to 
confer the high degree of certainty that somatic sensations enjoy onto 
empirical sensations. They are committed to the project of securing 
empirical knowledge, of giving the conditions for validation of empirical 
belief, rather than accepting the defeasibility of all such beliefs, as does the 
naturalistic epistemologist, who consequently has no motive for seeing a 
basic belief as a belief about sensations. 
On a naturalistic perspective, the content of a basic belief is a 'particular, 
current, empirical fact', in Austin's phrase (1976: 77). Content so defined is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for basic beliefs - one may hold it 
true that the water is now boiling either in an immediate experiential belief 
or in an evidentially inferred belief. But there is available to the naturalistic 
epistemologist who views belief in terms of its character as well as its 
propositional content, the sensory character of immediate belief as a means 
of distinguishing it from inferential belief. 
Finally, on the subject of the content of empirical belief, we need to note an 
implication of its objective reference. Being about 'some way in which the 
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world is', an empirical belief, even a false one, always has a guaranteed, more 
or less exactly defined, extension. Its content always has some claim to a 
spatiotemporal location, even if it is as vague as 'once, in the world', so that 
it may always be said to have as its object a certain area at a certain time, 
and as its content, a representation of (some aspect of) that area. Of course 
an empirical belief might always be false, so that its content will not always 
be realized in the wider or narrower location assigned it by the agent. In this 
case, the belief is false precisely in virtue of having as its extension or 
object, a spatiotemporal location in which its content is not realized. An 
empirical belief can always be cast in the form: 'Of spacetime region xy, S 
believes that p'. In this way, all empirical beliefs have a guaranteed object. 
The link between object and intensional content is provided by the normally 
reliable sensory mechanisms. This conception of object, content and their 
relation is useful for understanding how immediate empirical belief becomes 
knowledge. 
Notes to Chapter 4 
1. Causal history is pretty clearly assimilable to the origins of the belief in 
one of the two modes in which empirical beliefs may be acquired: immediate 
experience or inference; an account of causal history tells us how and by what 
the belief was determined. Character is broadly speaking the manner in 
which the belief's content is presented to consciousness. In the case of an 
immediate belief of experience, character is typically sensory. Content it 
seems is construable as a function of character and, indirectly, causal 
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history. 
2. It might be useful at this point to make an initial distinction between 
subjective and objective justification. Subjective justification consists of 
the reasons for which S holds some belief, which make p seem acceptable to 
S, and they are not necessarily good reasons from any point of view but S's. 
But if a belief is objectively justified for S at t, then it is justified in the 
light of objective standards set by the epistemic community, and the reasons 
for which S holds it are in fact good reasons. The contention here is that in a 
fully justified empirical belief, subjective and objective justification 
conditions converge in that the latter is the former which fulfils certain 
criteria independently of S's judgement of it. 
3. A terminological note: there are at least three other words that mean 'of, 
associated with, the senses' - 'sensational', 'sensuous' and 'sensorial', in 
preference to which 'sensory' was chosen because it has fewer inappropriate 
associations. 
4. The term 'sensations' will be reserved here for consciousness, in the 
medium of sense-specific phenomenal images, of the sensible properties of 
matter, where 'sensible' means 'able to be sensed' and implies that these 
properties are accessible to any normal percipient with the requisite 
background beliefs. On this view, tickles and pains are not sensations. A 
distinction between 'empirical' and 'somatic' sensations is defended in 
section 4.4. 
5. For discussion of experimental work on blindsight, see Sanders et al., 
(1974), and Weiskrantz (1980: 365 - 386; 1986); a recent, philosophically 
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interesting study of this and similar perceptual phenomena is the article by 
Young and de Haan (1990), in which this conclusion, among others, is reached: 
'As concerns our understanding of awareness, the principal implication of 
findings from studies of vision after brain injury is that awareness is not 
integral to the operation of many perceptual mechanisms' (ibid.: 43). See in 
this regard the work of Norton Nelkin, especially his 'Unconscious sensations', 
1989, in which he cites the work of Weiskrantz on blindsight and Gazzaniga 
on commisurotomy patients, both types of cases in which subjects 'almost 
certainly have representations of an image-like sort, although ... the patients 
are not aware that they have such representations. Why not call these 
image-like representations 'sensations', too, since these representations play 
a very similar functional role to that of our CN (conscious phenomenological) 
sensations?' (ibid.: 137). 
6. Weiskrantz (1986: 24) reports of a test in which the patient DB took an 
outstretched hand, located markers on a wall, and identified the horizontal or 
vertical orientation of a stick, all in his 'blind' field: 'After one such long 
series of "guesses", when he made virtually no errors, he was told how well 
he had done .... DB expressed considerable surprise .... "Can you say how you 
guessed - what it was that allowed you to say whether it was vertical or 
horizontal?" "No, I could not because I did not see anything; I just don't know." 
Finally, he was asked, "So you really did not know you were getting them 
right?" "No," he replied, still with something of an air of incredulity.' 
7. For Peacocke the idea of intentionality or representation, as a component 
of experience, is closely linked to that of qualitative sensations. 
'Representational content' in Peacocke's usage is thus to be understood as 
sensory in character. 
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The conclusion of the last chapter was that the ordinary beliefs of experience 
have a sensory character in which their justification is located; it was also 
said that such beliefs are justificatorily basic to all other empirical beliefs. 
The definition of a basic belief is generally thought to include the following 
conditions: {i) that the basic belief itself be justified {ii) that it not depend 
upon any other beliefs of the subject for its justification (iii) that it serve as 
the ultimate stopping place of justification for other beliefs. 
Now it might be doubted if these conditions can be jointly satisfied once the 
thesis of the 'raw data' of experience is rejected, as it was in the last 
chapter. Even immediate experiential beliefs, it was said, depend upon further 
beliefs of the subject, on S's 'conceptual range', acquired cognitive skills and 
contingent 'background beliefs' (cf. Chapter 8). The expert who perceives 
immediately that it is a bone-china plate, is drawing on existing background 
beliefs as to what bone china looks and feels like, and would quote these if 
asked to defend the judgement. But if immediate beliefs depend on other 
beliefs, then they cannot be basic in the required sense. 
It is to this problem that the following discussion is addressed. Briefly, the 
claim will be that there are different kinds of dependence relations holding 
between immediate empirical belief and its determinants, and that in respect 
of the epistemically important relation of apprising conditions, immediate 
beliefs depend on no further beliefs. This allows them to sustain a claim of 
foundational status vis a vis other beliefs in the empirical belief set of the 
subject. 
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The idea of a dependence relation per se is presented first, with some 
explanation of how the claim of the supervenience of empirical belief may be 
squared with a functionalist account of such belief. This is followed by a 
discussion of four dependence relations in which empirical belief may stand. 
Finally, some consequences are drawn about the significance of these 
relations for a theory of empirical justification. 
5.1 Relations of determination or dependence 
The idea of a dependence relation has been developed by Kim in the course of 
his discussion of one particular such relation, supervenience 2 . A starting 
point for thinking about supervenience, and, it seems, the term's historical 
origin in the literature, is Moore's suggestions concerning the supervenience 
of ethical properties on natural, empirically observable fact. The kind of 
dependence that the normative features of something have on its natural 
properties, has since been seen to hold between psychological and physical 
properties (possibly a special case of normative/natural supervenience), and 
between macro- and microphysical properties. For instance, a particular 
empirical belief of S's that the cat is over there, might be said to supervene 
on a causal array of material fact, including cat, agent, cortex and light; the 
colour, odour and viscosity of oil might be said to supervene on its 
microphysical structure. 
Supervenience is just one kind of dependence relation; others, according to 
Kim (1984:154), are the determination of an effect by its cause(s) 3 and the 
me reo logical dependence of a whole on its parts. The notion of dependency, 
and its converse, determination, is central to the view of the world 'not as a 
mere assemblage of unrelated objects, events, and facts, but as constituting 
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a system, something that shows structure' (ibid.:153), and central also to the 
intelligibility of that world and the possibility of explanation and 
understanding. 
A dependence relation holds between two different terms, in a base and a 
dependent realm. The presence of individuals in the determining base realm is 
a necessary condition for that of individuals in its dependent realm (which 
makes a relation of this sort sensitive to a counterfactual test). A certain 
configuration of the base set is also sufficient to instantiate an element of 
the dependent realm. Dependence conditions differ from the usual necessary 
and sufficient conditions of logical equivalence, in that a description of the 
states in the base set is not at the same time a description of states in the 
dependent set. 
The two sets however may have the same physical extension. It is possible to 
say, given certain elements of the base realm and the state dependent on 
them, that every exact replica of those elements will reproduce the dependent 
state too, but it is not possible to establish a nomological connection in the 
other direction and say that a certain dependent state will always be 
instantiated by base elements x, y, z 4 In Moorean terms, it is impossible that 
two apples should differ only in this respect, that one is a good apple and the 
other not good, but goodness is not reducible to a set of natural properties. 
We might say, as a working definition of a dependence relation, that if realm 
B, a set of states b1 _ n with properties BP describable in vocabulary BV, is 
necessary for the instantiation of a realm D, where D = {did has properties DP 
describable in DV}, then the elements of D depend on those of B. BP and DP, BV 
and DV, may be completely or not at all co-extensive, but cannot, it seems, 
partially overlap, i.e., there may be dependence relations within one category 
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(e.g., causal dependence among physical events) or across categories 
(psychophysical dependence), but an appearance of dependence of D partially 
on D itself and partially on B, can usually be resolved by a further reduction 
of D. In what follows, the contention is that empirical belief depends on both 
physical conditions and other beliefs, but then it must be borne in mind that 
these other beliefs are themselves dependent on physical conditions, 
specifically, those states internal to an agent's own neurological system 
which dispose him to proceed in certain ways and constitute parts of his 
belief system. I shan't undertak~ this further reduction here, but will speak of 
an empirical belief depending in part on other beliefs. 
The question then is 'Given that any mental state supervenes on a complex 
physical array, what particular dependence relations, to what particular 
terms, are discernible in the case of an empirical belief?'. There are it seems 
at least these four things on which any particular empirical belief Bp (read 
'the belief that p') of an agent S at a time t, may variously depend: causal 
physical conditions at t, including S's afferent nervous system and usually 
elements external to him, and cortical states of S at t which may be 
identified as evidential beliefs , general semantic beliefs and probabilistic 
beliefs relevant to p. 
5.2 Dependence relations of empirical belief 
5.2. 1 Relevant physical conditions 
Immediate empirical belief arises within the natural order at the instance of 
physical causes and effects. That is, some sort of cause/effect chain may be 
picked out from the circumstances of any particular belief, which is essential 
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to it. Notice that both physical causes (usually external to S) and 
neurophysiological effects are necessary for the generation of an immediate 
belief; to identify the belief with only the effects is to see it as a 
self-contained internal state and this opens the door to a narrow solipsistic 
materialism 5 . The physical conditions relevant to any empirical belief are 
rather to be thought of as an array of physical facts definable by virtue of the 
cause/effect relations among them, upon which the belief depends. 
It is the nature of the afferent nervous system of a rational agent that, when 
it is brought into causal interaction with some part of its environment, the 
agent is thereby normally put in a state of readiness to act appropriately 
with regard to the fact(s) perceived. S is apprised of some way in which the 
world is. Empirical belief may thus be acquired and held while the sensory 
mechanisms of the agent are engaged by the (supposed) objects of the belief. 
The force of the 'normally' just above is two-fold. Firstly, it embodies the 
claim that in its ordinary functioning, without handicapping conditions or 
blocks on awareness, an afferent nervous system is not just sensitive, but 
attentive to the environment 6 . It automatically executes the interests of the 
agent by generating doxastic states which should enable successful 
negotiation of the surroundings (and of course values are also vital as 
determinants of empirical belief, though they are not discussed here). 
Normally then, the agent cannot help but acquire beliefs about the 
environment if her senses are stimulated by it. The qualification 'normally' 
presupposes a standard rational agent, with the usual neurological and 
cognitive equipment - some experience and understanding of the world. It 
does not presuppose that the beliefs acquired in the course of sensory 
experience are true. Regrettably, it is perfectly normal to get things wrong in 
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an individual belief. 
Here is a rough illustration of the physical cause/effect array upon which a 
true visual belief depends, applicable mutatis mutandis to doxastic states of 
other perceptual modes. S holds Bp at t, where p = there is a bend in the road 
before S at t. Bp depends on the cause/effect array of: a road with a bend in it 
being in a certain spatial relation to S at t, a light source adequately 
illuminating it, an unobstructed visual pathway between the bend and S's 
eyes, good enough eyes, backed up by a proper visual system, focussed on the 
bend, and a cortex, functioning in a normal, attentive mode. 
What of a false belief though - can it depend in any significant sense on a 
cause/effect array to which the belief's content does not refer? The answer I 
think is yes, given that this is a dependence relation of generation and that 
the belief's content is determined by other factors as well as its cause. For 
example, S believes there is a bicycle tyre on the lawn before him at t, but 
the array which is the physical matrix of the belief includes, besides all the 
other usual elements, a snake and no tyre. Given S's probabilistic belief (vide 
infra) at t, that a snake on his lawn is unthinkable, the physical array is 
consonant with the belief. Again, S believes there is a bent stick in water 
when the stick is really straight, because his working semantic beliefs do 
not include any about refraction. It is thus. possible to see how the 
cause/effect array, coupled with S's other beliefs at t, determine even a false 
current empirical belief. 
In these two examples, S did not get things badly wrong. He was mistaken 
only as to particular properties of the objects in the experience and much of 
the physical array was still directly correlative with the belief. In a case of 
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grossly disordered experiential belief., as when a hospitalized and 
hallucinating S believes there are pink rats on the dungeon wall before her, 
and the belief depends on a pathological brain state induced by toxins, then 
this particular dependence relation is not so important in the constitution or 
to the understanding of the belief, and one must look to S's other beliefs, 
memories and experiences for the more significant determinants of the 
belief. I have tried to avoid saying that Bp is caused by its relevant physical 
conditions, for the reasons mentioned earlier, viz. that this encourages 
thinking of the belief as identical with only a certain neurological state, but 
it does seem that this particular dependence relation is one of generation and 
at least very similar to a causal dependency. 
5.2.2 Evidential belief 
S may come to have a belief about some way in which the world is (say p = 
the chimney is smoking), not through her own experience of it, but indirectly. 
She may not see the smoking chimney for herself, but learn about it from a 
credible source, or see a fire in the grate and infer p. Bp may thus be arrived 
at by S on the basis of other beliefs of hers, in putative facts which indicate 
that p is the case. These beliefs, and what they are about, seem to fall into 
two main classes. 
Belief in the natural evidence for p : S may come to believe that it rained last 
night (Bp) on the basis of his beliefs that the trees are wet (Bq), there are 
pools on the paths (Br) and the soil is damp (Bs). There are natural relations 
of cause and effect between q, r and s, and p, so that the presence of the first 
three is strongly indicative of p. If awareness of these relations is an 
operative part of S's body of semantic or theoretical belief, then, (in the 
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absence of special reasons to the contrary, e.g., S's believing his neighbour's 
sprinkler was on), if S holds q, r and s, he will at the same time accept p. An 
empirical belief that p may thus depend on belief in the direct or natural 
evidence for p, and on the fact that it· is such evidence, being in S's 
cognizance. 
It seems also that there are times when S's acceptance of certain statistics 
or objective probabilities can act as a kind of evidence for some particular 
thing's being the case. If S believes that the worldwide birthrate is 28 000 
per day, then it might occur to her at t that, during the last 5 minutes, a baby 
has been born somewhere on earth - surely a particular empirical belief with 
respect to time and place. 
Belief in testimonv for p : S may come to believe that it rained last night as a 
result of accepting the statement by a trustworthy source that this was so. 
Here, it is possible to explain the dependence relation in one of two ways. 
Firstly, there is a Humean sort of view on which S's belief that a source is 
reliable has the effect of rendering that source's claims of p, into something 
like direct evidence for p. The direct natural evidence that q constitutes for 
p, is just the highly regular consequence of p upon q; granting a source 
reliability is allowing that its claims of p are regularly conjoined with the 
fact that p. Hence, to allow that a source is reliable is to give its claims the 
status of natural evidence. Alternatively, it may be that Bp is arrived at via 
acceptance of the truth of 'p'. If S believes that T has uttered 'p', and S 
believes that T is trustworthy, i.e., speaks the truth, then S thereby believes 
that 'p' is true, and so also that p is the case. The utterance is now seen as a 
conventional rather than a natural sign of the fact that p. Either way, S's 
belief in testimony that p results in S's belief that p. 
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As was also the case with the physical cause/effect array, the mere 
existence of evidential beliefs is normally enough to guarantee that S will 
hold the dependent belief, and here again the 'normally' excludes irrationality 
and includes the usual background beliefs of cognitive agents. If S sees a fire 
in the grate and, believing that fire smokes and there are no blocking 
conditions on this one's smoking, yet rejects the proposition that this fire is 
smoking, he does so at the price of being irrational. If T asserts that the 
chimney is smoking, and S, believing T credible, yet holds that there is no 
smoke coming out of the chimney, he is committed to a contradiction. We may 
think of the physical array and evidential beliefs as the apprising conditions 
for empirical belief, since these are what inform S of some new state of 
affairs, or what give her cause to believe that something of which she was 
not previously cognizant, is the case. 
Might there not be many other states which are apprising conditions for 
empirical belief? Memory, intuition, wishful thinking and brain-washing are 
some other ways in which it seems S might come to hold an empirical belief. 
Memory however, can be ruled out on the grounds that what S remembers is 
not a fact new to him but something previously believed, and so memory has 
no apprising force. As for the other three, it is true that S may come by their 
means to hold that p is the case, in something very like a doxastic state, a 
state that plays a belief-like role in his functional economy. 
But these are not the terms of true dependence relations of empirical belief, 
as those relations were defined above. S may be in a state of guessing or 
wishfully thinking that p, without accepting that it is in fact the case and 
being ready to commit himself to appropriate action; his readiness to act and 
Chapter 5 - Some dependence relations of empirical belief 1 2 9 
his conviction (if he does reach one) that the proposition is true, in these two 
cases depend upon his having forgotten its dubious origins. A conviction that p 
which is induced in S by brain-washing, hypnotism or the like, is similarly 
not one in which S is rationally constrained, simply by virtue of being in that 
state, to accept p. In fact, he would be well advised, and has the reflective 
capacity, in such circumstances to with old belief in p. If S asks himself the 
question 'Why do I believe p?' and comes to recognize as a result that he has 
no grounds for thinking p to be the case, he cannot continue to believe p in the 
serious epistemic sense of believing. S's perception of the fact that p, 
however, either sensorily in a causal physical array, or inferentially, among 
his existent beliefs, is identical with its acceptance by him, and does 
constitute a state of serious belief. 
Relevant physical conditions and evidential beliefs are necessary if S is to 
come to learn of the existence of some empirical state of affairs; as such we 
have said they are the apprising conditions for his belief. The next two 
classes of beliefs, while also necessary to the generation of Bp, do not play 
an annunciatory role, but a shaping or determinative role; they will be 
referred to generally as the theoretical conditions for Bp. Both apprising and 
theoretical conditions are informative, but in different senses. The first 
cause S to perceive that something is the case, while the second enable her to 
give expression to the perception, and to hold it with more or less confidence. 
5.2. 3 Semantic belief 
There is more needed than just the apprising conditions in order for S to hold 
an empirical belief, say, that there are gondolas in Venice. He will need 
besides some sort of concept or understanding of gondolas and what they are, 
and some sort of recognition of Venice and what it is, and these are cognitive 
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capabilities which involve further beliefs of his about boats, transport, 
canals, cities and their identity, and ultimately, about things, their 
properties and relations, their location in space and identity over time; 
'endless interlocked beliefs. The system of such beliefs identifies a thought 
by locating it in a logical and epistemic space' (Davidson, 1984: 157). This is 
the familiar Quinean 'web of belief', the cognitive context without which a 
psychophysiological state could not be a belief, since it would have no 
semantic content. 
The term 'semantic' should not be taken to imply a necessarily linguistic 
element in belief. It would be a nominalistic mistake to insist that S have the 
words 'gondola' and 'Venice' at his command in order to have the belief that 
there are gondolas in Venice, although being a linguistic creature, he will 
recognize his belief under some suitable statement of its content 7 , and will 
be disposed to assert and assent to such a sentence. 'Theoretical' would have 
done as well, but 'semantic' is used here since these are the beliefs that 
invest the representational content of Bp with its meaning, rather than its 
existential import, which is the function of the apprising conditions. 
While both these features of a belief's representational content - meaning and 
existential import - are expressed in the same proposition, there is at least 
this difference between them: that meaning is general while the ontological 
commitment of a particular empirical belief arises only with the belief. S 
may have command of a whole theory of gondolas and Venice and may 
entertain the thought that there are gondolas in Venice, without having any 
cause to believe there are any particular gondolas there or anywhere at all. 
S does not in any sense infer from his general beliefs about the nature of 
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things, together with his particular experience, to the conclusion that there 
are gondolas in Venice; rather the reverse. The general beliefs are present in 
the particular empirical belief and an observer, or S himself on reflection, is 
able to say, that since S has a certain particular empirical belief, that he 
must have certain other general beliefs too. The particular belief is a state of 
readiness to behave in certain ways, the general belief is the capacity to take 
up that state in the appropriate experiential context. We might explain such a 
general belief in terms of the disposition to apply a proposition of the form 
(x) (Fx => Gx), where F represents a quorum of properties perceived by S, 
sufficient for the identification of something as being of a certain kind, and G 
is a conjunction of all the properties (including F) which S thinks belong to 
things of that kind. 
For instance, F = brown, matt, aromatic, rectangular, sectioned, which is 
enough for S to recognize a slab of chocolate by. If it is chocolate, then it is 
also (G = ) sweet, nutritious, soft, cocoa-flavoured, yielding to the teeth, 
soluble, etc., properties which dispose S to proceed in certain ways. If S did 
not have the general semantic belief that chocolate was all these things, she 
could not recognize it, understand what she was looking at, act appropriately 
towards it, in short, acquire the belief that it was chocolate before her. A 
New Guinea headhunter with no experience of such stuff might believe it was 
a very soft wood. The general belief ~ay be thought of as S's theory of 
chocolate, applied in a specific instance. She has certain expectations, based 
on her past experiences of chocolate, as to how it will behave in interaction 
with herself. S having recognized this as chocolate, her general expectations 
are translated into a disposition to proceed here and now in ways which will 
serve ers ends. 
chapter 5 - Some dependence relations of empirical belief 1 3 2 
Once again, it seems that normally, semantic beliefs relevant to the occasion 
are automatically brought into operation. 
Though bath particular empirical beliefs and their determining semantic 
beliefs are dispositional states, there is the genuine difference between them 
referred to above in the phrase 'existential impart'. 'Beliefs about particular, 
spatia-temporally limited, states of affairs have been compared to maps ... 
which, taken together, farm one great map of the world ... General beliefs are 
nat part of the map. They are dispositions to extend the map according to 
certain principles' (Armstrong, 1973: 99). Talk of this kind should nat be read 
as implying the possibility of same athearetical kind of given, or of pure data 
of experience a. 
Nevertheless, it seems that a general belief of the kind we are calling 
'semantic' is operative only in the company of a cause/effect array (and 
possibly inference), and it is the apprising condition which is essential to S's 
coming to believe that p is the case, and it is also essential to S's coming to 
believe that p is the case, since it is the nature of the experience that 
determines what general beliefs became operative. If S experiences a gondola 
an a canal, he is nat at liberty to construe it as an acrobat an a tightrope, or 
does sa at the cast of his understanding and effective negotiation of the 
world. 
5.2. 4 Probabilistic belief 
A probabilistic belief, Bq, is a belief that S holds at t, antecedently to being 
apprised of p, which renders it mare or less likely far him that p is the case. 
It bears thus an the credibility of the proposition p and disposes S to accept 
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or reject it, and to do so with greater or lesser firmness. A probabilistic 
belief is not necessarily about an objective probability; q may be any sort of 
proposition, though it must have some sort of perceived bearing for S on the 
features or context of p, and this relationship is such that it can always issue 
in a formulation, however rough, of the objective probability of p. 
Like semantic beliefs, probabilistic beliefs precede S's acquisition of, and are 
applicable to, the particular Bp. The same beliefs may be both semantic and 
probabilistic; what distinguishes them as two kinds is that the belief they 
determine, is determined in different ways by each class. The base realm of 
semantic beliefs determines how S will construe an experience and what 
range of actions she will be disposed to in her acceptance of p; the base realm 
of probabilistic beliefs determines the degree of credibility that p will have 
for S, and (sometimes) which among several possible semantic construals is 
the most likely. The example above of S's believing there is a tyre on his lawn 
when it is really a snake illustrates how S's background beliefs about the 
likelihood of p may deflect its credibility for him onto q, even when his 
sensory experience suggests p more strongly than q to him. 
An experience's representational content may also appear incredible to S in 
the light his beliefs about its or the context's mendacity; visual illusions, 
wax figures, deliberate deceptions of one sort or another will, if S is 
cognizant of the circumstances, cause him to believe not the apparent, but 
something else 9 . The corollary of this is that when, in normal circumstances, 
S believes an ordinary empirical proposition like 'There is a cat on the mat', 
his acceptance of the proposition depends on his having beliefs about the 
match of context and content, or about context alone, which do not militate 
against the proposition's credibility. Put into dispositional terms, S is 
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predisposed by his general beliefs that mats are a likely place to find cats, 
and his particular beliefs that there is nothing untoward about this case, to 
act as if p were the case when apprised of p. 
Probabilistic beliefs may act to deflect S from the prima facie belief in a 
causal array or in the evidence, but they may also promote such belief. S is 
keen to add a blue-eared starling to her bird list, so she goes to a spot where 
these birds are known to be plentiful and settles near a tree full of their 
favourite fruits. Presently she sees, somewhat obscured, a bird with a bluish 
sheen on its head. She believes that there is a blue-eared starling on the 
branch in front of her. In the presence of her background beliefs about the 
context of her experience, and the high likelihood of the birds occurring in 
this context, what would otherwise be evidence too sketchy for thinking 'This 
is a blue-eared starling', becomes sufficient. No wishful thinking need be 
involved; even for a conscientious and careful believer, if there are 
contextual factors which increase the probability of p, then S's belief that 
such factors exist automatically increases p's credibility for S, or (in the 
case of an inferential belief) decreases the need for evidence or grounds. 
Conversely, if S were to see a blue-eared starling sitting on the back fence in 
broad daylight, she would probably not believe her eyes, simply because it is 
so unlikely a situation to find one of these rare birds in. 
There is an important class of probabilistic beliefs discernible in the fact of 
doxastic involuntarism regarding the contents of experience. It is a pretty 
uncontentious fact that a rational agent S normally has a disposition to 
accept what his eyes, ears, and other senses tell him. This readiness is 
construable as a higher-order belief to the effect that his eyes, ears, etc., are 
believable, i.e., that his sensory belief-producing mechanisms are 
trustworthy, and it thus provides S with a measure of warrant for holding his 
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immediate beliefs (more on this point in Chapter 7). It is higher-order firstly 
because it is not an empirical belief which primes S to act with reference to 
some way the world is - like a semantic belief it directs him rather in the 
holding of first-order beliefs; and secondly because it is not contingent upon 
S's experience - there is no question of his changing his opinion in this 
respect as his experience changes. 
Even when S has background beliefs which cause him to doubt the 
straightforward representational content of an experience, as in his seeing of 
a hologram image or a desert mirage, these background beliefs will cause him 
to believe a transmuted version of the apparent content rather than cause him 
to suspend belief altogether, so that any content presented to S by his senses 
is going to be believed by him under some aspect. It seems to be a 
'hard-wired' state of S fixed in the sensory belief-producing mechanisms in 
virtue of which he is a perceiver/cognizer 10 
So far the claims made regarding probabilistic beliefs have been relevant to 
their determination of immediate empirical belief. Here is a comparative 
example of how inferential belief depends on probabilistic beliefs. S goes into 
her garden in Johannesburg in the early morning and sees that the shrubs are 
wet, there are pools on the paths and the soil is damp. If it is in December, S 
concludes that it rained in the night; if it is in June, S thinks that the 
neighbour's sprinkler has been on. The first belief depends on S's further 
beliefs about the likelihood of rain being high in December; the second, on 
beliefs about rain being almost unheard of in June. This example illustrates 
too that Bp is not typically arrived at by S's inferring it from premisses of 
probabilistic beliefs plus experiential or evidential beliefs. That the 
experience or evidence assumes one particular character for S, rather than 
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another, is explicable in the light of her background beliefs. 
There are {at least) two possible objections to regarding these probabilistic 
beliefs as dependence conditions for empirical belief. Firstly, does empirical 
belief essentially depend upon such beliefs? Aren't they rather an adjunct to 
a particular empirical belief, perhaps acting in the exceptional case to bar or 
generate belief, but normally playing a merely cautionary or confirmatory 
role? A probabilistic belief disposes S to accept or reject p with greater or 
lesser firmness {vide supra). Surely the implication of this, in conjunction 
with the thesis of apprising conditions in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above, is that 
probabilistic beliefs are not essential to the acceptance of an empirical fact. 
If this objection can be answered, and it can be shown that they are 
necessary, then a second question may be raised: are probabilistic beliefs in 
any real sense different from the particular empirical belief they 'determine', 
or should they not rather be regarded as identical with it? The degree of p's 
subjective probability for S at t is surely just the more or less firmly held 
belief that p is the case. And if this is so, there can once again, though for a 
different reason, be no talk of dependence of the one on the other. The first 
objection would have it that probabilistic beliefs are only contingently 
related to an empirical belief, the second, that they are in a relation of 
identity; either way, the relation is not one of dependence. 
I lack space here to deal fully with these objections, but think that both can 
be met. Firstly, that p's likelihood in terms of S's other relevant empirical 
beliefs, is necessary for Bp, and that p's acceptance after an initial rejection 
depends on a revision of· those other beliefs, may be established both by 
exemplification and an argument on coherentist lines which equates 
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credibility with acceptability, with the consistency of p with S's whole 
doxastic set. Secondly, it may be granted that p's subjective probability for S 
at t is nothing but the sum of his other beliefs which bear on p's likelihood, so 
long as we remember that this is not all there is to a particular empirical 
belief. There are also the apprising and semantic conditions, so that Bp cannot 
be completely identified with the probabilistic beliefs it depends upon. That 
they are an integral part of Bp is not a difficulty for, but a vindication of, the 
dependency thesis. 
5.3 Some implications for the concepts of belief and justification 
As far as the character of the different classes of beliefs outlined above is 
concerned, the claim is that semantic and probabilifying beliefs are not 
empirical beliefs, because they are not themselves about some way in which 
the world is. They do not apprise S of any empirical fact, nor do they dispose 
S to any range of overt actions. These claims need some defence. Firstly, on 
the question of whether theoretical beliefs are apprising or not, it seems 
possible to construct a case where they do apprise S of some way in which 
the world is. S has the theoretical semantic belief that all G cats have an 
extra layer to their coats ( = r). She sees, in an experiential array, that Moggy 
is a G ( = p), and thereby acquires the belief that Moggy has an extra layer to 
his coat { = q). It seems fair to say that S is apprised of q at least as much by 
r as by p. She could not have arrived at Bq without Br and it provides essential 
information regarding the particular concrete fact, q. 
But to take this line is simply to equate apprising conditions with whatever 
causes or produces a belief, i.e., with dependence conditions, when there is a 
real difference. A stricter definition of what it is for something to apprise S 
of an empirical fact, is needed. What is essential to apprising conditions that 
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theoretical conditions do not have, is that they give S a compelling reason to 
believe. In the Moggy example, Br had, we may suppose, been in S's doxastic 
set for a long time without her holding Bq. It gave her no reason to hold Bq. 
But when Bp entered the set, S did have reason to hold Bq. It was only when S 
saw that Moggy was a G that Br became operative and combined with Bp to 
produce Bq. In general, an agent has a host of inoperative theoretical beliefs, 
which by themselves have no power to apprise him of particular facts. 
Apprising conditions or beliefs are those which, when S takes cognizance of 
them, produce in him a belief in some empirical fact of which she was not 
previously aware. 
Secondly, the claim is that theoretical beliefs are not empirical because they 
do not dispose S to any overt behaviour vis a vis his environment; rather, they 
direct him in the acquisition of his empirical beliefs, and as such are 
higher-order beliefs. One might think that this difference in character is to 
be explained with reference to the particularity of empirical beliefs and the 
generality of theoretical beliefs, but it is not this simple - empirical beliefs 
may be general too. It is possible for S to hold one general content true in an 
empirical mode and in a semantic mode, (there may be other examples of 
overlap but one will do for our purposes here), as when he believes that all 
red apples are sweet ( = p). 
On the scant propositional view, belief in the same content is the same 
belief, but appealing to functional criteria will enable a distinction to be 
drawn between the empirical and the semantic belief here. If S is disposed by 
Bp, given his love of eating sweet things, to eat red apples when they present 
themselves, then his belief is empirical, e Bp. If S is disposed by Bp to 
predicate sweetness of x when he has identified x as a red apple, then his 
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belief is semantic in character, sBp. The two doxastic states will have some 
of their instrumental effects in common, at least it seems S will be inclined 
by both to assert sentences of the appropriate form. The assertions caused by 
e Bp, however, will have physical reference or existential implication, 
whereas those due to sBP will be hypothetical in character. e Bp is about 
things in the world, sBP is about the co-assertibility of terms, or perhaps the 
co-instantiation of properties. 
Do we need to distinguish beliefs here, though? Surely this is just a single 
belief state Bp acting in rather different ways? This view would be possible 
on a propositional view of belief, but if we identify a belief with its range of 
input and output conditions, rather than the sentence(s} held true by S in it, 
then we must allow that eBP and sBP are at least two different beliefs of the 
same formal type (vide infra}. In fact it is only on a very reductive view that 
the two are identifiable, because the range of sentences to which they prompt 
S is not the same. eBP induces S to hold true 'All the red apples there are in 
the world, are sweet'; sBP induces 'All red apples, whether there are any or 
not in the world, would be sweet'. These two sentences can of course both 
roughly be expressed as 'All red apples are sweet'. So identifying them as 
exactly the same belief seems to entail the general principle that if, among 
the two ranges of sentences that any two doxastic states give rise to, just 
one sentence token is the same, then they are the same belief - an 
implausibly reductive principle. 
There is a different kind of dependence relation of empirical beliefs - their 
occurring at the instance of the agent's interests, needs, values. Since a 
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belief is a means-choice disposition, it is integrally related to the agent's 
purposes, and he acquires beliefs about things only as he conceives them in 
functional interaction with himself 11 . However, it is incumbent on agents to 
discount their immediate local interests or idiosyncratic values in forming 
empirical beliefs. Given that absolute truth is the one value to which all 
empirical belief ultimately aspires and that all normal rational agents are in 
consequence type-identical in their relations with the material world, the 
needs and interests upon which empirical beliefs essentially depend will be 
the same across the board. The teleological relations of empirical belief may 
thus have less, or a different kind of, determinative power than the four 
discussed above. Still, values represent a base realm which would require 
investigation in any full study of the dependence relations of empirical belief. 
Returning to the four conditions set out above, it is fairly safe to say that any 
particular empirical belief is determined in part by apprising conditions, by 
semantic and by probabilistic beliefs of the agent. The first gives S reason to 
think that p is the case; the second gives p a cognitive content that S can 
grasp; the third gives p acceptability in terms of S's other empirical beliefs. 
This thesis of dependency relations has various applications. What, on a 
purely propositional view of belief, would be the same belief (i. e., belief in 
the one proposition) may depend to different degrees on these three terms, in 
different agents or the same agent at different times. It is possible to 'hold 
content steady' and construct different inputs and outputs for doxastic states 
that it is the content of. For instance, agents Q, R and S all believe that there 
are dugongs in the Sargasso ( = p). Q has encountered them in immediate 
experience, though he may not have their or their location's name; R has 
forgotten how she came by the fact and has only the sketchiest idea of what 
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dugongs or the Sargasso are, but p's intersubjective assertibility has 
confirmed him in Bp; S extrapolates on evolutionary principles from what he 
knows of marine animals and their habitats to Bp. 
It seems reasonable to say that the physical array of which Q is a part is 
centrally determinative of Q's Bp (belief de re); that whatever substance R's 
Bp has is derived from R's semantic beliefs (de dicta);, and that S's Bp is a 
hypothesis that depends in the main probabilistically on other beliefs of S 
from which he deduces the likelihood of p. How these three instances of the 
'same' belief differ, is thus explicable with reference to the different 
dependence relations of each. It is still the case though that all three terms 
(apprising conditions, semantic and probabilistic beliefs) must be present in 
each belief. This is to draw a distinction among different beliefs of the same 
formal type in terms of input conditions; it is possible to do the same in 
terms of output. 
We have seen how a general empirical belief that all red apples are sweet 
differs from a general semantic belief in the same content. It seems 
reasonable also to say, with reference to the example here, that only Q's is a 
full-blooded empirical belief in that its character is such as to direct Q in his 
negotiation of some part of the world. Although the truth-conditional content 
of R's and S's belief states are just the same as Q's, the character of R's is 
such as to direct her in the co-assertibility of certain terms, and of S's, such 
as to lead him to seek confirmation of his hypothesis. He is in the same 
position as students who, with years of book-learning, begin to practise in 
their field. If the behavioural dispositions of Q, R and S are different, it is 
fair to say that their beliefs differ, at least on the naturalistic 
epistemologist's understanding of a belief as a functional state and not just 
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the holding-true of a content. 
If the truth conditions for Bp and Bq are the same, then they are beliefs of the 
same formal type, and being the same in this way guarantees their similarity 
only in terms of truth-conditional content. If their input and output 
conditions are of roughly the same kind too, then they are beliefs of the same 
formal and psychological type, and then their justification conditions as well 
as their truth conditions will be the same. Several interesting questions come 
out of this, which we lack space to pursue but will just list: Could two 
beliefs be of one psychological but two different formal types? What would 
count as input and output conditions of the same kind? Since a formal type is 
individuated by its propositional content, can we distinguish, as different 
kinds of formal belief, empirical, a priori and perhaps hypothetical beliefs? 
Are there sub-species of psychological kinds of belief? 
The semantic and probabilistic relations of a belief state, related as they are 
to S's understanding of the belief's content in terms of his existent beliefs, 
rather than to any reasons he might have for thinking the content true, are not 
directly relevant to justification of the kind that will be discussed in the 
next parts, that reasonableness or groundedness in a belief which constitutes 
empirical justification. They (semantic and probabilistic relations) seem to 
form the basis of the coherentist's conception of justification though. There 
are thus also implications in this dependency thesis for the definition of 
empirical justification 12 and related issues, in particular for the 
longstanding disagreement between coherentists and foundationalists. 
If the physical cause/effect array is indeed a determining factor of some 
I 
empirical beliefs, then there is at least one important respect in which they 
are not dependent on the existing beliefs of S at t, and in which it might 
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therefore be argued their justification cannot consist in relations of 
coherence. In the case of inferential beliefs too, it seems that their 
epistemic status, and so perhaps their justification too, may consist in 
relations of at least three different kinds. Moreover, if the conclusion reached 
above regarding the identity and difference of beliefs with the same content 
is a sound one, then at least two anti-foundationalist arguments (those of 
Pollock and BonJour set out in Chapter 7) are rebuttable by it. 
Notes to Chapter 5 
1. Most of section 5.1 and all of section 5.2 in this chapter were presented, in 
a slightly different version, as a paper at a congress of the Philosophical 
Society of Southern Africa at the University of Cape Town, in January 1990. 
The paper was subsequently published in Au s I e gun g, 17, 1, Winter 
1991:27-40, and is used here with grateful acknowledgements to the Editor. 
2. See Kim 1978, 1982, 1984 (most useful), 1985 and 1988 (especially 
399-400 on epistemic supervenience). 
3. There is a serious difficulty in reading cause/effect as a relation of 
supervenience, at least if a Moorean conception of supervenience is to be 
maintained, on which elements in the base set provide the ontological 
realization of those in the dependent set. Causes and their effects are 
ontologically distinct, and if they were not, we should be faced with a 
cause/effect relation with only one term, an absurd sui causa . 
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4. Kim however suggests that an accommodating sort of reduction may be 
possible if we allow a wide enough disjunctive definition of the base realm 
elements on which a particular supervenient state depends (1984: passim). 
5. Some of the problems attendant on such a view are accounting for the 
representational content of empirical belief; avoiding scepticism ~ if a belief 
depends on nothing outside out heads, we might all very well be brains in 
vats; and explaining cross~category causation. 
6. The homuncular idiom here is harmless; the point could as well be made by 
saying that the agent is not just sensitive to the environment through the 
medium of his neuronal system, but attentive to it. 
7. There are difficulties in saying what a 'suitable statement' would be of the 
empirical content that there are gondolas in Venice, for the purposes of 
attributing that belief to S. If the sentence that S holds true as a result of 
seeing gondolas in Venice is 'There are odd black boats in the city my uncle 
lives in', does he believe that there are gondolas in Venice? For the 
functionalist, it is behavioural dispositions which are essential in 
individuating a belief, so that if S is able to discriminate behaviourally 
gondolas and Venice from among other boats and cities, then he believes there 
are gondolas in Venice. Even if he does not have the words in his semantic 
network, he has their meaning and the ability to understand them. 
8. For detailed illustrations of how immediate perceptual belief is theory 
laden, see Churchland 1979: 16 ~ 21 and 28 ~ 34. 
9. Compare the discussion in Chapter 4 of Peacocke (1983: 6). The claim may 
be reiterated that the sensory contents of the experience are also the content 
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of the immediate belief. 
10. If Chomsky is right, the linguistic competence in virtue of which S 
recognizes, classifies and represents empirical facts, an ability stored in his 
stock of 'semantic' beliefs, is also hard-wired in the structures of the brain. 
Then the two kinds of higher order beliefs upon which particular empirical 
beliefs depend, probabilistic and semantic, might both turn out, at least in 
part, to be of this kind. 
11. For a definition of belief as essentially the choice, exercised or not, of a 
means to satisfy an individual's 'ensemble of ends', see Goldstick (1989: 
passim). 
12. Support for the thesis that justification of an immediate belief might 
consist in relations of roughly these kinds is to be found in Millar (1989). 
Though he chooses to regard experience as non-doxastic, and sets himself the 
task of saying how a sensory experience could justify the belief it causes, he 
does allow that experience may involve a propositional attitude. 'A way of 
doing justice to our intuitions would be to hold that the class of sensations 
and the class of propositional attitudes are not exclusive. Experiences could 
be treated as hybrids which have, as it were, both sensational and 
propositional dimensions' (ibid.:141), as I have done here. For Millar 
(ibid.:150), the formation of a basic empirical belief that an F is there 
depends on 'an F-type experience' (our causal experiential array), on 
'capacities associated with the mastery of the concept of an F' (semantic 
beliefs), and on the belief that 'there are no relevant countervailing facts', 
(background beliefs - cf. Chapter 8; he omits probabilifying beliefs). These 
three determining conditions are translatable into justification conditions 
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for the belief. 
Chapter 6- Criteria for epistemic justification 
The suggestion has been made that, on a naturalistic perspective, the 
materials for a theory of empirical justification are to be found in an 
explication of the features of empirical belief, since how we do in fact 
believe is how we should believe. But not all the features of belief are 
justificatory; how shall we know which are relevant, and what will 
distinguish the definition of justificiation from the description of empirical 
belief? We need to consider what the criteria for a theory of epistemic 
justification are, that is, to consider the terms in which recognizably 
epistemological theories of justification, especially immediate empirical 
justification, have been developed in the past. There is such a wide variety of 
theories that we cannot hope to capture the common features of them all, but 
the four aspects of justification singled out as relevant here - internal 
reasonableness, the implication of responsibilities, its relation to objective 
truth, and its warranting role - are recognizable in, and basic to, much of the 
Western epistemological tradition. 
6.1 Reasonableness 
6. 1. 1 The credibility of a content for S 
There seems to be much that is right in Chisholm's opinion that it is 
justification in the sense of reasonableness which secures for true belief the 
status of knowledge. He takes reasonableness as a primitive concept in terms 
of which epistemological analysis should be conducted, and offers a 
definition in which it is relativized to a comparative three-term relation 
between two propositions and an agent: 'the concepts of the theory of 
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evidence may be explicated in terms of the undefined epistemic locution II 
is more reasonable for S at t than _ II ' (1987: 294) 1. 
In preferring one content to another, S indicates its greater credibility for 
her, or its being more evident to her, than the other content is. Credibility is 
synonymous with believability, and as such it is necessarily true to say that 
it is intrinsic to the psychological state of empirical belief. The purpose of 
the discussion of credibility that follows is to establish its equally close 
relationship to the notion of subjective justification. 
If a belief state of S at t can correctly be described as justified or (what is 
the same for present purposes) reasonable, then it has a certain positive 
epistemic status, related, as Chisholm's locution suggests, to the intrinsic 
credibility of a content for S. Credibility as a feature of empirical contents 
comes in degrees2 which vary with context. Something may be more or less 
believable for S; she may be very slightly inclined to grant it credence and 
very ready to withdraw belief, or she may hold it with great conviction and 
relinquish it only with difficulty, depending upon the evidence she has for it. 
The voluntaristic idiom in which talk of believing is conducted tends to imply 
that the agent has more power than she actually may have in the matter of 
choosing beliefs, i.e., choosing whether and what she will believe. In the case 
of empirical beliefs, as the discussion of doxastic involuntarism in Chapter 3 
confirms, it is normally just the way the world is, which determines both the 
fact (that S will believe something) and the content (what exactly it is that 
she will believe) of any particular belief. 
However, the degree of credibility of an empirical content, and so too the 
strength or weakness with which S believes some empirical fact, is 
determined by factors which are within S's influence as a rational agent. To 
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take the case of a basic belief: Bp arrives in S's doxastic set in a sensory 
experience whose cause and features are beyond S's volition. S observes, for 
instance, in a visual experience, that there is a mango tree outside the 
window. 
The degree of credibility of the content will depend on the features of the 
experience - if it is a clear and close view or a glimpse in dim conditions -
and on S's general background beliefs about such trees and about the context 
of his experience. If he believes both that mango's are tropical trees and that 
he is in the tropics, then the content's credibility will be high for S; on the 
other hand, if he believes that they are tropical and that he is in a Nissen hut 
on the South Polar icecap in mid-winter, then he should have some 
reservations in accepting his sensory experience's content. 
So too in the case of an indirect belief. The belief's content will be generated 
for S by other beliefs of his, in the light of which p will become evident to 
him. But the degree of confidence or suspicion with which he treats p, the 
acceptibility ~f the content for S, is determined both by his perception of the 
strength and nature of the evidence and by his awareness of other relevant 
background beliefs he holds. Whether S is alive to these things or not will 
determine whether the strength with which he holds the content true is 
judicious or not. It is a sign of epistemic virtue in a rational agent neither to 
under- nor over-subscribe a content's credibility. If Bp is justified for S at t, 
then he has fulfilled his epistemic responsibilities of bringing all his 
relevant background beliefs to bear on p, and of being alive to the kind of 
inferential connections in operation on an indirect content, and we may know 
that he has fulfilled those responsibilities if the degree of credibility he 
accords p is apposite in context. 
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This is not to say that S is always first apprised of a content and then 
consults his background beliefs etc., to establish if the content is acceptable. 
The credibility of an empirical, especially sensory, content for S is intrinsic 
to it and immediately apprehended; as soon as S believes something, he 
believes it more or less firmly. To illustrate this point, consider the example 
of someone who, while travelling through the countryside in his car, sees a 
barn 3 . In normal perceptual conditions, with nothing untoward about the barn 
or its circumstances, and being familiar with barns, the credibility of the 
immediate empirical belief that there is a barn before him, is high for S. He is 
strongly inclined to hold it. 
Add to this situation the background belief which S has that this area is full, 
along with some few real barns, of cleverly constructed sham barns, 
indistinguishable from the real thing for a traveller in his car. Now, though 
the external conditions of the experience are the same as before, the 
credibility of the belief that there is a barn in front of him is so low for S as 
not even to generate belief. He may concede that it looks just like a barn, and 
might even be one; that anyone who did not know the odd habits of the local 
inhabitants would think it a real barn; but given what he knows of the 
objective probability of its being one, he views it with suspicion and is 
disinclined to believe that here is a barn. 
Suppose, having been told, he forgets about the sham-barn passion of the 
locals. Then the defeating background belief is inoperative. S's perception of 
the barn will be just the same as if he had never been told; he will think: 'Here 
is a barn'. Should the defeating belief suddenly occur to him as he is looking 
at the supposed barn, however, he will suddenly see the previously stone 
walls as papier-mache walls, etc., and withold credence. The point is that for 
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S, the credibility of the content is immediately perceived, whatever its 
relative degree of strength or weakness. The variety of epistemological terms 
which characterize the relation of S to the content of his belief - it is 
'evident', 'obscure', 'dubious', 'obvious', 'certain', 'indubitable', 'unlikely', 
'plain', etc., - mark credibilities of various degrees. 
Though degree of credibility may differ across contents and contexts for S, 
there will be a just measure of acceptability in each case, depending on the 
nature of the apprising conditions: sensory experience (for an immediate 
belief) or the evidential beliefs (for an indirect belief). If S gets this measure 
right, we could say she was reasonable in the belief 4 . For instance, in poor 
light S can just make out a figure at the front door; the visual experience is 
so obscure that it licenses only a judgement of there is someone at the front 
door. Were S to come to that careful belief, she would be being reasonable in 
it; were S to jump, perhaps wishfully or fearfully, to a belief about the 
identity of the person at the front door, then she would not be being 
reasonable, and the belief would not be justified. 
In order to strengthen the claim that internal credibility is a necessary 
aspect of epistemic justification, let us try to imagine a counterexample, a 
case where p has high credibility for S but low or no justification. What about 
the beliefs of the religious or ideological fanatic? They have very strong 
credibility for him, but are surely unjustified. This apparent counterexample 
can be explained by pointing out that the belief-content does not have 
credibility, as defined, but rather credulibility (see footnote 5 below). 
Credibility is the rational degree of acceptibility which a belief-content has 
for S in context; credulibility is the attractiveness of a belief-content to S 
for moral, religious, pragmatic, aesthetic, or even for pathological reasons 5 
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i.e., he may have an idiosyncratic interest in p's being the case. If in such a 
case, there were no, or not much, evidence of p's objective likelihood of being 
true, then S's belief would not have much epistemic justification. The 'just 
measure' of a content's credibility is thus determined for S in each case by 
the epistemic grounds he has for holding it, i.e., his reasons for thinking p 
true (see section 6.4 below for the distinctions among different kinds of 
grounds). If S were to hold a belief strongly for practical or religious reasons, 
with no or little epistemic justification, though we might understand and 
even condone his holding it, it would not be possible to judge him reasonable 
in it. 
Conversely, let us try to imagine a case in which S holds Bp at t with a high 
degree of (internal) justification and yet sees in p only a low degree of 
credibility. Might there not occur a situation in which there was 
overwhelming evidence for p, and S, aware of the evidence but to make sure of 
believing correctly, accorded p a degree of credence well below that 
warranted by context and her own background beliefs? For instance, S is an 
archaeologist who has amassed an overwhelming amount of data which points 
to some prehistoric people in this area being stone-workers ( = p), but she 
refuses to accept that conclusion. All she permits himself to believe at t is 
that many local stone fragments have incisions on their surfaces ( = q). Here 
there might appear to be a case of 'high justification, low credibility', but it 
is not; p has a fairly high degree of credibility for S, and Bp, a like degree of 
justification, but she rejects it in order to secure the even higher 
justification of Bq, since q is indubitable for her at t. The example in fact 
illustrates the relation of direct proportion that exists between the 
credibility of a content for S at t, and the reasonableness with which she 
holds it true. She would be reasonable in holding p true, given that the 
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evidence supports it; she is super-reasonable in holding q true, given that the 
evidence makes it an apodictic truth. 
If credibility is identifiable with reasonableness, then the point about 
degrees of acceptability may be extended to justification: the beliefs in S's 
doxastic set will be more or less justified for him. His basic beliefs will be 
more or less evident, obvious, apodictic, and he will hold his indirect beliefs 
for good, plentiful reasons or on poor, sketchy grounds. There will be a certain 
minimum level of apprising evidence essenti~l to every case of bona fide 
epistemic belief, evidence to which S has cognitive access and to which he 
can refer in the intersubjective practice of justifying his belief. In the case 
of immediate belief, it is the sensory experience which provides this 
essential, apprising evidence; indirect beliefs rest essentially on evidential 
beliefs. If S has no such grounds, then this fact too is cognitively accessible 
to him, and having recognized it, he will not be able to maintain his belief in p 
without self-deception of some kind. 
6. 1.2 Reasonableness as a necessary criterion for justification 
The claim that empirical justification must always incorporate the aspect of 
credibility - even more, that internal reasonableness is the core notion 
underlying all explanations of justification, is open to two different kinds of 
challenge at least. The first is based on the terminological complexity of talk 
about justification, and the second, on the variety of very different 
epistemological theories of justification that there are. 
On the first point, the objection may be raised that there are a great many 
epistemological terms for expressing the relation of a subject to a content in 
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a belief state - S may think the content barely likely, certain, stronger than 
merely possible, plain, very probable, indubitable, obscure, self-evident, 
necessarily true, etc. Why should the locution 'the content is reasonable for S' 
be favoured above all others? - for two reasons: firstly, there is the internal 
relation noted above between reasonableness and credibility, or believability, 
which suggests that reasonableness must be present if belief is; secondly, 
there is the fact that all the usual terms used in speaking of justification can 
be expressed in terms of reasonableness. It is not necessary to undertake the 
task of reduction here, since Chisholm (1977: 5 - 15, 135) has satisfactorily 
shown how evaluative terms used in epistemic assessment: 'beyond 
reasonable doubt', 'some presumption in its favour', 'certain', 'evident', to 
name a few, can be defined with reference to the single idea of 
reasonableness, and we may take it that the possibility of reducibility is thus 
effectively demonstrated. 
The second objection directs attention to the great variety of convincing 
accounts that there are of justification which do not mention reasonableness, 
e.g., justification as satisfying the rules of some scientific or epistemic 
community, as coherence of a content within some doxastic set, as the 
reliability of the belief-producing mechanism, as a process of validation 
consequent upon the holding of a belief, as the way in which a belief holds up 
under practical testing. From this wide range of answers to the question of 
justification, answers which all seem to have some truth in them, the 
likelihood emerges that justification itself is a complex concept realized in 
many different phenomena. lntersubjective agreement, coherence, reliability, 
etc., might all be agreed to be justificatory in nature, even by those 
epistemologists who do not hold the theories concerned. 
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While the phenomena mentioned may all have a role to play in justification, it 
is neither necessary nor desirable to conclude from this that there are many 
kinds of epistemic justification. The more accurate explanation seems to be 
that these various epistemic properties and processes are all related in some 
way or other to the basic feature of reasonableness. The claim made above 
(Chapter 4, footnote 2), that justification simpliciter is subjective 
reasonableness which fulfils certain intersubjective criteria, suggests how 
they might be related. If this is so, then reasonableness is indeed basic to 
other kinds of justification. 
There is not space for a full examination of this claim. In brief though, as far 
as typically contextualist theories go, after some beliefs have been certified 
as justified, and others rejected as unjustified by the ruling epistemic 
community or authority, the question remains as to how the judgements were 
made, and in virtue of what features the justified beliefs were distinguished 
from the unjustified beliefs. lntersubjective or authoritative acceptance, as 
well as pragmatic success and validating processes, arguably are consequent 
to, and depend essentially upon, the justified status or reasonableness of a 
belief. They are not constitutive of justification, but rather markers of its 
presence. 
Then, the reliability of a particular belief-producing mechanism, perception, 
inference or memory say, can be shown to be directly proportional to, and to 
have a role in, the credibility of an empirical content for S. Reliabilist views 
of justification therefore, unless they specifically deny that the subject can 
have access to the nature of his own belief-producing mechanisms, do not 
contradict the core concept of justification as reasonableness. It is true that 
reliabilists tend to ignore the first-person perspective, but this does not 
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mean that it is incompatible with reliabilist-causal accounts of 
justification. As has been noted, neurological events have the property of 
consciousness, and there is a recognizable internal character to, or 
'something that it is like' to be the subject of, a trustworthy belief-producing 
process (ut infra). 
Lastly, the strength of coherence theories lies in the fact that they take 
justification to be a function of the internal relations of a belief to others in 
the same doxastic set, which maps very neatly on to one part of the core 
concept: that inferential justification is essentially the reasonableness of a 
content for S in the light of other beliefs of his (though it should be noted 
coherence theories offer no criteria for the acceptability to S of basic 
beliefs). 
We may conclude that the range of different theories of justification is no 
cause to reject, but indeed may be seen to support, the hypothesis that there 
is a single essential epistemic status, viz. reasonableness, or the credibility 
of a content for an agent. The practice of calling all these different things 
'justification' is perhaps a little loose, but they are justificatory in nature, 
given their supervenience on reasonableness, the core sense of justification. 
In fact, conceiving of them all in terms of their relations to the 
reasonableness of an individual belief offers a prospect of unifying the field 
of justification theory. 
Justification in the core sense of reasonableness is thus identifiable with the 
credibility of some content for S. In accepting (more or less firmly) that 
something is the case, in a sensory experience or in the light of her other 
beliefs, S gives that content her 'credatur', we might say: she signifies that 
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she considers it permissible to believe it. If S does seriously believe that p, 
i.e., does hold p with some degree of conviction and not guess or surmise that 
p, then the reasons she has for believing that p are ipso facto sufficient in 
her view to establish p and they justify her in the belief, though it is always 
possible for her conviction to weaken or even be withdrawn upon reflection, 
and for an observer to judge her belief inadequately supported by the 
evidence, or vitiated by reasons that S should have taken into account but has 
failed to consider, and so to judge it unjustified. 
6.2 Deontological aspects of justification 
It seems desirable that any theory of justification should take into account, 
or at least leave room for, the role of the epistemic agent, his 
responsibilities, rights and duties, if only because this is the way in which 
we commonly speak of and judge people, in the matter of believing. Pollock 
(1986:124) suggests that epistemic justification may be always be thought of 
in these terms: 'What are we asking when we ask whether a belief is 
justified? What we want to know is whether it is alright to believe it. 
Justification is a matter of "epistemic permissibility". ... Thus will think of 
epistemic justification as being concerned with questions of the form, "When 
is it permissible (from an epistemological point of view) to believe P?" '. The 
notion of 'permissibility' implies that there are certain criteria which have to 
be satisfied before a particular belief is allowed or sanctioned by the ruling 
epistemic authority; in the context of voluntary agency, this places a 
responsibility of observing certain rules on the agent. 
We have already suggested that talk of an 'agent', who 'chooses' whether 
'responsibly' or otherwise, what to accept in the way of empirical contents, 
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can be squared with naturalistic talk of belief as the supervenient product of 
causal processes, by bearing in mind that the subject of the belief state is 
the conscious instantiator of the causal processes, and that from his 
first-person perspective, the causal determinants of belief are experienced 
as reasons for it. The voluntaristic idiom of choosing beliefs may thus be 
seen as a convenient way of referring to the causal processes, and of 
expressing the epistemic community's wisdom on what constitutes right 
belief. If empirical beliefs are thought of as populating a supervenient realm, 
depending on and being determined by physical arrays, then the epistemic 
agent S is a construction in this same realm. 
There is a potential difficulty for the deontological aspect of justification in 
the concept of reasonableness set out above. We have identified the 
believability of a content with its reasonableness for S, and reasonableness 
with (subjective) justification. There may appear to be a conflation in this 
position, of the notions of belief and justification which would make the idea 
of unjustified belief problematic if not impossible. If this is so, then it is 
arguable that the thesis of subjective reasonableness being necessary for 
belief, absolves the epistemic agent of any duty to believe continently or 
responsibly. 
Of course we want to be able to say what it is that a justified empirical 
belief has which an unjustified belief does not have; there must be 
distinguishing marks, recognizable by the agent, which serve to differentiate 
the one from the other. The mere fact of a content's being accepted cannot 
serve this purpose, since contents may be, and often are, accepted for all 
sorts of wrong reasons. It would be a vicious epistemic principle that held a 
belief to be justified by the mere fact that it was a belief. 
Chapter 6 - Criteria for epistemic justification 159 
But there is room in the idea of the acceptability of a content for objective 
as well as subjective criteria. We may ask: 'Acceptable to whom?'; the answer 
is, in the first place, acceptable to S, without whose acceptance of p there 
would be no belief to judge as justified or unjustified, and in the second 
place, acceptable to the epistemic community, whose norms establish if p 
should be accepted by S at t, and so if it is acceptable in a wider sense (cf. 
Chapter 8). It should not be overlooked that S herself is a member of that 
community, and a sharer in its norms, practices and values, and as such she 
has the reflective capacity to establish if her own empirical belief is 
acceptable in the wider sense. 
All that the conflation of serious belief and reasonableness does, is to ensure 
the subjective justification of a belief. Credibility or acceptability in the 
serious sense (as opposed to credulibility or the plausibility of an empirical 
content for S on 'grounds' other than epistemic grounds) incorporates 
conditions whose satisfaction ensures some measure of justification for the 
belief, even if it is subjective and defeasible justification. In the empirical 
belief that there is ice-cream in the freezer - whether this is an immediate 
or an indirect belief, a hallucination, delusion, or based on a mistaken 
inference - there are subjectively available marks of reasonableness, viz., its 
sensory character or its relationship to other of S's beliefs. In the wishful 
thought or hunch or sheer guess that there is icecream in the freezer, there is 
no such sensory character or evidential relationship, and consequently no 
claim even of subjective reasonableness can be made for these states. 
Among the states properly called empirical beliefs, there will be those which 
are fully justified and those which are not. In the first case, the grounds upon 
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which S holds the content true will be good grounds, which fulfil the criteria 
set by the epistemic community for such grounds; in the second case, of 
beliefs not adequately justified, the grounds on which they are held will in 
some way or other fall short of these criteria. Unjustified belief is thus 
entirely possible, seeing that there are objective standards of what counts as 
good grounds or sufficient reason to believe some empirical fact, and there 
are epistemic obligations on S to ensure that he believes in accordance with 
these standards. 
Moreover, as a member of the epistemic community, S shares these standards 
and knows what his obligations are in the matter of empirical belief. His duty 
to believe reasonably, obliges S, not to follow any particular procedures in 
arriving at his beliefs, since they are largely thrust upon him anyway, but 
rather to be alive to the snares and illusions possible in each particular case 
of empirical belief, and it is ultimately these general norms of rationality, 
holding across the whole epistemic community, which license S in Bp at t or 
declare him unjustified in his holding of it. Justification simpliciter of a 
belief is necessarily the degree to which S in his holding of it, conforms to 
these standards. 
They include prescriptions like the careful and conscientious scrutiny of the 
empirical grounds (material causal conditions or other empirical beliefs of S) 
for thinking that p is the case, making sure that Bp is consistent with other 
beliefs held, and that all the appropriate semantic and probabilistic beliefs 
have been canvassed - in short, that all the information possibly relevant to p 
and accessible to S has been brought to bear by S in his accepting or 
maintaining of p. There may be other prescriptions besides. If S in his 
believing that p at t fulfils these standards, he will be judged justified in Bp; 
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if not, then he will be said to be unjustified. 
S's epistemic duty may be summed up generally as the obligation to ensure 
that his doxastic set is as true as possible. The injunction to maximize true 
belief might initially be interpreted in one of two ways: to acquire as many 
true beliefs as one can, or to hold as few false beliefs as possible. The first 
would be satisfied by any thoroughly incontinent agent who saw reasonable 
grounds in every thought that presented itself, and whose doxastic set 
contained a large number of false beliefs too. The second would be satisfied 
by an agent who discarded every belief he possibly could, at the cost of having 
very few true beliefs. It seems therefore that S's belief-monitoring practices 
should be guided by the aim of achieving the highest possible ratio of true to 
false beliefs. 
6.3 Truth-d irectedness 
Truth might be thought of as the highest epistemic value, certainly the goal 
towards which all empirical believing strives. It is this fact that gives 
epistemic justification its distinctive character vis a vis other kinds of 
justification, in fields other than the episterna logical. Thus, aesthetic 
justification might be thought to have as its fiducial point some concept of 
the beautiful, with reference to which critical claims are advanced and in 
terms of which a work of art is judged as better or worse. Moral justification 
depends similarly on some concept of the good or virtuous, in terms of which 
actions or judgements are justified. 
In the case of empirical judgement, it is also capable of moral and pragmatic 
justification, in contrast to its epistemic justification. As an illustration of 
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how an empirical belief might be justified in moral terms, consider the case 
of S, who believes loyally but rather against the evidence in her old friend's 
innocence. Pragmatic justification is exemplified in a terminally ill S's 
believing that she will get better, against all the odds, since a positive frame 
of mind is essential to any chance of recovery. In both these cases, the belief 
is suspect on epistemic grounds. S is not warranted in believing as she does 
by her cognition of the likely truth of the content, and she believes at the 
cost of irrationality 6 , and yet it may be allowed (in fields other than the 
epistemological) that S is entitled to continue in her belief by the exigency of 
these other grounds. Moral or pragmatic considerations may thus ameliorate 
judgement of S's holding an epistemically unreasonable belief, but they are 
irrelevant to its epistemic status. Those cases in which S seems to hold an 
empirical content with great conviction and no, or inadequate, epistemic 
grounds, will usually be found to be cases in which moral, pragmatic or even 
aesthetic reasons override epistemic considerations, and for strictly 
empirical contents anyway, they can never be justified. 
Consider the case of Pascal's wager. There are, as Pascal shows, compelling 
pragmatic reasons for believing in the existence of God and nothing to be 
gained but everything to be risked by not so believing. Nevertheless, the 
argument fails to be persuasive because it does not offer anything in the way 
of epistemic justification for holding the existential (if . not strictly 
empirical) belief that there is a God. The premisses of the argument do 
nothing to establish the likely truth of the content and give us no grounds for 
taking it as a fact that God exists. If someone chooses to hold the proposition 
for the reasons that Pascal suggests, he must admit that it is epistemically 
speaking an unreasonable belief. Moreover, it cannot be a serious epistemic 
belief. It will at best be a state of mind generated by the high value S places 
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on the hypothesis' being true, which causes him to act in the hopes that his 
supposition will pay off; as such it is more accurately characterized as a 
wishful thought than a belief. 
The relation between the truth of a content and its justification for S at t is 
not a straightforward one. The fact that S is justified in believing that 
something is the case does not entail that it is true, nor does the truth of the 
content ensure that S will be justified in believing it. As Chisholm (1986: 37) 
puts it: ' ... a belief may be justified and yet not true, and a belief may be true 
and yet not justified. (There are occasions under which one may be justified 
in taking a dog to be a sheep; and therefore there are occasions under which 
one may be unjustified in taking a sheep to be a sheep)'. 
Nevertheless there is a positive relationship between the two. Having 
conceded that the absolute truth value of any empirical statement at a 
particular moment is beyond a fallible and egocentrically-situated S's 
establishing, and that it is not at all clear what would count as 'establishing' 
the correspondence' of a statement with the world anyway, we may make the 
modest claim that an empirical content is justified for S at t to the degree 
that he discerns its likely truth at t, and it is justified simpliciter to the 
extent that his discernment is careful and conscientious. 
Truth is not the only epistemic value. Explanatory power is another 
desideratum in a belief and an inference may be justifiable because it 
represents the best explanation, in the light of his other beliefs, of some fact 
observed by an agent. It is usual to see explanatory power as coherence within 
a doxastic system, but it may also be argued that 'the best explanation' is 
always the truest or the one closest to the facts. In cases of conflict, where 
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an agent resists accepting some empirical content because it seems 
extremely improbable given his other beliefs, and its acceptance would 
necessitate revision of a considerable part of his doxastic system, the 
agent's perception of reality nevertheless has the last word. The explanation 
of his experience which S is rationally obliged to accept is the one which the 
experience itself and not his other beliefs, suggests; it is the most evidently 
true one. The apprising conditions of an immediate belief thus have priority 
over its other dependence relations. In this way, truth (an absolute 
correspondential kind of truth rather than the coherentist's version) remains 
the ultimate epistemic goal, for empirical belief at any rate. 
Thagard (1989: 437 - 438) discusses the difficulties of including basic 
beliefs in a theory of explanatory coherence. Though he allows that a principle 
of 'data priority' is necessary in such a theory, ('Propositions that describe 
the results of observation have a degree of acceptibility on their own'), he is 
'not suggesting that it [an observation proposition] is indubitable, but only 
that it can stand on its own more successfully than can a hypothesis whose 
sole justification is what it explains. A proposition Q may have some 
independent acceptibility [i.e., be the possible content of a basic belief] and 
still end up not accepted, if it is only coherent with propositions that are 
themselves not acceptable.' (My inserts in square brackets.) 
Thagard is pointing up the natural reluctance of an agent to accept a 
proposition incompatible with other of his beliefs. Reluctant or not, in the 
presence of apprising conditions, the agent will have no choice but to accept 
some proposition which is compatible with those conditions and as many of 
his other beliefs as possible, and in cases of real conflict, it is the apprising 
conditions which are overriding in determining an empirical belief's content. 
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We may conclude that the apprising conditions, or causal matrix of the belief, 
enjoy a similar importance in questions concerning the reason that an agent 
has for holding a particular belief, or questions of justification. 
6.4 Warrant - the objective likelihood of truth 
The warrant of an empirical content is that which gives it some degree of 
objective likelihood of truth. In terms of the warranting requirement on 
justification, if a belief is justified for S at t, then it is warranted for S at t. 
Warrant is an intrinsic part of the acceptability of a content for S, who, as a 
practising member of the epistemic community and sharer of its norms, can 
recognize a likely empirical truth when he sees one. 
The reliabilist 7 explains justification exclusively in terms of warrant, 
leaving aside the ideas of credibility, deontology and internal marks of 
justification. Roughly speaking, a belief is justified for S at t just in case it 
is the product of a reliable belief-producing mechanism, such a mechanism 
being one that delivers a high proportion of likely true beliefs 8 . The belief is 
thus justified in a general, objective way whether the agent is aware of it or 
not. This goes against the internalist intuition that S must be reasonable in 
holding p true if the belief is to be justified. Let us try to express this 
intuition, by constructing a counterexample to the reliabilist's claims in 
which an agent overlooks the trustworthy mechanisms which produce Bp, and 
which warrant its likely truth, and comes to hold a reliably-produced, even an 
absolutely true belief, for quite the wrong reasons. 
For instance, S gathers reliable data on horse-racing form and employs sound 
reasoning on these premisses to arrive at the reasonable and very likely true 
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belief that Aztec will win the 2 o'clock race. He is not very taken with his 
conclusion, but thinks the event is going to occur, and that he will bet R1 0 on 
it. Then he remembers dreaming that Aztec would win and continues, with 
enthusiastic conviction, to hold the reliably-produced belief on these shaky 
grounds. No-one would want to say that such a belief was justified 
simpliciter for S at t 9 . It seems to be a counterexample to the reliabilist's 
claims. 
Unfortunately, it is not a counterexample. On the functionalistic construal of 
empirical belief that takes input and output conditions to be essential to a 
belief's individuation, the sensible belief and the dream-based belief are not 
the same beliefs in any justificatorily significant sense. They have the same 
truth conditions, and are beliefs of the same formal type, both being the 
belief that Aztec will win the two o'clock race. But they not of the same 
psychological type, having different degrees of acceptability for S, different 
causal histories and different causal projections in action. Justification is a 
function of the belief qua psychological state, so that the lack of 
groundedness of the second dream-based doxastic state thus cannot vitiate 
the reasonableness of the first. If S were to bet on Aztec because he 
remembered his dream, he would be acting irrationally; if he were to bet on 
Aztec in the light of his reasoning, he would be being rational. The 
reliably-produced state is thus justified for S, the dream-based state is not, 
and this is not a case that will refute reliabilism. 
If reliabilism cannot be disproved it must be conceded, with the qualification 
that while this view of justification is not wrong, it is not the whole truth 
either, omitting as it does the deontological aspects of empirical 
justification, failing to explain acceptability of a content for S, and offering 
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no internal differentiating criteria for a justified belief. 
The reason that it is counter-example proof is that every case of a 
reliably-produced belief is at the same time a case of justified belief, 
justified in the full sense, that is. This is not just a happy coincidence. There 
is something that it is like to be the conscious rational subject of a 
belief-producing process and S is not in principle ignorant of his empirical 
beliefs' provenance. The warrant which a reliable means of production confers 
on a belief, of the objective likelihood of its content's truth, is within S's 
cognizance, as will be shown in the case of immediate justification in the 
next chapter. 
To sum up the discussion in this chapter, it seems that if any empirical belief 
is justified for S at t, then it will have certain intrinsic features which an 
empirical belief which is unjustified for S at t will lack. These features will 
be cognitively accessible to S and serve to distinguish a reasonable content 
from an unreasonable one for her, thus explaining the acceptability of p for S. 
They will be such that S's holding of Bp will be seen to fulfil the 
deontological criteria of epistemic justification, thus explaining the 
acceptability of S's Bp at t on the norms of her epistemic community. The 
intrinsic features of a justified belief will furthermore show how S is aiming 
at truth in accepting the content. Lastly, they will be such as to warrant the 
content with some objective likelihood of truth. In brief, whatever it is that 
justifies Bp for S at t must furnish distinct differentiating marks, explain 
credibility, satisfy deontological requirements, demonstrate S's 
truth-directedness, and provide some account of why the belief is objectively 
likely to be true. These being the main aspects of epistemic justification, 
they will also be evident, if only by implication, in any definition or theory of 
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justification. 
Notes to Chapter 6 
1. For Chisholm's further discussion of this basic epistemological concept, 
see 1977: 12- 15, 135 and 1986: 38. 
2. The fact that the credibility of a content for S will be a matter of degree 
should not be understood as contradicting the fact that serious epistemic 
belief is bivalent and that p's truth for S is not more or less probable. If Bp is 
serious, then the range of greater or lesser firmness with which S holds p 
absolutely true, will always be enough for her unequivocally to assert or 
assent to 'p'. If the acceptibility of a content drops below a minimal value, 
then it is no longer acceptable or credible for S, and she does not have the 
belief that p. 
3. The example is a free adaptation of one used by Goldman (1978:121 - 122) 
for a rather different purpose, viz., to get at the conditions under which S is a 
reliable instrument for observing empirical facts. S is such an instrument, 
and his experiential beliefs will be justified beliefs, only if he is in command 
of information (here, about the fake-barn-building practice) which enables 
him to discriminate relevant alternatives in the context of his immediate 
belief. 
4. The justificatory force of credibility is developed in a theory of epistemic 
justification called 'evidentialism', by Feldman and Conee (1987: 334 - 345): 
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'What we call evidentialism is the view that the epistemic justification of a 
belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief. 
Disbelief and suspension of judgement also can be epistemically justified. 
The doxastic attitude that a person is justified in having is the one that fits 
the person's evidence. More precisely: 
EJ Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for 
S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t . 
We do not offer EJ as an analysis. Rather it serves to indicate the kind of 
notion of justification that we take to be characteristically epistemic - a 
notion that makes justification turn entirely on evidence'. 
5. Notice that it is hardly appropriate to say that S holds Bp 'on pathological 
grounds ', perhaps because 'grounds' implies commendation of some sort and 
an empirical belief with pathological origins will not (except perhaps in very 
lucky circumstances when it happens to be true) have anything to recommend 
it. The same suspicion of inappropriateness may be extended to moral, 
practical and aesthetic 'grounds', on the assumption that truth is an absolute 
value for empirical belief, and these kinds of interest can give S no reason (at 
least without an adjunctive argument linking virtue, practical success and 
beauty to truth) to think that p is true; therefore any merit the psychological 
state has qua empirical belief can only be its accidental truth. The 
acceptability that these other kinds of reason-to-believe give to p from S's 
perspective, might better be called 'credulibility', implying the credulousness 
of their subject, than 'credibility'. 
6. For a good discussion of the character of epistemic as opposed to moral and 
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pragmatic justification in the context of what it is rational to believe, see 
Moser (1985: 1, and Ch. VI). 
7. Goldman (1987a) is representative. See also Armstrong (1973) and Nozick 
(1981) for definitions of mental states which support the reliabilist view of 
justification. 
8. The phrases 'objective likelihood of truth' and 'a high proportion of likely 
true beliefs' should not be taken to imply that truth can in any one case be 
proven. An absolute realist conception of truth, on which truth is established 
by the way in which a mind-independent world is, is taken as axiomatic 
throughout this thesis. It entai Is the impossibi I ity of conclusively 
demonstrating the truth of any particular truth-claim, whether it be in a 
linguistic assertion, a knowledge claim, or a statement of belief. As Davidson 
effectively shows (1983: 422 - 423), the idea of 'confrontation' between any 
representational psychological state and an uncognized world, is an 
incoherent one. Nevertheless, the naturalist mitigates this handicap by 
assuming the truth of a majority of the beliefs in any one doxastic set, by 
holding that most of what we take to be states of knowing are in fact such, 
and by insisting that if a belief is both defeasible and undefeated, we are, if 
unable to prove, at least entitled to claim its truth. 
9. See BonJour (1985: Chapter 3) for a series of similar examples, aimed at 
demonstrating that our intuitions favour the internalist criteria of 
justification, and depending for their effect on a belief reliably produced 
being held for bad or no reasons. 
Chapter 7- An outline of prima facie justification 
Given the conclusions which have been argued for in the previous chapters, we 
are now in a position to draw up an outline of immediate empirical 
justification. Let us briefly review that position. The consequences of 
naturalism are realism about states of knowledge and justified belief, taking 
the standard and not the ideal belief as the paradigm, and granting the 
justificatory importance of material causal conditions. Consequences of 
these theses include the foundational structure of empirical justification; 
the corrigibility of all empirical belief; the view of belief as a complex 
psychological state with several kinds of dependence relations; the sensory 
character of immediate belief; and the priority of apprising conditions in 
empirical justification. The criteria for a theory of epistemic justification 
are that it describe the differentiating marks which tell justified from 
unjustified beliefs, explain the credibility of a content for S, that it allow 
for the duties of the agent, and show how a justified belief is likely to be 
objectively true. 
In what follows, a theory of prima facie justification for immediate beliefs 
is set out, on which an immediate belief is justified by its sensory character, 
which renders the content prima facie credible and reasonable for S. It 
remains defeasible justification and S has always in consequence the 
responsibility of being alive to possible defeaters. Since the sensory 
mechanisms produce mostly beliefs which may be claimed to be objectively 
true, and since S has cognitive access to this fact of trustworthiness, 
immediate empirical beliefs are also warranted for S as likely true by their 
sensory character. 
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7.1 The reasonableness of immediate belief 
The term 'immediate' may be thought to refer to the fact that there is no 
distinction between the content which is believed and the reason for which S 
believes it, i.e., nothing other than the perception of p , in particular no other 
belief of the agent, gives him cause to believe that p . Immediate beliefs are 
often referred to as 'self-evident' or 'self-presenting'. Beliefs about present 
facts may be said to be immediate in another sense too: that they are those 
functional states which are about, and which prepare an agent to deal with, 
the immediate environment. They are beliefs in the operational mode, as it 
were. 
There are some important consequences of immediacy. Belief which is direct 
in this way is also epistemologically basic or foundational. This is a 
justificatory status of all and only immediate beliefs, which may be defined 
as the conjunction of the following conditions: (1) Bp is justified for S at t; 
(2) Bp depends for its empirical justification on no other empirical beliefs of 
S; (3) Bp may serve as the empirical justification for, i.e., it may determine 
the empirical content of, other beliefs of S. When a basic belief's 
'foundational status' is referred to, it should therefore be understood as 
including these three properties. The epistemological significance of such a 
status in relation to an agent's whole epistemic set is clear, and condition (3) 
in particular has been the focus of much epistemological theorizing 1 . But it 
is conditions (1) and (2) that will occupy us here, in an effort to get clear on 
how a belief might be justified for S when the 'reason' for which she holds it, 
does not consist of reasons in the usual sense of other beliefs of S's. 
Justification as the reasonableness vested in the credibility or evidentness 
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of a belief's content for S, may be either a matter of the relations of Bp to 
other beliefs of S, as when Bp is an indirect empirical belief, and S comes to 
hold it by perceiving in his other beliefs about the world, that p must be the 
case; or it may be a matter internal to Bp itself, as when the doxastic state 
is marked by sensory phenomenal qualities, and S comes to hold that p is the 
case in perceiving sensori/y that it is so. In both cases, if S is justified in 
holding Bp at t, then the justification consists in 'having sound reason' to 
think that p is the case. There are, as we have noted, several factors which 
may combine to infuse p with the acceptability which gives S such reason: its 
objective truth warrant, recognizable marks of justification and 
conscientiously-established absence of defeaters, i.e., consistency with all 
S's other beliefs. 
The acceptability of the content subsumes, though it does not reduce to, these 
other three, which is appropriate to the fact that it is empiric a I 
justification we are dealing with, the kind of justification concerned with 
the establishment of matters of fact, in which the primary focus is the 
belief's existential import and how the agent has arrived at it, i.e., what gives 
the agent reason to believe that some objective state of affairs exists. The 
content of an empirical belief is always an existential proposition and, by 
virtue of the link between justification and truth, the justification of such a 
belief is a matter of establishing the likely truth of that existential 
proposition. In terms of the belief's dependence relations, empirical 
justification supervenes on, and may be publicly established with reference 
to, the belief's apprising conditions alone; semantic and probabilistic 
dependence relations are not essential for showing the likely truth of 
ontological claims. 
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The term 'empirical' then, qualifies justification in terms of the reasons an 
agent has (internalist), or might have (non-internalist) for thinking that 
something is the case. In this sense, the empirical justification of basic 
beliefs is often seen to be problematic, even non-existent, since there seems 
to be nothing an agent can refer to as the reasons he has for a basic belief. 
Before he perceives it, S can have no cause to think, for instance, that there 
is a hibiscus outside the window. Immediate experiential beliefs depend for 
the existential import of their content on no further beliefs of S, being 
'inject(ed) ... into a doxastic system' (Pollock, 1986: 88) by the processes of 
perception. There is thus nothing that S can point to beyond the belief itself, 
as the reason he has to think that p is the case. Moreover, experience has 
shown, especially illusory experience, that there is nothing intrinsically 
epistemically secure in an immediate belief. A very common response to the 
question of what internal empirical justification basic beliefs have, 
therefore, is the sceptical response that they do not have any. 
However, two considerations may be advanced against this position. Firstly, 
it is a mistake to think that the reason S has to believe that p, must consist 
exclusively in Bp's relations to other beliefs of hers. Reason or cause to 
believe is identical for the agent with the credibility of some content, and 
with the evidence of an empirical fact for her. 'Reason' here is not a further 
belief which S can adduce in support of Bp, nor is 'evidence' some further 
body of believed fact which renders p likely for S. It is of course sometimes 
the case that p is evident to S in the light of other empirical beliefs of hers 
(where Bp is an indirect belief), but it may also be that Bp is sufficient 
reason for itself, i.e., is self-evident (an immediate belief). Where this kind 
of justification is at issue - the internal reasonableness with which S holds p 
or her grounds for thinking 'p' true - then perceptual beliefs may be said to 
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enjoy prima facie justification, in a sense to be made clear below. 
Secondly, the argument from illusion need not issue in a sceptical conclusion. 
It is not inconsistent to hold that all immediate belief is in the first instance 
acceptable by S, while it is always corrigible and its justification subject to 
a defeasibility condition. The deliverances of S's senses are as such, 
automatically and in default of background reasons to the contrary, credible 
to him - they are on the face of it acceptable and remain so until (if at all) 
defeated by new evidence. In short, empirical contents marked by a sensory 
character are prima facie justified for S. 
There might be felt to be some awkwardness about saying in one breath that a 
belief is justified and defeasible. After all, justification, like the verbs of 
perception, has a kind of success condition on it. Just as a true statement to 
the effect that S saw x, entails the existence of x, so a true claim that Bp is 
justified for S at t, means that Bp has successfully met certain objective 
standards of epistemic rationality. How then is it possible to say that the 
justification of a belief is successful and yet may be defeated? The answer 
to this question lies partly in the character of the project of naturalistic 
epistemology, with its concession that epistemic agents are fallible human 
beings and not ideally rational creatures, so that the epistemologist must 
allow in his theory of justification for the ubiquitous possibility of false 
belief; and it lies partly in the conception of belief as a complex 
psychological state, determined by its own unique dependence relations. 
Justification of Bp is thus never absolute, but relative to an agent, a time, a 
context, the belief's causal history and its particular dependence relations. 
7.2 The nature of the prima facie 
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The notion of the prima facie is well suited to the delicate task of striking a 
balance between the success and the defeasibility of immediate justification. 
'Prima facie justification' implies that the belief which is so justified, is 
successfully and completely justified, but its justification is nevertheless 
defeasible, continually open to revision in the light of new evidence. A belief 
will be prima facie justified for S at t when, given the context of its 
occurrence, it requires nothing else for its justification, although this 
justification may be defeated either by Bp's conjunction with certain 
background beliefs of S or by new evidence. 
There are two possible interpretations of the term 'prima facie' as it applies 
in general and not only to justification. One reading emphasizes the 
self-evident and clearly obvious nature of whatever is prima facie; if x 1s 
prima facie F, then on the face of it and most conspicuously, x is F. This 
interpretation of the term implies there is a sense in which the attribution of 
F to x is uncontroversial, since it is a strikingly apparent feature of x. It may 
be called the strong or emphatic sense of the term, e.g., 'Of course he's guilty; 
it's a prima facie case of fraud'. 
The second interpretation proceeds from the fact that appearances may not be 
what they seem. x may be F prima facie, but will it also be F 'secunda facie', 
(in Haack's phrase, 1988-: 5), or 'ultima facie', (in Alston's, 1988: 276)? 
Application of the term 'prima facie' to something, implies that the last word 
on the subject has not yet been said, and the final analysis has not been 
reached, and that it is quite possible that x should turn out not to have been F. 
The implication of this second sense of prima facie is that though the 
property in question is being predicated correctly and uncontroversially, it is 
Chapter 7- An outline of prima facie justification 177 
subject to further investigation in the light of which the attribution may be 
withdrawn. This may be called the weak sense of the term, e.g., 'He may or 
may not turn out to be guilty; it's only prima facie fraud after all'. 
The nature of the qualification imposed by the term prima facie is important. 
It does not imply that the predicate is of doubtful application in the case at 
hand, or that it yields statements of uncertain truth value. It does state the 
important reservation that further evidence may be relevant to the continuing 
. 
security of the attribution (of fraud, justification, or whatever). In other 
words, the term allows that the predication may be both unqualifiedly correct 
and defeasible in the light of further evidence. This sounds at first like a 
contradiction: if x is prima facie F, then it is unconditionally and certainly F, 
on condition that new evidence does not show it to be not-F. There are three 
ways in which this apparent contradiction may be dispelled. 
The first is to consider some qualifications which do undermine the security 
of their predicates, and compare these with the 'prima facie' case. 'x is 
probably F' is one such; another is 'x is hypothetically F'. Here the implication 
is that F is not uncontroversially and unconditionally established as a 
property of x. In the case of 'probably', there is evidence at hand which 
renders the application of F to x more likely true than false, but it is not 
completely unproblematic. In the case of 'hypothetically', the body of evidence 
which supports the claim is not strong enough to make it an unconditional 
claim; there is some degree of unconfirmed guesswork in the predication. By 
comparison, 'prima facie' does not itself cast any doubts upon the 
acceptibility or degree of confirmation of the attribution it qualifies. 
The second means of dispelling the apparent contradiction and showing that a 
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claim may be successful and defeasible at once, is to point to the growing 
body of argument, some of which was referred to in Chapters 2 and 3, which 
urges a new conception of the conditions for epistemic success. Any 
empirical claim is defeasible. When a claim is successful, then it must be 
allowed to be revisable too, in the light of new evidence. The naturalized 
conception of all the terms of positive epistemic appraisal - certainty, 
reasonableness, acceptability and justification (of empirical claims anyway) 
must thus embody a revisability condition 2 . The definition of doxastic 
success must allow for the possibility that a claim which is certain, 
reasonable, acceptable, and justified for S at t, is just the opposite at t + 1. 
At least part of the seeming contradiction in juxtaposing 'successful' and 
'defeasible' is then seen to be the idealistic expectation, nurtured by a strain 
of traditional epistemology, that if an empirical belief is once allowed to be 
justified, then there should be no possible doubt, ever again, as to its 
epistemic status. Otherwise, it was wrongly judged as justified in the first 
place. However, on the naturalistic view that all beliefs, even foundational 
ones, are corrigible, and so that all justified claims are defeasible, much of 
the difficulty in the juxtaposition mentioned above, disappears. It then falls 
to the naturalistic epistemologist to provide a new definition of epistemic 
success or justification, one clearly compatible with the defeasibility 
condition. 
The third way of dissolving the contradiction, will be to examine one 
particular application of the notion of prima facie justification, to 
foundational empirical beliefs. The situation is complicated, in the discussion 
of prima facie justification, by the fact that the notion of the prima facie, 
simpliciter and in abstraction from any particular application of it, is already 
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a notion of justification. A case of prima facie fraud is one which clearly 
justifies its description as fraud; the prima facie moral preferability of act 
A over act 8 refers to the fact that A is morally more justifiable than B. So 
that when we speak of the prima facie justification of (basic) beliefs, there 
are two levels of justification to be distinguished: (1) the justification or 
reasonableness of the belief itself, which inheres in the psychological states 
of the agent in a particular context and is relative to certain epistemic ends; 
and (2) the grounds that there are for applying the term 'justified' to a (basic) 
belief. 
There need be no difficulty with this complication if it is borne in mind that, 
just as a case of prima facie fraud is justifiably though defeasibly a case of 
fraud, so a case of prima facie justification is justifiably though defeasibly a 
case of justification. What this distinction does draw attention to is the 
small but important fact that it is the justification which an agent has for a 
belief, and not the proposition believed or the state of belief itself, that is, 
properly speaking, defeated when counter evidence comes to hand. This 
distinction will be taken up below. 
7.3 Prima facie justification of immediate empirical beliefs 
There have already been several arguments offered which tend to support the 
conclusion that the content of a basic belief is (usually) automatically 
acceptable to an agent. The arguments offered in Chapter 4 for the conclusion 
that sensory experience is essentially doxastic in character, together with 
the unobjectionable assumption that sense experience is involuntary, yield 
the proposition that experiential belief is involuntary. The argument for the 
dependence of basic belief upon its causal physical array (in Chapter 5) may 
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be developed to the same effect. In addition, the naturalistic focus on causal 
belief-producing processes permits an understanding of doxastic 
involuntarism which in turn supports the prima facie credibility or 
reasonableness, for the agent, of immediate experience. 
There is thus a considerable body of argument to the effect that an agent's 
experiential contents are immediately credible, in the absence of defeating 
beliefs, to him. 'Seeing is believing'; perceived facts are believed facts. Now 
the further claim here is that to say that p is perceptually or sensorily 
evident to S is to say that S is fully, objectively and not just subjectively 
justified in believing that p. 
But this further step may be challenged - does the automatic acceptability of 
a content for an agent constitute justification simpliciter? It seems lacking 
in any of the deontological aspects proper to the notion of an agent's being 
justified in a belief, things like showing epistemic responsibility in 
evaluating a belief, assessing its likely truth and being able to give the 
grounds on, or reasons for, which a content is considered likely. Moreover, 
there is nothing at first glance to provide that warrant of likely truth of a 
content which is essential to justification. Any satisfactory explication of 
justification must embody an account of deontology and warrant, so that it 
will not do to define justification merely in terms of acceptance, which is 
what the definition of immediate justification seems to be doing. To 
establish the successful objective character of prima facie justification 
therefore, we shall have to address the questions of what differentiating 
marks it allows to justified beliefs, and what epistemic duties devolve on the 
agent according to such a theory. 
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7.3. 1 Differentiating marks 
A serious objection to the definition of immediate justification as prima 
facie, centres on its apparent lack of positive characterization of 
justification, its apparent neglect of warrant and differentiating marks, and 
the resultant principle that merely accepting a content is sufficient to 
justify a belief. The thesis of prima facie justification of basic beliefs does 
not in fact entail this principle. The discussion so far, especially the 
definition of the 'serious, epistemic sense of believing' in Chapters 3 and 6 
and the naturalistic principle that the way in which an agent actually does 
believe most of the time is also the way in which she should believe, has 
tended to run together the ideas of belief and justification. I hope at any rate 
that enough has been said to establish their intimate and necessary 
connection. Now, however, there is a need to distinguish the two in order to 
make clear that. no basic belief can be justified simply by the holding of it, or 
by the act of accepting an empirical content, and that subjective credibility 
alone is not enough to justify a belief. 
What marks the content of an immediate belief as acceptable to the agent and 
distinguishes it from contents which do not enjoy prima facie acceptability, 
is its sensory character and immediate indexicality. This is a somewhat 
misleading way of speaking; these two 'marks' are inseparable from the 
functional state's doxastic character. They do not present themselves as 
features of the content, intrinsic or relational, about which S has beliefs and 
on the strength of which S then decides to accept the content. Sensory 
character and immediate indexicality are rather to be thought of as the 
vehicle of the content's acceptability and the means by which some fact 
becomes evident to S, and as such they provide an answer to the objection 
that the principle of prima facie justification sanctions indiscriminate 
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acceptance of empirical contents. It is only beliefs with these features that 
enjoy prima facie evidentness 3 · 
Signs of immediacy (sensory character and indexicality) have considerable if 
not absolute power of conferring credibility, persuading S of the likely truth 
of p even when p is not remotely the case. In hallucination and delusion for 
instance, it is the sensory mode of presentation and the immediate 
indexicality of the content which gives the experience its plausibility, and it 
is generally agreed that S is justified in his acceptance of such contents, 
other things being equal. If S remembers, while experiencing a vivid 
hallucination, that he took a hallucinogenic substance shortly before, or if 
experience is of such a quality as to suggest that it is not normal, then S 
would be remiss in accepting the hallucination as the real thing. But if there 
are no defeating background beliefs, or if the hallucination is of such a kind 
that there is no question of S's exercising epistemic judiciousness in 
accepting or rejecting it, and such that it convinces him completely of its 
objectively real reference, then we have no difficulty in understanding why S 
believes as he does or in allowing that he is properly justified in that belief. 
What it takes for S to be brought to believe is simply the presentation of an 
empirical content with immediate indexicality via the activity of his sensory 
apparatus. 
It is easy to see that the sensory character of an immediate belief's content 
acts as a mark of acceptibility of the content for S, distinguishing it from 
unacceptable contents for him (generated perhaps by wishing, imagining, 
fearing, etc.). But can sensory character also in the full objective sense of the 
term justify S in accepting an immediate content? Anything which qualifies 
as justificatory must satisfy not only the credibility and 'distinct marks' 
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conditions, but must also incorporate deontological criteria {S must in some 
sense exercise epistemic virtue in holding Bp) and a warrant condition {a 
belief's justification increases its likelihood of being absolutely true). 
7.3.2 Deontological aspects of immediate belief 
The concept of prima facie justification does in fact incorporate some 
deontological aspects. Admittedly, an agent's immediate beliefs are pressed 
upon him by the world; he does not choose what he will believe, nor does he 
have any antecedent means of assessing whether a newly acquired belief that 
p, should not rather be the belief that q or r. There is not the scope for 
empirical evaluation of the content of a basic belief that there might be in 
the case of indirect belief, where two or more conclusions might issue from 
the same set of beliefs, and the agent is able to display epistemic virtue in 
deciding between the competing inferences. There are, however, two ways in 
which S may be shown to be exercising epistemic virtue in his immediate 
beliefs, firstly, not by choosing judiciously, but by following {albeit 
ineluctably) the sound epistemic principle of believing what is evidently true, 
and secondly, by taking care to observe the defeasibility condition. 
On the first score, while there is no denying the automatic nature of 
immediate belief, there is epistemic virtue in the nature of the process 
itself. The content of experience is presented to S as some factual way in 
which the world is, so that in accepting it, he believes what for him is most 
likely the truth. It was the aim of the discussion in 6.1 and above here, to 
establish a core notion of justification as the reasonableness with which an 
agent holds some proposition true. If a content is presented to S as factual, 
as is the case with perceptual contents, then it is self-evidently true and S is 
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reasonable to hold it true, unreasonable if he rejects it, at least without 
further grounds. 
The 'virtue' that S thus displays in acquiring immediate beliefs is not the 
first-order merit of fulfilling epistemic duties, but rather the higher-order 
merit of instantiating a well-formed immediate belief. S is reasonable in 
having fulfilled the conditions for proper immediate believing, not in his role 
as agent, but because there is a general sense in which the type of an 
immediate belief can be shown to be objectively justifiable and reasonable. 
'Fulfilling the conditions' here is synonymous with 'constituting' and not 
'acting in accordance with'. The general sense in which immediate beliefs are 
justified by their sensory origins is discussed at more length in section 7 .4, 
on warrant. 
Secondly, there is a positive epistemic duty on the agent in her holding of an 
immediate belief, of being sensitive to the fact that her belief is always 
corrigible, and her justification for it, always defeasible. This sensitiveness 
consists in alertness to new evidence and to relevant or possibly relevant 
background beliefs, semantic and probabilifying. The agent must attend 
carefully to the surroundings, be alive to peculiarities in her experience and 
to background beliefs which have a bearing on it. The duties imposed on the 
epistemic agent by defeasibility will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
It remains to be shown how sensory character might be connected to some 
kind of warrant for the likely truth of an immediate empirical content, where 
truth is understood in an objective sense. The truth of the content from the 
agent's point of view is subsumed by the credibility condition. The content is 
acceptable to him iff he holds it likely to be true and he is in the habit of 
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holding true, contents which have a sensory character and immediate 
indexicality. Now the question arises as to whether he is right in doing so, 
whether these features are linked in any objective way with the probable 
truth of what they cause S to accept. If it can be shown that they are, then 
the further question arises as to whether S has cognitive access to the 
truth-conducive link. He must have such access if an internalist account of 
justification as reasonableness is to be defended. 
Not too much needs to be said on the first score. While there is no absolute 
guarantee that sensory contents with immediate indexicality are true 
(illusion, hallucination, perceptual error), most of them are true for most 
people most of the time. The evil demon or the mad scientist, with his 
possibility of global or massive empirical error, is outside the ambit of 
naturalistic epistemology. Indeed such an epistemology eschews absolutist 
claims of universal and unconditional certainties, so that is not at all hard 
for the naturalist to qualify his definitions of belief, justification, truth and 
knowledge with a 'for human beings' 4 . 
The 'mostly true' principle regarding immediate empirical contents is a 
consequence of a cornerstone principle of a naturalistic epistemology, that 
most of what we think are mental states of knowing are in fact so. It may be 
further supported by transcendental arguments from a Davidsonian 
perspective (that the nature of empirical belief requires the truth of a 
majority in any set of them) and from evolutionary postulates (that continued 
existence of the species presupposes adaptiveness, which presupposes mostly 
true empirical beliefs). The truth-conducive nature of the senses, along with 
other belief-producing mechanisms, is assumed in reliabilist accounts of 
empirical justification, though these do not require that S be aware of the 
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reliable nature of his senses. 
7.3.3 The warrant of immediate empirical belief 
Is the subject of an immediate belief with sensory character aware that her 
senses are generally trustworthy and truth-producing? In a qualified sense, 
yes. If S is an average epistemic agent representative of the kind, then she 
will most likely not have any explicit knowledge or occurrent beliefs about 
the statistical probability of her immediate experiential contents likely truth 
or untruth. She will probably not have even any occurrent beliefs as to the 
reliability of her senses, this not being the sort of thing ordinary agents 
occupy their minds with. But in the- process of becoming a rational agent she 
has learnt to believe whatever she clearly and normally perceives and if she 
is normal this doxastic habit will by and large have proved itself in practice. 
She is in other words commonly and in default of special circumstances to 
the contrary, in a mental state which disposes her to treat as true what her 
senses tell her about her immediate environment. This mental state may be 
construed as, and allows the attribution to S of, the general, higher-order 
belief that her senses are trustworthy. On a functionalistic reading of belief, 
S's consistent practice of accepting the contents of experience, a practice 
reflected in the thesis of doxastic involuntarism, points to a psychological 
state describable as the belief that such contents are consistently 
acceptable. This is to say, that S does have the belief that her perceptual 
mechanisms are reliable. 
If presented with suitable formulations of this proposition ('People's eyes are 
usually good enough for them to go by', 'If you hear a noise, there's generally 
something making it'), S would concur with them. If asked to explicate her 
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justification for some immediate belief ('Why do you think there's a hibiscus 
in front of you?', ' ... something under the table?'), S is likely to come up with 
something like these formulations, perhaps relativized to her own particular 
case, herself. At any rate, she will typically refer to her sensory experience 
in justification of the immediate belief. 
The belief that his senses are reliable is a higher-order theoretical belief of 
the type defined as 'probabilifying' in Chapter 5, since it has a bearing on the 
likelihood of p's being true. Notice that on two counts it is not itself an 
empirical belief as here defined. Firstly, it is like the other class of higher 
order beliefs upon which a particular empirical belief depends, i.e., semantic 
beliefs, in being not a 'part of our map of the world' but rather a licence for 
'extending' that map (in Armstrong's metaphor). Being in this particular 
doxastic state does not dispose the agent to act in any overt ways vis a vis 
her surroundings; it disposes her to accept her particular sensory experiences 
as true. 
Secondly, empirical belief is belief about some way the world is, and not 
about psychological states. The belief in question may be interpreted, on the 
strength of what it causes S to do, as the belief that her sensory contents are 
probably veridical, which makes it a belief about, and not of, experience. This 
might be disputed by an externalist about justification. The fact that the 
senses are reliable is construable in terms of observable physical 
regularities; there are predictable patterns in the interaction of neuronal 
systems and world, and that surely is a general empirical fact about some 
way in which the world is, and a concrete one when S applies this general law 
to her own particular perceptual systems in some particular context. 
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But this is to overlook the fact that it is as belief-producing mechanisms 
that the senses are being judged reliable, and a belief is S's instantiation of a 
conscious neuronal state. The probabilifying belief in question as held by S 
thus amounts to a belief about a feature of her own sensory experience and 
not merely her own neuronal systems, (cf. Chapter 4 for the distinction 
between empirical belief and belief about one's own mental states). 
In sum then, the link between probable truth and immediate sensory contents 
comes down to the fact that the senses are objectively truth-conducive and S 
has a belief to this effect, providing her with justificatory warrant for 
holding her immediate experiential beliefs. The thesis of prima facie 
justification rests on that of doxastic involuntarism, which reflects the fact 
that an epistemic agent is so constituted as automatically and in default of 
special reasons to the contrary, to accept her sensory contents. This general 
practice on the part of S is seen to entail the higher-order belief that her 
senses are truth conducive. 
This is not to say that immediate beliefs depend on further beliefs for their 
empirical justification. The general warranting belief does not serve as an 
empirical reason for S, giving her cause to hold any other particular empirical 
belief. It is not a piece of evidence which apprises S of some fact or from 
which she infers some information about the world, but part of her system of 
background beliefs. It is important to recognize these features of the 
warranting belief if the foundational status of basic beliefs, particularly 
their independence from other empirical beliefs, is to be maintained. Let's see 
how this exposition of the warranting condition stands up to what is by now a 
widely quoted and admired anti-foundationalist argument: BonJour's 'regress 
of justification' argument (1985: 31 - 33). 
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BonJour agrees with many of the basic principles that are in use here, 
especially the conditions that justification be internal and doxastic, that 
there be distinguishing marks on a justified belief, that an objective 
truth-warrant is an essential part of justification and that whatever 
justifies S in believing something should also be what gives him reason to 
think it the case, though he does not distinguish these conditions explicitly. 
In its short form, his argument goes like this: If a basic belief has the 
foundational status of being independent, justified and 
justification-conferring, then there is some feature of the belief in virtue of 
which it has this status. This feature 'must also constitute a good reason for 
thinking that the belief is true' (ibid.: 31) and S must be in cognitive 
possession of this reason if his basic belief is to be justified. But then it 
cannot be justified independently of other beliefs of his and is not basic after 
all. The justification-conferring reason takes the form of an argument: '(1) B 
has feature Phi. (2) Beliefs having feature Phi are highly likely to be true. 
/Therefore, B is highly likely to be true' (ibid.: 31 ). These two premisses are 
what S must believe if B is to be justified for him. 
BonJour foresees the foundationalist's possible defence that (1) and (2) are 
not empirical beliefs, but he takes it that the only way of being non-empirical 
is to be a priori. 'B is ... an empirical belief, and it is hard to see how a 
particular empirical belief could be justified on a purely a priori basis. Thus 
we may conclude .. . at least one of the two premises of the appropriate 
justifying argument will itself be empirical' (ibid.: 31 ). 
We may agree with BonJour that S must in some way be in cognitive 
possession of an argument of the given form, but on the present account, 
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premiss (1) is not necessarily nor even usually a belief of S's. The feature by 
which the basic belief is marked as credible for S is its sensory character 
and immediate indexicality, and this is encoded in the belief itself, so that S 
has 'cognitive access' to it without forming any particular beliefs about it. It 
would also be a very 'peculiar belief' for the same reasons that beliefs about 
appearances have a dubious doxastic status. S's cognitive access takes the 
form of consciousness of the belief's present sensory genesis or 
consciousness of the immediately appropriate intentional action. 
S does have a belief concerning premiss (2) of the argument; it is the mental 
state which fosters his general disposition to accept the contents of sensory 
experience, defined here as that higher-order, probabilifying belief which, in 
conjunction with the distinguishing marks of a basic belief, provides the 
warrant of likely truth necessary for justification. Is it an empirical belief? 
And if so, does this mean that 'basic' beliefs are not really foundational? The 
conclusion that theoretical beliefs are not empirical in the required sense has 
already been argued for in Chapter 5; this is just such a theoretical belief and 
it is not empirical for the same reasons offered there. It readies S for no 
course of action in his physical environment; it has no existential 
implications; it is thought to be empirical only because its contents may 
sometimes take the same sentential form as an empirical belief's - in short, 
it can give S no reason for thinking there is a hibiscus outside the window. 
If it is not an empirical belief, then is it an a priori belief? To answer this 
we should have to say whether S learns to trust his senses as a result of his 
on-going pragmatically successful use of them, which would mean the general 
belief was arrived at as a result of particular experiences and is, in a special 
sense, a posteriori, or whether he has an innate disposition to believe what 
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his senses tell him, in which case it is a priori. This is similar to the 
question posed in Chapter 4 as to whether the features of psychological 
states, specifically experience, were known a priori or a posteriori, and it 
was concluded there that beliefs about the features of experiences at least 
are not empirical. If a belief about a feature of one particular experience is 
not empirical, then a belief about a feature of experience in general is not 
empirical either. So the basic belief which is warranted by the general belief 
may still be claimed to be basic, in the sense of being independent of 
empirical beliefs, i.e., where Bp is a basic belief of S's at t, there is nothing 
in S's doxastic set which gives him reason to think that p is the case before 
he acquires Bp. 
In what ways this circumscribed sense of independence is epistemologically 
significant, and what role basic beliefs play in a set of empirical beliefs, is 
an issue on which coherentists and foundationalists divide. A coherentist 
might agree that there are beliefs basic in the way defined here (it is hard to 
see how he could disagree), but he typically holds that this is a trivial truth 
with no bearing on questions of justification 5 . 
The coherentist argues that if justification is to be internal, as we are 
agreed it must be if it is to include reasonableness. then the epistemic agent 
has no means of justifying his belief except through the medium of other 
beliefs of his. Any belief, basic or not, is defined by its place in the whole 
system of beliefs that S holds, in what has been described as relations of 
determination by semantic and probabilistic beliefs, and it is these higher 
order beliefs, claims the coherentist, that S must turn to if he wishes to say 
why he holds a basic belief. 
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Furthermore, the coherentist thinks that S cannot refer to the perceptual 
processes that deliver the belief into his doxastic set unless he refers to 
beliefs about features of his experience, those 'appearance' beliefs which 
might serve as the terminus of justification in the sense of being the last 
word S can produce in the intersubjective process of justifying his belief to 
others, but not in the sense of being the ultimate reason for which S holds 
that some immediate fact is the case. By the coherentist definition, there is 
no such ultimate reason for a basic belief. The coherentist concludes that 
justification is a matter of relations among all the beliefs in a doxastic set 
and no one kind of empirical belief has a justificatory status different from 
any other. 
The foundationalist might agree with much of this, but require qualification 
of the two principles the coherentist bases his argument on, namely the 
holism of the mental and the impossibility of S's having cognitive access to 
anything except through the medium of belief. In support of the foundational 
thesis that some beliefs do have a justificatory status different from others, 
he will point out that the dependence relations of empirical beliefs on their 
apprising conditions are of two distinct kinds - supervenience on a causal 
physical array and on other empirical beliefs. Where an indirect empirical 
belief is held on the basis of other empirical beliefs of S, they provide his 
empirical justification for thinking that p is the case, and similarly where a 
direct empirical belief is held on the basis of an experiential array, it 
provides his empirical justification for holding Bp. 
But we have identified the experience of p with the immediate belief that p, 
which means that the belief is its own justification. Where the reason for 
which, and the evidence on which, S believes p in the inferential case is a set 
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of other beliefs of his, in the immediate case, his reason and evidence is 
nothing beyond the experiential belief itself, a fact reflected in the 
established epistemological practice of calling such beliefs 'self-evident' and 
'self-justifying'. The advantage of this usage is that it permits the concept of 
empirical justification to be marshalled under a single genus, that of reason 
to believe. It is a general model which satisfies the four criteria of any 
account of justification {acceptability, marks, deontology and warrant), as 
we have seen in the case of immediate justification. 
7.4 Prima facie justification on a functional view 
Before leaving this discussion of prima facie justification in general, it will 
be useful to consider a criticism of it in Pollock {1986). There are good 
reasons for rejecting Pollock's argument and an explication of them will 
serve to support the present view. 
Because S's readiness to accept immediate sensory contents is interpretable 
as a general belief about the reliability of his sensory belief-producing 
mechanisms, the account of empirical justification being offered here 
remains within the scope of the 'doxastic assumption' (Pollock's term, ibid.: 
19 et passim) that the justification of any empirical belief of S is a matter 
of states not only internal and cognitively accessible to S, but of belief 
states of his. This goes some way towards meeting the widely-held and 
intuitively plausible view that 'nothing can count as a reason for holding a 
belief except another belief' (Davidson, 1986: 31 0). 
Pollock himself however thinks the doxastic assumption is mistaken and tries 
to derive the warranting condition for immediate empirical justification 
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from the processes of perception and memory themselves, in an internalist 
but not a doxastic theory that he calls 'direct realism'. He is not 
unsympathetic to the modest foundationalist's concept of prima facie 
justification: ' ... a possible, and somewhat attractive, version of 
fou ndationalism posits the existe nee of prima facie justified 
epistemologically basic beliefs' (1986: 35 - 36), though as he points out, in 
the absence of incorrigibility to act as the marker and warrant of beliefs so 
justified, the concept will need careful defining. However, on the question of 
how experiential beliefs are justified, the doxastic assumption and prima 
facie justification stand or fall together, and Pollock has what he thinks is a 
knock-down argument against them both, which he develops as follows (1986: 
89): 
1. If the doxastic assumption holds, then 'the justifiedness of a 
perceptual belief can only depend upon your other beliefs and cannot 
depend upon any features of perception not encoded in belief.' 
2. 'Perceptual beliefs cannot be evaluated' with reference to other 
beliefs 'before being acquired, because it is the very fact of acquiring 
the perceptual belief that determines which possible belief ... to 
evaluate.' 
3. 'It follows that ... perceptual beliefs must be prima facie justified.' 
4. 'Perceptual beliefs are ordinary physical-object beliefs, and such 
beliefs can also be held for non-perceptual reasons. If such reasons 
are bad reasons, the beliefs are not justified. But then it follows that 
they are not prima facie justified.' 
5. '(4) conflicts with (3), so the assumption from which (3) followed, 
namely the doxastic assumption, must be false.' 
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Pollock finds himself obliged by this argument to hold that 'perceptual 
states can license perceptual judgements about physical objects directly 
and without mediation by beliefs about the perceptual states'. Since he also 
wants to maintain that whatever justifies a belief is cognitively accessible 
to the holder of that belief, he is further driven to say that 'there can be 
"half-doxastic" connections between beliefs and non-doxastic states that 
are analogous to the "fully doxastic" connections between beliefs and 
beliefs that we call 'reasons' ' (ibid.: 91 ). but he nowhere offers a 
satisfactory account of these 'half-doxastic connections', nor is there any 
easily seen way of doing so. On the account offered here, this difficulty is 
avoided, since the epistemic agent has cognitive access to his perceptual 
processes, as the mechanisms which produce his immediate beliefs, only 
through the medium of belief: the sensory provenance and immediate 
indexicality which is intrinsic to the basic belief (and markers of its 
justified status), and the warranting general belief as to the reliability of 
his perceptual processes, which disposes him to accept the 'deliverances of 
the senses', in Locke's phrase. 
How then can we counter Pollock's knock-down argument in steps 1 - 5 
above? Having deduced the contradiction that a basic belief is prima facie 
justified, premise (3), and not justified, (4), Pollock elects to drop the 
premise that it is prima facie justified, and with that, the doxastic 
assumption. But on the definition of belief developed above, it is (4) which 
should be axed, holding as it does that 'perceptual beliefs are ordinary 
physical-object beliefs, and such beliefs can also be held for non-perceptual 
reasons. If such reasons are bad reasons, the beliefs are not justified. But 
then it follows that they are not prima facie justified.' 
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Pollock's point depends on granting that the immediate experiential belief 
that p and the indirectly inferred belief that p are the same belief, and this 
in turn depends on an identification of a belief state with a sentence held 
true by S. If, as I have claimed, the identity criteria for an empirical belief 
include not only the proposition held true, but also the input and output 
conditions of the particular belief state, there cannot be any talk of an 
immediately perceived belief and an indirectly inferred belief being the 
same belief. 
A fortiori, the justification with which a basic belief is held .by S cannot be 
defeated by the lack of justification with which its content may be inferred 
by him. (Indeed it is doubtful if an agent could realistically be supposed to 
hold two such beliefs simultaneously except perhaps in very unusual 
circumstances, especially on the definition of immediate belief given here, 
that it is a doxastic state S is in while his senses are engaged by the 
objects of the belief.) With the admission that premiss (4) fails, prima facie 
justification is seen to be acceptable, and so too is the doxastic assumption. 
Prima facie justification as outlined here seems the best way in which to 
explain how it is that immediate experiential beliefs may reasonably be held 
in the absence of empirical reasons for them, and how they differ 
epistemologically from other empirical beliefs. I hope the discussion in Ch 6 
and above will have answered some of the more usual objections raised 
against this kind of justification. It is perhaps the favourite target of 
anti-foundationalist attacks, and understandably so since it is often poorly 
or perfunctorily dealt with in expositions of foundationalism. The criticism 
that 'basic' beliefs are in fact dependent upon many other beliefs of the 
agent for their justification may be conceded, with the qualification that 
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there is one important class of beliefs, viz., empirical beliefs, from which 
they are quite independent and that in respect of their empirical 
justification, they are determined by no beliefs, but a causal physical array. 
It is impossible to make a sound case for prima facie justification in a 
sentential epistemology, since it is then vulnerable to both Pollock's 
argument from the identification of immediate and indirect beliefs and to 
BonJour's doxastic regress of justification argument. In the first case, basic 
beliefs are not different from inferential beliefs in any doxastically 
significant way, and in the second case, if there is nothing to a basic belief 
but a positive relation to a content, then there is nothing to justify the 
basic belief within itself and other beliefs must be the source of its 
justification. 
It has been the contention here that a natu'ralistic epistemology must pay 
due regard to the causal processes by which beliefs are acquired, and that 
this both implies foundationalism and provides the means of understanding 
the prima facie justification of immediate empirical beliefs. On this view, 
justification remains doxastic: nothing but a belief can act in justification 
of a belief; and it remains internal: nothing but that to which S has cognitive 
access can act in justification of a belief of his. Basic beliefs are thus 
self-justifying and self-evident. 
Notes to Chapter 7 
1. Though if the lessons of the past are to mean anything, then the 
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temptation to undertake ambitious expansionist 'logische Aufbau', or 
postivistic programmes of reduction of all knowledge to empirically 
verifiable experience, should be resisted. 
2. This is not to say that knowledge is defeasible. If the statement 'S knows 
that p at t' is true, then statements of the three conditions for knowledge 
(truth, belief, justification) in relation to S's belief that p at t, are true too. 
Lehrer (1986: 6) takes care of this requirement by putting an indefeasibility 
clause in as the fourth condition on knowledge. But the justification of a 
belief that is not knowledge, or whose knowledge status is uncertain, 
remains defeasible. 
3. Perhaps we should reiterate here that the sensory character of basic 
belief is present in the phenomenal sense-specific imaging of perceptual 
experience, and reflects the essential role of the sensory mechanisms in 
conveying information to S about his immediate environment (the 
here-and-now fact that p). 
4. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the naturalistic and the sceptical 
attitudes towards justification are mutually exclusive. 
5. Thus BonJour (1985: 112 - 113) tries to explain observation beliefs 
within a coherentist account of justification by distinguishing 'two quite 
different senses in which a belief may be classed as "inferential" or 
"non-inferential". In the first place, there is the question of how the belief 
was arrived at ... but second, there is also the quite distinct issue of how 
the belief in question is epistemically justified or warranted ... why couldn't 
a belief which originated in some non-inferential way be justified or 
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warranted only by appeal to coherence with the rest of the system of 
beliefs?' (his italics). 
Chapter 8 - Two competing views of prima facie justification 
I have defended a version of prima facie justification for immediate beliefs 
which relies upon the sensory character and origins of such belief to provide 
the distinguishing marks and truth-warranting features necessary for 
successful justification, a version which is in accord with the naturalistic 
emphasis on causal conditions as important for epistemic, and especially 
empirical epistemic, justification. Bearing this in mind, it is instructive to 
make a comparative assessment of the views of Chisholm and Pollock on 
prima facie justification. I find that Pollock's is the preferable view, and that 
he too combines the core notion of subjective reasonableness with a reliance 
on objective justificatory features {specifically, the truth-conducive origins) 
of belief which is justified prima facie. Chisholm, on the other hand, 
identifies prima facie justification entirely with defeasibility, and makes no 
mention of the objective likelihood of truth. 
8.1 An initial distinction 
Prima facie justification is usually assumed to be a perspicuous notion, not 
standing in need of explanation. There are (to my knowledge) no 
well-developed theories of prima facie justification in the literature, and the 
two competing definitions compared here have been inferred (though 
justifiably, as believe the supporting quotations will show) from rather 
oblique textual evidence. Pollock (1974:31 et seq. and 1986: 29 et seq.), with 
his definition and discussion of prima facie justification as a possible 
justificatory status of basic beliefs, an alternative to the over-strict 
incorrigibility of traditional epistemology (he decides against it in the end), 
offers a more explicit theory than Chisholm. 
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Still, according to the range of beliefs to which a philosopher is willing to 
grant a presumption of justification, and there are significant differences on 
this point, he betrays his theory of prima facie justification. Differences in 
the set of beliefs that various applications of the term pick out, entail 
differences in the kind of justification involved, so that even if one keeps an 
open mind on whether prima facie justification as such might have a 
substantive character that called for explanation, it 1s instructive to compare 
the conditions for its attribution which emerge from the different fields in 
which it is taken to hold. 
There is one main divide among these, into what may be called the subjective 
or doxastic view, on which all beliefs, simply in virtue of being held 
undefeated, have a presumption of justification in their favour, and the 
epistemic or objective view, on which it is only those beliefs which are 
universally agreed to be justified by objectively recognizable features, which 
enjoy prima facie justification. 
The idea of the prima facie in general is, as we have seen, of something 
evident at first blush, immediately obvious 'on the face of it', but something 
which may very well prove on investigation not to have been the case. In the 
context of the epistemic justification of empirical belief, prima facie 
justification is immediately evident in those beliefs which have it. There is 
an epistemological presumption in favour of the justification of such beliefs; 
the term 'presumptive justification' is synonymous with 'prima facie 
justification', and 'presumably justified' with 'prima facie justified', and will 
sometimes be used as such in the following discussion. Since it is presumed 
to hold, prima facie justification does not ·rest on argument or require 
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proving, though it is always defeasible in the light of subsequent reasoning or 
evidence. 
There are two very different ways in which the claim Bp is prima facie 
justified for S at t may be taken, depending on the perspective from which 
the judgement of justifiedness is being made. They correspond with the two 
sides of the divide mentioned above. On the first interpretation, 'prima facie 
justified for S ' means that it is S and not necessarily anyone else, who 
considers the belief to be justified. The implication is that S does in fact 
hold Bp. It is not a strong judgement of justifiedness; it would not be 
inconsistent to say 'Bp is prima facie justified for S at t only because she's 
ignorant of all the evidence there is against it' - that is, it may be prima 
facie justified for S but not for a more alert epistemic agent, or on the wider 
perspective, because there are sound reasons for not believing p, which are 
not evident to S at t 1 · 
This view identifies prima facie justification very closely with the 
credibility of a proposition for S. It was referred to as the 'doxastic' view 
above since, though it is put forward in an epistemological context, it is 
strong enough to explain only why S believes as he does, and not why his 
belief might count as knowledge. On this view, a paraphrase of the claim 
above might be Bp is apparently justified for S since she holds it at 
t. 
On the second interpretation, the assessment of Bp as prima facie justified 
(for S at t) is made from the point of view of a third person who is not 
necessarily S, though it may be, but is a member of the epistemic community. 
It may be the case that S does not actually hold the belief, but his epistemic 
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situation at t is such that Bp would, on the face of it, be justified for him, or 
anyone else in his situation, were he to take it up. This judgement of prima 
facie justification gives a much stronger stamp of approval to the belief than 
the first; it marks it as a successfully justified belief which, if true, would 
qualify as knowledge (hence the reference to it in the first paragraph as an 
'epistemic' view of prima facie justification). Though such justification is 
always defeasible in principle, if it holds at t then there are no defeaters of 
it in either S's or an observer's view, at t. A paraphrase of the original 
locution on this view might be Bp is uncontroversially justified for S, 
or anyone in S's situation, at t. 
One salient difference in the two points of view (others will emerge in the 
course of the discussion) is that the first one is that of the holder of the 
belief and it gives a purely subjective view of Bp's justification; the second 
is that of the epistemic community and it gives a measure of objective force 
to the justification in question. The two are not mutually exclusive; in fact I 
shall argue that both are necessary in a proper account of the prima facie 
justification of sensory beliefs. S is quite capable of taking up a reflective 
stance towards his belief and assessing its justification on the criteria of 
the epistemic community, that is, saying why or how he believes as he does, 
so that there is a complete sense of the locution Bp is prima facie 
justified for S at t which incorporates both subjective and objective 
elements. The subjective viewpoint is distorting only when it is unreinforced 
by objective justificatory criteria, that is, when it is associated with the 
thesis that all belief is justified simply by virtue of being held. It is, 
nevertheless, often taken as the basis of attributions of prima facie 
justification in the literature. 
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8.2 Weak prima facie justification 
A definition of prima facie justification on the subjective view would look 
something like this: 
P F J 1 _ A belief Bp is prima facie justified for S at t iff he holds p 
true at t and there are no other beliefs of his at t which amount to 
not-p, or entail not-p, or defeat the belief-that-p. 
An application of this principle is to be found in Chisholm (1980: 551-2): 
[Note: Chisholm's theory of belief as property-attribution to oneself directs 
that we may read 'attribution of a property' as roughly synonymous with our 
term 'belief'.] 
'I suggest now an extremely latitudinarian principle. This is the principle that 
anything we find ourselves believing may be said to have some presumption 
in its favor - provided it is not explicitly contradicted by the set of other 
things that we believe. Hence we may say, more exactly: 
P3 For every x, if (i) x directly attributes to himself the property of being F, 
and if {ii) being F is not explicitly contradicted by the set of properties that x 
directly attributes to x, then his being x has some presumption in its favor 
for x. 
The principle may be extended to propositional belief: for every x, if x accepts 
a proposition that is not explicitly contradicted by any set of propositions 
accepted by x, then that proposition has some presumption in its favor for x.' 
Further, in defining the 'epistemically unsuspect', Chisholm writes {ibid.:552): 
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'From among those propositions that thus have some presumption in their 
favor for our subject, we may single out those that are 'epistemically 
unsuspect' or 'epistemically in the clear.' An attribution may be said to be 
epistemically unsuspect , or epistemically in the clear, for any subject, 
provided only that it is not disconfirmed by any set of properties that have 
some presumption in their favor for him' (my bold type). 
From this it appears that Chisholm considers lack of defeating beliefs to be a 
sufficient condition for prima facie justification, and to be both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for epistemic merit of any belief of S's, in S's 
estimation. There is thus a presumption in favour of the justification of any 
belief which S holds, excepting those beliefs which are overridden by other 
beliefs in his doxastic set. A belief can be unjustified only if there exist 
other beliefs in the same set which defeat it, and which are available to S at 
t, but which S has somehow failed to take into account in his acceptance of 
Bp. 
On PFJ 1 therefore, defeat is the only criterion by which epistemically bad 
beliefs can be told from good ones, and it is essential to a justified belief 
that, though not actually defeated (as the unjustified belief is) by other 
beliefs in its set, it remain always defeasible. To say that a belief is prima 
facie justified is to say no more than that its justification is liable to be 
defeated 2 . There is thus no feature of the belief itself in virtue of which it is 
justified, and all the work of ensuring that it has some epistemic merit, is 
done by the defeasibility of its justification. The next chapter deals in some 
detail with defeasibility. Here, we need mention only that all empirical belief 
is in principle defeasible in so far as it is revisable in the light of evidence; 
that any particular empirical belief of S's is defeasible both on the broad 
principle and by evidence which S actually possesses; and that defeat on the 
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narrow perspective, by 'evidence which S actually possesses', is what is 
relevant to PFJ1 . 
This means that the justification of each empirical belief of S's is a matter 
of its doxastic relations (specifically, its lack of relations to countervailing 
beliefs); further, since all and any of the beliefs which S does in fact hold are 
in principle equally defeasible, they all have the same justification 
conditions. These are the distinctive marks of coherentism - that 
justification be a matter of relations among beliefs and that no one kind of 
belief have a justificatory status any different from another. In structure, 
P FJ 1 is a coherence theory of justification. It is a negative coherence view3 
because it supposes that justification of any belief is identical with lack of 
defeating beliefs, and lack of justification with the presence of defeating 
beliefs, in the same set as it is. Moreover, it results in a variety of 
epistemological conservatism4 - S would need some reason to alter, or cease 
in, any particular beliefs but no grounds are necessary for him to continue in 
those beliefs. 
8.3 Two problems for the weak view 
There are at least two kinds of belief whose epistemic status is not 
satisfactorily explained by PFJ1 : (i) indirect empirical beliefs, or the sort of 
belief described as 'well-reasoned' in the last chapter, and (ii) beliefs which 
are arrived at via epistemically unsound means - the hunches, wishful 
thoughts, fears, etc., that get into the best regulated doxastic set under the 
guise of serious beliefs. The way in which explanation fails is instructive, 
regarding the shortcomings of the weak subjective view. 
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(i} It seems that, contrary to the claim of PFJ1 that all beliefs are correctly 
presumed justified if undefeated, we cannot say that indirect beliefs are 
prima facie justified. The crucial difficulty here is that such beliefs are 
justified only if they are held for some (positively) good reason , that is, if 
there exist relations of support between them and grounding or basing beliefs 
in the same set, and it will not do to presume them justified on the sole 
condition that they not be defeated. 
Suppose that S believes 'There is now a cat on the mat next door', and there 
are no defeating reasons available to her; is she then necessarily justified in 
the belief? No, for it could be the case that she is holding the belief on a 
whim and for no reason at all, or for no good reason. A belief about some 
unobserved state of affairs, that is, an indirect or inferential belief, ·is 
justified only in the presence of good reasons for holding it. S, from her 
perspective as holder of the belief, is justified in it only if she has both 
reason to hold it and no reason not to hold it, and she is unjustified in it if 
she has either no reason to hold it or reason not to hold it 
Still, it might be thought possible to get indirect beliefs to fit PFJ 1 and the 
negative coherence mould by collapsing the two kinds of reason, that is, by 
showing that having no (positive) reason to hold Bp is the same as having a 
(negative) reason not to hold it It might be argued that if S holds a belief 
about some unobserved empirical state of affairs on a whim, then he does 
thereby have reason not to believe it, a defeating reason. The fact that the 
belief is not based on adequate grounds is available to him on reflection, if he 
pauses to think about it, and that surely gives him a reason to think he should 
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not hold it. Any violation of the broad epistemic principle that indirect 
beliefs require positive grounding in reasons is ipso facto accompanied by a 
reason for not so believing. Thus S is unjustified in holding an inferential 
belief only when he has reason not to hold it and this would seem to make 
inferential beliefs prima facie justified too. 
I shall leave aside for the moment the problematic issue of how general 
epistemic rules might enter S's doxastic set or be available to him as 
defeaters. In the next chapter it is squarely addressed and in (ii) below the 
point is made that if the judgement of prima facie justification is made only 
by the holder of the belief, as PFJ 1 would suggest, then certain defeating 
reasons, i.a. those stemming from the broad perspective, are automatically 
excluded. There is a more obvious difficulty for the conflationary argument to 
prove indirect belief prima facie justified. 
To accept this argument for the conflation of inadequate and negative 
reasons, and to say that S's having no reason to believe that p, implies that S 
has reason not to believe p, is just to affirm the principle that S's having no 
reason not to believe that p (where p is some unobserved empirical state of 
affairs) is sufficient reason for him to believe that p. 'If S has no grounds 
for an indirect belief, then he has a defeater of it' is equivalent to 'If 
S has no defeater of an indirect belief, then he has grounds for it'. 
This is clearly an undesirable epistemic rule, sanctioning as it does any wild 
or whimsical belief so long as it is not defeated by other beliefs of its holder. 
It runs counter to intuitions about what good reasons for holding an indirect 
empirical belief are. If S, on being asked why he believed there was a cat on 
the mat in the room next door, replied 'There's no reason why I shouldn't', it 
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would not normally be thought a very satisfactory reply. The equivalence set 
out above shows moreover that one cannot make the need for grounding 
reasons disappear when the justification of inferential beliefs is at issue. To 
identify the absence of grounds with a defeater is tacitly to acknowledge that 
grounds are essential to indirect belief, and hence that it is not prima facie 
justified, at least in the weak sense of that term. 
So there is at least one exception to the claim of PFJ1 that every kind of 
belief is prima facie justified for S, an exception that rests on the fact that 
there is a general rule about the conditions under which S can properly hold an 
indirect belief, that is, there are criteria for justification independent of 
(though they may be contingently within) S's subjective viewpoint. 
(ii) In the case of some paradigmatically unjustified doxastic states like 
hunches, wishful or fearful thoughts, and fanatical convictions, it happens 
that the justificatory criteria which are independent of S's viewpoint, are 
also necessarily external to it. This has the undesirable result that on PFJ1 
patently unjustified beliefs have the same justificatory status as 
well-formed beliefs. 
In the case of normal empirical beliefs, if some proposition p is believed by 
S, it follows that she judges p to be true and not not-p. In S's judgement 
therefore, there are no defeaters of Bp in his doxastic set at t, and this would 
seem to suggest that, in some restricted sense, defeaters are not available to 
her if she holds Bp true. Perhaps an ideally rational agent would always be 
conscious of other beliefs of hers relevant to Bp, especially defeating beliefs, 
but then she would not come to hold Bp in the first place. So we may say that 
Chapter 8 - Two competing views of prima facie justification 21 o 
in according credibility to p at t, S shows not only that there were no 
defeaters of Bp of which she actually availed himself at t, she shows also 
that on the perspective of one who judges p true, that is, for a believer of p, 
there are no potential defeaters of Bp. This is trivially true of any belief of 
S's. 
For instance, S believes that there is ice-cream in the fridge. He arrived at 
this idea by a process of wishful imagining, and it has turned into a belief 
only because he has succeeded in obliterating its shaky origin from his 
consciousness. His forming and maintaining the belief depend essentially upon 
his having forgotten this fact, so that from his perspective as subject of the 
belief, the defeating belief is not, ex hypothesi, available to him. An 
unfortunate corollary of this principle that defeaters are not in practice 
available within the purview of someone committed to the truth of a 
proposition is that the greater the commitment, the less accessible are the 
defeaters. To the fanatic who believes an extensive and coherent system of 
very dubious propositions, defeaters are virtually unthinkable, and the 
stronger his convictions, the more remote is the possibility of defeat. It 
follows that on PFJ 1 the wishful thought or fanatical conviction is prima 
facie justified for S at t. 
All that this shows, of course, is that PFJ1 needs supplementing with some 
statement of what constitutes availability of defeaters. There are two ways 
in which S might try to gain access to the defeaters which are not available 
on the perspective of the holder of the belief: he could acquire new beliefs, 
fresh evidence which shows that Bp is not likely to be true (he opens the 
fridge), or he could put a question mark on p, that is, conscientiously assume 
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a critical, reflective position with regard to Bp and any of his beliefs which 
might be relevant to it. The first method is not certain, and with the second, 
S suspends his commitment to the truth of p and thus quits the subjective 
viewpoint of PFJ 1 for that of a member of the epistemic community. 
In looking to fresh evidence for defeaters (the first method), the assumption 
is that an. unjustified belief, one not likely to be true, will be revealed as 
such to S in the course of time and further experience 5 . However, there is no 
certainty of defeat for a wishful belief or the like. Circumstances might 
conspire to shield the lucky guess or wish from discovery; someone might 
. have put a tub of icecream in the fridge by the time S opens the door, so that 
his wishful belief never gets defeated - nothing ever enters his doxastic set 
which might lead him to doubt Bp. In such a case, its justificatory status 
according to PFJ 1 is exactly the same as that of a soundly-acquired sensory 
or memory belief. It is plainly an undesirable result for any theory of 
epistemic justification that it be non-discriminative between epistemically 
good and bad beliefs, so it seems that the second method - conscientious 
application of epistemic criteria - is the alternative to investigate. 
In general, what these two difficulties for the weak subjective view of prima 
facie justification show, is that if any principle is to be effective in an 
epistemological context, it must include more than just the reasons that a 
holder of a belief may have for or against it. 
8.4 The objective sense of prima facie justification 
This is the view on which only certain kinds of beliefs, the patently 
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well-formed or evidently justified beliefs, are correctly presumed to be 
justified. If a particular belief is of a kind which enjoys some characteristic 
justification, and there are no obvious ways in which it deviates from the 
standards of its kind, then on the face of it, it will be justified. The 
statement 'Bp is prima facie justified for S at t', on the strong or objective 
reading, means that S's epistemic circumstances are such that the belief Bp, 
whatever kind it may be, is obviously justified for her in those 
circumstances, whether she holds it or not. 'Prima facie justified' in this 
sense would apply to all standard sensory, memory and interoceptive beliefs 
held in the right contexts, as well as to inferential beliefs based on explicit 
or implicit reasons. 
In fact, any belief which is produced by one of the recognized sources of 
epistemically good beliefs has some presumption in favour of its 
justification and so is prima facie a justified belief for an observer, or for S 
herself when she slips into judicial or reflective mode regarding some belief 
of hers. 6 
If we take the field of prima facie justification to be beliefs of this sort, the 
following definition emerges: 
P F J 2 - Prima facie justification is defeasible justification which 
obtains in any single belief Bp held justifiedly by S at t in the 
absence of empirical reasons adducible by him in relation to Bp, 
and which is proper to all beliefs which may be so held. 
In the definition, 'justifiedly' is preferred to 'justifiably' because the latter 
suggests the process of justifying which consists in adducing reasons 
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(justifiable = able to be justified), and the possibility of this process is 
excluded in the case of prima facie justification, at least for S. 
'Empirical reasons' relating to Bp are of two kinds: (i) beliefs of S which give 
him reason to think that p is the case; reasons supporting Bp, and (ii) beliefs 
of S which give him reason to doubt that p is the case; reasons defeating Bp. 
'Adducible' is meant to suggest that they be within his cognitive perspective 
at t, and not be remote possible reasons, adducible only after S has acquired 
them. If he doesn't have them at t, they are not reasons adducible in relation 
to Bp at t. 
The last clause points to the fact that it is only certain kinds of belief which 
enjoy prima facie justification, kinds identifiable by S himself or a third 
party, viz., beliefs held in the presence of a relevant perceptual or 
interoceptive experience, or memory. The third party - S himself qua member 
of the epistemic community - could give some reasons as to why the belief is 
justified by referring to the kind of belief it is, though these would not be 
empirical reasons. 
An application of PFJ2 is to be found in Pollock (1974:31) - 'The basic idea 
behind the concept of a prima facie justified belief is that there is a "logical 
presumption" in favor of the belief's being justified. If a belief is prima facie 
justified, one does not need a reason for believing it , but it may be possible 
to have a reason for disbelieving it'. In a later version (1986:29) - ' ... one 
must be able to hold basic beliefs justifiably without having reasons for 
them, but reasons could still be relevant in a negative way by making one 
unjustified in holding such a belief when he has a reason for thinking it false. 
This is captured by the following definition: "A belief is prima facie justified 
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for a person S if and only if it is only possible for S to hold the belief 
unjustifiedly if he has reason for thinking he should not hold the belief 
(equivalently, it is necessarily true that if S holds the belief and has no 
reason for thinking he should not then he is justified in holding the belief)".' 
What range of beliefs does this definition pick out? Indirect beliefs, for a 
start, are excluded. To run one through the second part of the definition: it is 
not necessarily true that if S holds the belief 'The cat is now on the mat next 
door', and has no reason for thinking he should not then he is justified in 
holding the belief, because the positive support of grounds is necessary for 
such a belief's justification. If S has no reason to think this state of affairs 
obtains next door, then he is not justified in thinking it. Hunches, wishful 
thoughts and other disreputable doxastic states are also excluded, not on the 
uncertain and sometimes impossible condition of S having defeaters of them, 
but because they are generally recognized as an unjustified kind of belief. 
A sensory belief which (as we have seen) is held for no prior reasons, and 
which is always open to correction in the light of further experience, would 
seem a likely candidate for prima facie justification in this sense. It is not 
the only kind of non-inferential empirical belief, acquired in the absence of 
prior reasons. Remembered beliefs and beliefs about states of our own bodies, 
have also an immediate or groundless character, and so they too would, if 
justified, seem to be prima facie justified. These three kinds of belief may be 
put together under the single classification of 'experiential beliefs'; beliefs 
which S is inclined to treat as justified and acceptable though he has no 
positive reasons for doing so, and which he may reject in the light of 
overriding reasons 7. 
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So though Pollock's position, as set out in the above quotations, may seem at 
first glance to be a reiteration of PFJ 1 , it is not. The essential difference is 
that Pollock leaves room for criteria of justification which are independent 
of the lack of defeaters, while on PFJ 1 justification is constituted by that 
lack. 
It is instructive to compare Pollock and Chisholm on this point. A rough 
paraphrase of Chisholm's claim (1980:552): 'An attribution may be said to be 
epistemically unsuspect , or epistemically in the clear, for any subject, 
provided only that it is not disconfirmed by any set of properties that have 
some presumption in their favor for him' would be 'A belief is prima facie 
justified for S iff it is not defeated by other beliefs of his'; of 
Pollock's (1986:29): 'A belief is prima facie justified for a person S if and 
only if ... it is necessarily true that if S holds the belief and has no reason for 
thinking he should not, then he is justified in holding the belief', a rough 
paraphrase would be 'A belief is prima facie justified for S iff when 
he holds it undefeated then necessarily he is justified in it'. 
In the first, Chisholm is giving an explication of justification of a certain 
kind. Neither the term 'justification' nor any of its cognates occurs in the 
explicans, which is a statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
prima facie justification. This is not the case in the second quotation. Here, 
Pollock is saying when justification is a prima facie attribute of a belief. 
There is mention in the explicans of a justification which necessarily obtains 
whenever a certain kind of belief is undefeated, but it is not constituted by 
lack of defeaters. The point is that on PFJ2 , much stronger criteria, 
independent of the subjective perspective, are appealed to. Defeasibility 
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alone is not enough for justification, and this avoids the weaknesses of PFJ 1 . 
The view expressed in PFJ2 is a variety of foundationalism regarding the 
structure of empirical justification. At least, one individually necessary 
feature of any foundations theory is explicitly stated in the definition - that 
there be certain beliefs which are successfully justified in virtue of features 
which are not doxastic, that is, in the absence of supporting beliefs. PFJ2 
says nothing explicit about the second individually necessary (and, with the 
first, jointly sufficient) condition for any foundations theory, that the beliefs 
so justified should have the capacity for serving as justification for all other 
empirical beliefs of S. Nevertheless, if it can be shown that the justification 
adumbrated in PFJ2 is epistemically satisfactory, and that it does in fact hold 
in at least the case of sensory belief, which is all that I wish to do in this 
thesis, then we shall incidentally have gone some way also towards 
establishing a foundational thesis regarding the structure of empirical 
knowledge. 
The significance of these features of prima facie justification for the case of 
sensory belief is that they support the naturalistic view which assumes the 
necessity of objective warranting features in any justified belief. Briefly, 
however, by holding sensory belief to be justified in the sense of PFJ2 , we 
allow that it is justified simpliciter: on the subject's perspective, in the 
absence of grounds and defeaters, and on the wider perspective, by the 
character of the belief's producing mechanism. 
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Notes to Chapter 8 
1. The differences between potential and actual defeat, kinds of defeat, and 
what should count as a defeater, are addressed in the next chapter. 
2. There is certainly a tendency to equate 'prima facie justification' with 
'defeasible justification' in the literature. Moser, using the term to 
characterize apparently good reasons, says (1985:4) - 'Yet we should 
recognize from the start that all good reasons may be prima facie reasons. 
That is, they may be defeasible in the sense that they can lose their 
justificational efficacy once one acquires certain additional reasons.' Alston 
consistently uses 'prima facie' in this weak sense, as synonymous with 'liable 
to fail or be overridden'. The following (1989:238) is representative - 'Being 
based on an adequate ground is sufficient only for prima facie justification, 
justification that may be nullified by sufficient overriding reasons ... ' And 
Dancy (1985:64) speaks of ' ... some beliefs which are ... fully justified unless 
something arises to defeat their justification. We could call this a 
'defeasible' or 'prima facie' justification.' 
3. Pollock (1986:72) gives the following exposition of the kind of theory under 
consideration - 'Some coherence theories take all beliefs to be prima facie 
justified. According to these theories, if one holds a belief, one is 
automatically justified in doing so unless he has a reason for thinking he 
should not All beliefs are "innocent until proven guilty". This is the view 
expressed by the Neurath metaphor. According to theories of this sort, 
reasons function in a negative way, leading us to reject beliefs but not being 
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required for the justified acquisition of belief. I call these negative 
coherence theories ' In 1979:105-111, Pollock points out the similarity 
between this variety of coherentism and classical foundations theories, and 
offers 'a defense of a particular negative coherence theory'. Foley (1987:31 0) 
remarks that 'in contrast to standard coherence theories, so-called negative 
coherence theories ... imply that any proposition believed by S is 
epistemically rational for him provided that the other propositions he 
believes do not support its negation.' 
4. As any weak or 'latitudinarian' principle of justification is likely to. See 
the discussion of Chisholm in Foley 1987:281, for an analysis of why this 
variety of epistemic conservatism fails. 
5. There is something of a pragmatic theory of justification associated with 
the view that justification consists in nothing but lack of defeaters, and it is 
vulnerable to the same kind of criticism that is effective against all 
pragmatic theories, viz., that justification is not to be identified with 
practical success or lack of defeat, though they may be co-extensive. There is 
some logically prior feature of the belief in virtue of which its pragmatic 
success or lack of defeat is to be explained, and this is its justification. 
6. On one recent account, Audi 1988:8-64, the 'sources of belief, justification 
and knowledge' are just these four: perception, memory, introspection and 
reason. Audi does not limit his enquiry to empirical belief, but it seems these 
four are also all sources of empirical belief, justification and knowledge, and 
the only sources. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the set of 
empirical belief is closed under perception and reasoning, interoception being 
a special case of sensory experience and memory not being a source of new 
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beliefs. But as far as justification and so too knowledge go, all four figure as 
sources. Though only sensory belief and its justification is at issue in this 
thesis, much of what will be claimed of it is applicable in the cases of 
memory and interoceptive beliefs too. Perception, interoception and memory 
are conscious, belief-producing bodily states, so that though there are 
problems special to each, there is also much that applies mutatis mutandis to 
all of them. 
7. As Carruthers, 1992:2, points out, there is an empiricist tradition on which 
experience may be 'understood broadly to include both memory and 
introspection'. 
Chapter 9 .. Defeasibility 
There are (at least) two problematic issues attached to the notion of 
defeasibility that any theory of prima facie justification must face. Firstly, 
there is an apparent inconsistency in the naturalistic conception of 
immediate justification which needs to be explained. If a belief is corrigible 
and revisable in the light of negative or defeating evidence, as the modest 
foundationalist claims basic beliefs are, then there seems to be a sense in 
which it is dependent upon positive evidence, and so upon the other beliefs in 
an epistemic system, for its justification. But this is something which a 
basic belief may not be, on pain of losing its claim to being foundational. 
Conversely, if a belief is truly independent of all other beliefs in S's doxastic 
system, then it would seem to be insulated from evidential connections, and 
so indefeasible, in the manner of classical foundational beliefs. Corrigibility 
and independence seem mutually exclusive. 
Secondly, the possibility of defeasibility depends on a basic belief's having 
the potential for being unjustified, and it is not clear that any immediate 
empirical belief can be unjustified. If any sensory content is marked as 
warranted, and so is prima facie justified, for S, then how is it possible for S 
ever to be unjustified in holding an experiential content? If there is no such 
thing as an unjustified basic belief, then we can hardly talk of a justified one 
either and the whole notion of basic justification falls away. 
Before coming to an explanation of these two apparent difficulties, and in 
order to understand the justificatory status of basic beliefs in a modest 
foundationalism, we need first to get clear the relations among certain 
significant terms. 
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9.1 Three levels of epistemic appraisal 
There is a large number of terms which are distinctively epistemic. Thus 
Goldman (1987: 92): 'Obviously, an exhaustive list cannot be given, but here 
are some examples: "justified", "warranted", "has (good) grounds", "has reason 
(to believe)", "knows that", "sees that", "apprehends that", "is probable" (in an 
epistemic or inductive sense), "shows that", "establishes that", and 
"ascertains that".' Being epistemic, such terms are all normative in their 
application, but among them there are those which are specifically terms of 
appraisal, and it is with these that the theory of justification is concerned. A 
(non-exhaustive) list would include 'justifiable', 'unlikely', 'reliable\ 
'reasonable', 'credible', 'indubitable', 'certain', 'corrigible', 'apparent', 'prima 
facie', 'evident', 'infallible', 'revisable', 'apodictic*, 'demonstrable', 
'acceptable', 'doubtful', 'probable', 'defeasible', and of course the opposites of 
all these words. They mark the epistemic properties that a proposition, or a 
belief, or a believer may be said to possess. 
Any general taxonomy of these terms would be an ambitious project, but it is 
necessary just to draw attention to what seems to be an important 
hierarchical distinction among them, or at least among the three of them for 
which I shall argue: 'acceptable', 'justifiable', and 'defeasible'. If it holds for 
these three, the distinction should be of more general application, but I shall 
not try to establish it here. 
If we suppose that the terms 'acceptable', 'justifiable' and 'defeasible', apply 
loosely to the intentional state of believing, that an epistemic agent S is in 
at t, then it would seem that they apply in different ways. It is a proposition 
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that is acceptable or unacceptable for S at t 1 , and what is justifiable or 
unjustifiable is his acceptance, denial or witholding of it. This means that S 
must have taken up a doxastic attitude with respect to p before there is the 
possibility of justification (or disproof); the predicate 'is justified' applies 
to the holding true of some sentence. There is at least this priority of 
acceptance over justification, then, that the second presupposes the first. 
Similarly, the application of the term 'defeasible' makes sense only when its 
object is a justified belief. It is justification (and with it, acceptance) that 
may be defeated by new evidence, since one cannot speak of defeasibility 
with respect to a proposition which is unjustified for S, one which he is 
merely entertaining. We may say that it is a content that is acceptable for S 
at t, the acceptance of a content that is justifi8:ble or reasonable for S at t, 
and the justification of the acceptance of a content that is defeasible for S at 
t. 
Notice that justification may be found wanting in one or both of two ways: it 
may fail subjectively for S, as when S remembers a countervailing fact he had 
forgotten in coming to hold Bp, and then S will give up Bp or at least modify 
the credibility he accords p; and it may fail intersubjectively, as when an 
observer declares S's justification for Bp at t to be inadequate, perhaps 
because he realizes S has overlooked or neglected to acquire countervailing 
evidence. It is only the first case we are calling 'defeated' justification. The 
second is a case of objectively unjustified belief in which S's subjective 
justification is not necessarily defeated. 
To put the three different levels in more concrete terms: S, in the course of a 
visual experience, comes to believe (accepts) that there is an apple on the 
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table. She is justified in the belief (acceptance of the content), always 
assuming of course that she is aware of no countervailing reasons. Her 
justification is defeasible by new evidence. The three levels of epistemic 
appraisal terms are quite plain in this example. An empirical content must be 
accepted in order to be justified, and justified in order to be defeated. 
There are some significant conclusions to be drawn from the hierarchy just 
described for the case of foundational beliefs. First, it draws a distinction 
between acceptance of a content and the justification or acceptability (in the 
wide sense and not just for S) of the belief, and thereby affirms the 
possibility of an unjustified immediate belief. An experiential content may be 
accepted and maintained by S without justification, for instance when she 
sees what looks like a barn from the highway and, forgetting what she has 
been told about this being barn-facsimile country, believes that it is a barn. 
Then, it is often assumed that if an empirical belief, and especially a basic 
belief, is allowed to be corrigible, revisable, or its justification in any way 
defeasible, then this in some sense makes it epistemically suspect. It is 
rather the case that if (the justification of) a basic belief is allowed to be 
defeasible, then the basic belief must be justified. 
Lastly, the distinction of these epistemological levels confirms the 
naturalistic principle that the proper object of justification is the whole 
psychological state of belief. There seems to be a growing realization, 
perhaps fostered indirectly by issues like Kripke's 'puzzle about belief' and 
the reference of indexicals, that what is justified is not a proposition, or at 
least not a Fregean proposition, but a content defined by a history and a 
potential output, that is, a doxastic state 2 . 
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9.2 Defeasibility and foundational status 
There are two requirements for basic empirical belief: (i) A particular, 
current, empirical fact is presented to S's consciousness (not necessarily in 
the form of a phenomenological image) through the medium of his senses; (ii) 
there is no awareness on S's part of any undermining evidence, or any 
untoward circumstances in the causal complex which resulted in his present 
state of mind, which would have the effect of rousing his suspicions 
concerning the perception and perhaps defeating the prima facie justification 
of the belief. Given these two conditions, S will usually accept the fact so 
presented 3 . 
If these are the actual conditions for the holding of basic beliefs, then, in the 
spirit of a naturalistic epistemology, this is where we must look for their 
justification and for the defeaters of justification as well. The two 
conditions represent two aspects of prima facie justification; its positive 
and negative aspects, one might say. The positive reasons which S has for 
accepting a basic belief have already been dealt with in some detail; in brief, 
a basic belief is justified for an agent at a time in virtue of the agent's 
recognition that it is a basic belief, i.e., that it has sensory character and 
immediate indexicality. 
Negatively, the justification of a basic belief is not defeated for S at t iff he 
has no reason not to hold it. Some epistemologists identify prima facie 
justification tout court with this lack of defeating evidence: 'A belief is 
prima facie justified tor a person S if and only if it is only possible for S to 
hold the belief unjustifiedly if he has reason for thinking he should not hold 
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the belief (equivalently, it is necessarily true that if S holds the belief and 
has no reason for thinking he should not then he is justified in holding the 
belief' (Pollock, 1986: 29}. But this is to neglect the deontological, 
warranting and 'distinct marks' requirements on any satisfactory account of 
justification. 
Possible defeaters, or the reasons that S might have for not holding an 
empirical content, may be looked at under the rubric of the dependence · 
relations of empirical belief. It will first be necessary to show briefly how 
these relations play a role in the justification of any empirical belief before 
coming to the question of defeat of justification. If the account in Chapter 5 
was correct in canvassing the epistemologically significant determinants of 
such belief, then S's reasons for holding Bp at t cannot come from outside 
these base realms. It was suggested there that the two main bases, apprising 
conditions and theoretical beliefs, might both play a role in the justification 
of a particular empirical belief. In different ways, they both provide S with 
reasons for believing as he does. If he were asked to justify his belief, he 
would be able to do so by referring to the apprising conditions of his belief or 
to the semantic beliefs in terms of which he conceives its content or to the 
probabilifying beliefs which make it most likely true. They all give him rather 
different kinds of grounds for thinking that p is the case, and the contention 
will be that it is only apprising conditions that are properly called 'empirical 
justification'. 
An agent may adduce, firstly, what might be called 'semantic reasons' for 
holding just the particular belief that he does, where these reasons consist in 
the agent's beliefs concerning the meaning of the words which describe his 
experiential belief, and their aptness for that task. For instance, on being 
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asked why he believes that there is a red geranium on the windowsill, S might 
reply that the colour of the flowers in front of him is just what is called 
'red'; or he might say that geraniums have that characteristically-shaped 
fuzzy leaf; or he might offer any of a very large number of reasons which 
would have this in common, that they referred to the semantic content of the 
belief. Semantic justification derives from the fact that any particular belief 
is individuated in terms of its relations to whatever other concepts and 
beliefs an agent possesses, and an agent in adducing it as justificatory, is 
appealing to the shared semantic network of the epistemic community for 
ratification of his reading of the apprising conditions. Such justification 
when offered in defence of a basic belief, is not empirical justification since 
it has nothing to do with the sensory acquisition of the belief. 
A useful way of determining whether reasons of some kind are empirical 
justifiers or not, is to ask if the epistemic agent could have those reasons 
and not have the belief that they are offered in support of. If the answer is 
'Yes', then those reasons do not function as empirical justifiers. It is plain 
that S has many beliefs about flowers, colours, windowsills, spatial 
relations, etc., all the beliefs that he may offer as semantic justification for 
his belief that there is a red geranium on the windowsill and which are 
presupposed for the semantic interpretation of the belief, without having the 
belief that there is a red geranium on the windowsill. Semantic reasons are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the generation and justification of 
an immediate belief. Kornblith, who calls this kind of reason 'background 
beliefs' describes their non-empirical role thus: they 'do not appear on the 
justificatory tree tracing the etiology of the belief in question' (1987: 121), 
and so do not provide positive support for it, but they are nevertheless 
relevant, often in a negative way, to its general justificatory status. 
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Secondly, an agent may adduce probabilifying beliefs in defence of her holding 
a particular belief Bp. These are the theoretical beliefs which bear in some 
way or other on the likely truth of p, perhaps being about the statistical 
probability of p's in that context, or the kind of causal circumstances in 
which Bp arose, or the reliability of the sort of process by which it was 
produced. The automatic acceptance of a basic belief always occurs in the 
doxastic context of a presupposed set of theoretical background beliefs with 
which it must be consistent. Once again, as with semantic beliefs, the 
possession of such a set is compatible with the agent's not having the basic 
belief in question, and therefore background beliefs do not function as 
empirical justifiers. 
The third kind of reason that an epistemic agent might give in support of her 
belief that p at t, are empirical reasons, which refer in some way to the 
apprising conditions of Bp. If it is a basic belief that she is justifying, then 
there will not be much she can say in its defence, beyond referring in various 
ways to the sensory causal history and immediately indexical character of 
the belief itself. Immediate empirical justification has been discussed in the 
section above on prima facie justification. If it is an inferential belief that 
she is justifying, then the reasons that S will give as its empirical 
justification (as has already emerged in the test for semantic and 
probabilifying reasons), will be whatever gives her reason to think that p is 
the case. Empirical reasons are, like S's general theoretical reasons, 
essential to her belief that p in that she could not have come to believe that p 
if she had not had these reasons (or others of equal force). 
But, unlike theoretical reasons, S's having of empirical reasons guarantees 
that she will believe p (if, as we assume, she is rational). The 
Chapter 9 - Defeasibility 228 
foundationalist's claim is simply that in respect of its empiric a I 
justification, a basic belief is independent of any other belief. This claim 
explains also how it is that an immediate belief may be defeasible and yet 
independent - the class of defeaters originates from within that of general 
theoretical beliefs, though it is not identical with it. We may look to the 
hierarchy of epistemic appraisers established earlier for confirmation of 
this; defeaters apply to the justification of a belief rather than to its 
acceptance and are therefore not themselves justifying reasons. If S can be 
shown that it is not a geranium but a pelargonium, the she will cease to hold 
Bp. A reason like 'No one else here can see a red geranium on the windowsill' 
may defeat empirical justification because it makes the truth of the basic 
belief less likely. 
We may define a defeater roughly as follows: if S holds the justified Bp at t, 
any belief (Bd} that is in S's doxastic set at t and that, in conjunction with S's 
full set of reasons for Bp, causes S to hold 8-p, is a defeater of the 
justification of Bp 4 . Seeing that, on a functionalist view, any empirical 
belief is to a large extent its apprising conditions, since it is defined and its 
psychological type is fixed in terms of them, it is not possible for apprising 
conditions to defeat justification. 
Of course, S may hold Bp true of c at t. and at t + 1, hold Bq true of c, but then 
p's and q's apprising conditions are quite different and they are quite 
different beliefs. We might sat that Bq has superseded Bp, perhaps that the 
belief itself has been corrected, but it is not the defeat of justification as 
defined above. Only background beliefs 5 may act as reasons to defeat any 
justification, and since they are not empirical reasons as defined, the 
foundationalist's claim of the empirical independence of basic beliefs is not 
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disturbed by his admission of the defeasibility of all empirical belief. 
9.3 The possibility of unjustified immediate beliefs 
As was claimed above, if an agent believes seriously and in the absence of 
vitiating background beliefs, he is thereby assured of believing reasonably in 
a subjective sense. This is not enough for an objective judgement of 
reasonableness to be accorded the belief though; for that, an observer who is 
cognizant of S's mental states and circumstances, or S himself in a judicious 
attitude, must assess the belief epistemically, its causal history, character, 
and its relations to other beliefs actually or possibly in S's doxastic set. This 
is a rather formal way of speaking about what is common and inconspicuous 
practice among epistemic agents, evinced in idioms like 'should realize that', 
'can't seriously think that', 'could have seen/ heard/ smelt/etc that', 'must 
remember that', and so on. 
It seems that the justified belief is allowed to pass without comment and 
assessment is vocalized only when S falls short in his epistemic 
responsibilities. It is thus quite possible and, to judge by the prevalence of 
the censorial idioms, quite common for an agent to believe seriously, in the 
epistemic sense, and with a sufficient measure of subjective reason to 
ensure acceptance of the content, and yet not to satisfy the objective 
standards of justified belief. 
When might the sensory mode of presentation and immediate indexicality of a 
content fail to justify S in accepting it? Just in case he has reason to think 
the physical causal array which determines the belief is less than 
trustworthy, is off-key or non-standard in some way. These reasons may be 
antecedent to or arise concomitantly with the experience. In the first case, 
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although the experience may be phenomenologically indistinguishable from a 
normal perception, there exist vitiating background beliefs of which S is or 
should have been aware, such as that his colour perception is being affected 
by a recent attack of jaundice, or that he is looking at Peacocke's tromp l'oeil 
door, or the Hall of Illusions at a funfair. 
Then, there may be something fishy about the experience itself (a peculiar 
quality to it like a dimness or lights before the eyes, a penumbra, an echo to 
the sounds) which should lead S to treat the whole experience with 
circumspection. Of course it might happen that S has no reason, and cannot in 
all fairness be expected to have any reason, to suspend belief in the content 
of the experience. These are the successful cases of illusion and hallucination 
mentioned above in which S is justified in believing as he does because he is 
the unwitting dupe of mendacious conditions. 
But we should notice that he is not always and not necessarily a helpless 
victim; if he is on the alert for off-key perceptions, open to the warning signs 
which often accompany abnormal experiences; if he places a high premium on 
careful and accurate scrutiny of the environment and the acquisition of 
immediate empirical belief which is as exact a representation of its objects 
as possible; and if he takes these epistemic responsibilities seriously enough, 
then he will not be the victim of illusion as often as an agent who does not. In 
short, to the extent that he is an excellent epistemic agent who exercises the 
epistemic virtues, he is able to acquire true beliefs. 
In general though, cases of perceptual illusion are successful and thus 
underscore the principle that any content whose mode of presentation appears 
to the agent to be a normal sensory one or whose indexicality is immediate, is 
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automatically credible to him, and if it is acceptable then he is justified in 
believing it. 
Hallucination and illusion are not the only or the most common sources of 
error in sensory experience. It might happen that S goes beyond the given 
content, and so arrives at a belief with some hypothesis in it, which will be 
unjustified unless supported by other grounds. Kornblith (1987:121, in 
illustration of a rather different point) gives the example of Moe and Joe, 
both looking at an apple on the table in front of them, and both believing that 
they are looking at an apple, the typical setting for prima facie justification 
of a basic belief. Moe is in fact so justified while Joe is not, because Joe 
knows that he suffers from myopia which makes his eyes untrustworthy. 
The example is implausible for this reason: that Joe could not honestly and 
seriously come to believe there is an apple on the table in front of him if his 
eyes are truly not good enough to do so. He may choose to act as if there were 
an apple there, and even find his hypothesis confirmed by further experience, 
but there will be an element of guesswork in his belief and it is better 
described as the assumption that the reddish shape which he does seriously 
believe is before him, is an apple. Shortsightedness is precisely the inability 
to form beliefs about what one is looking at beyond a certain distance, as 
anyone with myopia will know. What Joe may well believe with conviction, in 
the epistemic sense of believing, is that there is a reddish, roundish object in 
front of him. 
The general point at issue here is that the deliverances of the senses wear 
their justification on their sleeves. An agent forms beliefs about his 
immediate environment at the direction of his senses and not by referring to 
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other of his beliefs. What he believes and how many beliefs he acquires in a 
causal experiential array is a function of those apprising conditions and 
nothing else, and if an agent does not go beyond them with assumption and 
guesswork, he is always justified in accepting the content of sensory 
experience (bearing in mind the further two qualifications mentioned above -
no vitiating background reasons and no peculiar phenomenology). 
Notes to Chapter 9 
1. The impossibility of any proposition's being justified in isolation from a 
generally intentional context, and of an empirical proposition's being 
justified in abstraction from a doxastic context, has already been argued for 
inCh. 3. 
2. See for instance BonJour (1985: 5): ' ... there are difficult problems 
concerning the concept of belief, especially pertaining to the idea that it is 
propositions which are the objects or contents of beliefs', and he refers in an 
explanatory footnote to 'the recent arguments by Perry (1979) and others 
[Lewis (1979) and Castaneda (1967)] that propositions as traditionally 
understood cannot serve as the objects of all kinds of knowledge because 
some knowledge seems to be expressible only in indexical terms' (ibid.: 230). 
3. 'Usually', because one might imagine a counterexample to the above 
generalization in which S, through some psychological quirk, doubts 
everything which he observes on, say, February 29th, or feels unsure, for no 
good reason, of everything he perceives through sunglasses, so that in spite of 
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what reason tells him, S cannot accept certain of the facts that his senses 
present him with. 
4. For more exact and carefully argued definitions, see Annis (1978: 156 -
157) and Swain (1978: 160- 183). 
5. The term is used by Kornblith (1987: 121) to refer to the class of possible 
defeaters. 
Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
The problem with which we started was the old philosophical worry about the 
security of our knowledge of the external world. Is it reasonable to hold the 
all beliefs that we do commonly hold, about the material world in our 
immediate vicinity? Are experiential beliefs about physical reality justified? 
and if so, how are they justified? There is a short answer to these questions: 
'Yes, it is reasonable to hold them because they are prima facie justified'. 
Understanding the nature of that justification, however, its relations to the 
subject of the justified belief and the adjudicators of justification in the 
persons of the epistemic community; what it says about the form of an 
immediate belief and the physical world about which the belief is, has proved 
to be not a short or simple exercise. Three main themes have been developed 
in the course of explicating a theory of prima facie justification, each with 
specific 'consequences for that theory. A summary review of these will give 
us a bird's eye view of the thesis. 
10.1 Naturalistic epistemology 
It has been the contention here that prima facie justification is best grounded 
in a naturalistic epistemology, and three main points, with significant 
consequences for the thesis, were made concerning the nature of that 
enterprise. 
10. 1. 1 Reconciliation 
A naturalistic approach should not preclude the traditional issues of 
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epistemology from being followed in a recognizably epistemological manner. 
The significance of this for the thesis is that it rules out the possibility of a 
purely externalist or reliabilist theory of justification. The traditional (and 
difficult) question has always been: 'Are we, as conscious subjects, 
reasonable in believing as we do of our environments?', and that is the 
question I have tried to address here. 
The difficulty of reconciling subjective and objective viewpoints has been 
met in various ways: taking consciousness and intentionality to be properties 
of the instantiation of brain states; taking justification to be a feature of the 
well-formed, standard belief; taking it that prima facie justification needs 
more than internal reasonableness effectively to warrant experiential 
beliefs, and that their reliable origins in neurophysiological processes must 
anchor their immediately obvious acceptability. 
10. 1.2 Realism 
The naturalistic viewpoint also mandates realism regarding justification and 
knowledge. In adopting a heuristic approach to her subject, the naturalistic 
epistemologist assumes the existence of the objects of study, and thus closes 
the door at the outset of the enterprise, on any possibility of radical 
scepticism. 
Part ·of a realistic approach is the commitment to description rather than 
prescription, to taking the average belief, case of justification, state of 
knowing, as the paradigm, rather than the idealized but unattainable model. 
The sort of justification that this thesis is about is therefore the mundane 
variety that we speak of in ordinary contexts, and attribute to ordinary 
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people. Taking the average epistemic agent rather than the ideally rational 
agent as a paradigm entails acknowledging the ubiquitous possibility of 
error, even in foundational beliefs, and this is reflected in the defeasibility 
clause in the definition of prima facie justification. Foundational beliefs are 
realistically seen as ordinary physical-fact beliefs rather than beliefs about 
the contents of experience. 
10.1.3 The physical matrix 
The naturalistic outlook is one in which the agent is conceived as an integral 
part of the material world, in constant causal interaction with it, and in 
which beliefs, especially immediate empirical beliefs, are determined 
essentially and substantially by the array of physical events upon which they 
supervene. The physical evidence for beliefs and their genesis in physical 
arrays, is epistemologically significant. 
This leads to a view of the structure of empirical justification as linear and 
to a view of experiential beliefs as justificatorily basic. Commitment to the 
causal matrix of beliefs also means allowing that the acquisition and holding 
of immediate beliefs is an involuntary matter, which supports the automatic 
acceptability of a content needed for prima facie justification, but bedevils 
the inclusion of any notion of epistemic responsibility or merit on the part of 
the agent. We tried to answer this difficulty by showing that S exhibits a 
higher-order virtue in automatically accepting sensory contents, and 
instantiating well-formed causal processes, and a first-order virtue in 
carefully and conscientiously servicing the defeasibility condition. 
10.2 Empirical belief 
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There are two main strands of argument here, each taking a premiss from the 
nature of empirical belief and drawing a conclusion for the nature of 
immediate empirical justification. 
1 0.2. 1 Sensory character 
It is the nature of immediate or experiential belief to be marked with a 
sensory character, reflecting its origins in causal neurophysiological 
processes. This acts as a marker for S of the credibility of sensory contents; 
its absence from an immediate content marks that content's unacceptability. 
This allows us to see the automatic acceptance of sensory contents as an act 
of some discernment and reasonableness. 
Further, the sensory character of immediate belief reflects the generally 
trustworthy processes by means of which it is produced. There is thus an 
objective warrant of likely truth in the sensory character of an immediate 
belief. Since S is disposed habitually to accept such contents, he evinces a 
higher-order belief that his senses are to be trusted, and this enables us to 
link the warrant of the belief to its internal reasonableness. Moreover, the 
warrant provided by its sensory origins is recognized by the epistemic 
community as such. Immediate belief with a sensory character is thus prima 
facie justified on the wider perspective too. 
1 0.2.2 Dependence relations 
The thesis of dependence relations supports the naturalistic view of belief as 
a complex psychological state defined in terms of its inputs and outputs, 
Chapter 10 - Conclusion 238 
rather than an attitude to a proposition. The corollary of this for justification 
is that the justification of beliefs resides in the web of causal and 
dependence relations in which they are defined and individuated, and not in 
propositional relations. 
The complex web of relations, to apprising conditions, semantic and 
probabilistic beliefs, in which an immediate belief stands, allows us to 
understand how it is that such beliefs may be justificatorily basic, and prima 
facie justified for their subject. They depend on no reasons in the form of 
further beliefs, in respect of their empirical justification, that justification 
essential for existential beliefs which consists in 'having reason to think 
that p is the case'. 
Prima facie justification rests largely on the possibility of defeat of 
justification. The dependency thesis substantiates this aspect of immediate 
justification by showing how background beliefs, which may act as defeaters 
of the justification of an immediate sensory belief, are to be found in the 
class of semantic and probabilistic beliefs, upon which the immediate belief 
depends for its theoretical justification. 
10.3 Criteria for prima facie justification 
There are at least four features of justification which need to be recognized 
if we are to agree that a belief is a successfully justified belief, and 
consequently, four necessary conditions for justification which any theory 
must accommodate: 
- the content of the belief must be reasonable for its subject; 
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- there must be distinguishing marks by means of which the subject and the 
epistemic community can tell a justified from an unjustified belief; 
- there must be some epistemic virtue or responsbility displayed by the 
subject in acquiring or maintaining the belief; 
- whatever it is that justifies the belief must give it some objective 
likelihood of truth. 
These conditions can be seen to have been met in the theory of the prima facie 
justification of immediate empirical belief: 
- sensory contents are automatically acceptable and reasonable for their 
subject; the immediate empirical beliefs so constituted depend on no other 
beliefs of the subject for their reasonableness; 
- their acceptability is marked for S and the epistemic community by their 
sensory character; 
- prima facie justification bears responsibilities in so far as the subject 
has to constantly be alive to defeaters of that justification, and it exhibits 
epistemic merit at the level of instantiation of well-formed experiential 
beliefs; 
- the warrant which is necessary for objectively successful justification is 
ultimately provided by the general reliability of the sensory mechanisms, and 
may be claimed as a higher-order belief of the subject's in virtue of her 
disposition to accept sensory contents as true .. 
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